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ABSTRACT 
Financial sector reform has proved to be one of the greatest challenges facing the 
members of the former Soviet Union in their transition to a market economy. Their 
central banks have played a vital role in this reform - mainly shaping developments, 
but also being shaped by them. The Ukrainian experience is by no means unique. 
Banking was given priority in the reform process in Ukraine. By granting loans on the 
basis of profitability criteria, strengthened, sound banks are to encourage companies 
to operate according to free-market principles and to assist the economic recovery 
process. 
After independence in 1991 Ukraine begin to develop its own banking system. There 
has not yet been a comprehensive study dealing with formation and function of the 
banking system of Ukraine and this thesis aims to remedy this omission. 
The major objective of this thesis is to examine and analyse the development of the 
banking system of Ukraine, its operation and its implications for a market economy. It 
also focuses upon the transformation' process necessary to bring about the required 
changes. 
The thesis presents an overview of the Ukrainian economy and its underlying 
principles; these are the corner-stone for transformation to a market economy. 
Subsequent chapters focus on Ukrainian banking and the experience of other post-
communist states. A major part of the thesis is the unique access to and interviews 
with a substantial number of senior Ukrainian bankers. 
The research shows that Ukrainian banks developed despite the burden of Soviet 
structures, inept monetary control and managements unprepared for market based 
banking. The ultimate decline of the "system" banks and the rise of commercial 
banks is highlighted and the expectations as Ukrainian banking begins the new 
millennium are outlined. 
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Introduction 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
In the early 1990s the history of financial world development changed dramatically as 
the break up of the communist-based model of social-economy in Eastern and central 
Europe accelerated. 
From the commencement of USSR President Gorbachev's "glasnosl" (openness) and 
"pereslroika" (restructuring) processes the old systems of the socialist centralized 
economy showed signs of halting or reversing development. The bad management of 
national resources aggravated this process. Despite the overall bureaucracy and 
corruption, however, post-communist countries have been going through the painful 
process of transforming their financial sector structures into a model close to that of a 
free-market economy. 
Each Eastern European country was to choose its own way of development and 
integration in the economic-political world. One of the main challenges in the 
transmission process of East and Central Europe to the market economy was the 
substitution of a centralized credit system with decentralised financial discipline. 
Typically the first step in this process was a tightening of monetary policy in order to 
control inflation (Bruno, 1992; Coricelli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1992). This also had the 
effect of inducing enterprises to substitute internal centralised financing for bank 
credit. The response to the credit tightening was disappointing. State enterprises 
responded by circumventing the liquidity ratios by accumulating trade debt to each 
other (Blejer and Gelb, 1993). These claims soon became overdue (for instance, trade 
arrears in Russia increased from 34 million to over 3 billion roubles in the first half of 
1992 (Litwak, 1994)). Arrears on bank, tax and wage obligations rose as well. In 
some countries the government resisted the pressure to provide financial relief to 
compames. As a result, output first fell sharply, but over some time the problem 
receded. 
In some other countries (including Ukraine, Russia and Romania) the governments 
decided to clear the massive amount of trade arrears by expanding credit. These 
governments were induced to act not only out of concern for the volume of arrears but 
also for the large number of companies involved. 
Following the "bailout" the level of arrears began to grow again while inflation rose 
quickly. Several countries including Russia, Ukraine and others fell into a repetitive 
cycle of credit tightening with mounting arrears, following by retlationary "bailouts" 
and high inflation. In contrast, countries such as Latvia, Estonia, Poland and the 
Czech republic, which resisted a bailout, succeeded in controlling inflation. 
The demise of several communist-led governments in Central and Eastern Europe has 
given way to an economic transformation of these nations that promised to be as 
important to the people who live there as the political transformation has been. 
These countries are trying to reduce the use of central planning and rely more on the 
behavior of firms and households operating in open markets to improve economic 
decision-making and resource allocation. However the transformation has not 
progressed as quickly or as smoothly as originally hoped. Moreover, basic policy 
disagreement continues over the pace of privatization, and the conditions under which 
foreign firms should be allowed to enter a national market or buy its existing 
companIes. 
Focus on Ukraine 
To understand better the difficulties policy makers face in reforming these economies 
this thesis focuses on economic transition and banking reform in Ukraine. 
Ukraine, the second largest republic of the former Soviet Union, was one of the most 
important producers of heavy-industry goods and food supplier for the USSR. After 
the break up of the USSR Ukraine experienced very tough changes in the economy, 
caused by the destruction of very important links between suppliers and consumers 
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within the former Soviet Union. Separating from Russia was the most serious and 
painful step in the transition to an independent economy. 
The economies of Ukraine and Russia are very intertwined, and separating them is a 
lot harder than just drawing borders. During the Soviet era Russia was Ukraine's 
principal market and the main supplier of oil and natural gas. Lacking that old 
guaranteed market and short of hard currency Ukraine's economy was in poor health 
in the early days of independence (Klebnicov, 1996). Lost markets could not, easily, 
be replaced since the EU does not need Ukrainian wheat, and the world is already 
awash with steel - Ukraine's key exports. 
Ukraine lags far behind Russia in abandoning socialism. This is largely because of 
opposition from both former communists and many nationalists who still have 
widespread popular support. Privatization in Ukraine, therefore, is proceeding at a 
very slow pace. Some of the country's most attractive enterprises are still 
goverrunent-owned. 
Since the proclamation of independence and separation from the rest of the Soviet 
Union, Ukraine decided to develop the national economy by supporting state 
enterprises through an expansionary monetary policy. Establishment of a market 
economy in Ukraine indicated that a new banking system was required. 
The old banking system was under government control of central planning and the 
state directed the distribution of funds throughout the economy with no regard for 
their most productive use. The institutional infrastructure and incentive necessary for 
decentralised credit allocation decisions based on rational economic criteria was not 
developed during Soviet rule. 
The issues Ukraine has faced in reforming its banking system are similar to those 
confronting other transition economies. The banking system emerged from the 
communist ruled world with low capital, a large portfolio of non-performing loans, no 
meaningful system of accounting and reporting, little recourse for lenders in case of 
default, little technological development and inadequately trained staff. 
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Ukrainian banking problems also bear similarities to t~ose of developed economies. 
Even though Ukraine has been making the transition toward a market economy for 
several years, the majority of its banking assets are still controlled by the state. Thus, 
deciding how and when to privatize commercial banks is a very important issue. 
However, some of Ukraine's largest banks are undercapitalised and have inadequate 
resources to address their non-performing loan problems. 
The very first stage of banking system formation in Ukraine was characterised by the 
restructuring of Soviet banks in Kiev. These newly restructured banks were given the 
key role in supplying government enterprises with required loan funds. Most of the 
government-owned companies were showing signs of problems since the Russian 
market became more selective and the volumes of supplies from Ukraine were greatly 
reduced. In order to support unprofitable enterprises and avoid budget deficit 
problems the government kept on expanding overall direct credit volume. These 
factors along with import pressure were causing a sharp devaluation of the national 
currency. This situation ended up with a huge uncontrolled cycle of hyperinflation in 
1992- I 994 until the government decided to work to eliminate the financing of budget 
expenditures by printing money. Instead it started to attract funds from international 
financial institutions. 
Many problems have retarded the improvement processes m Ukrainian banking. 
There is still unclear and unstable tax regulation in the economy and continuing 
uncertainty over the government policy of budget deficit management. The credit 
rating of Ukrainian institutions and doubt about the Ukrainian government combine to 
prevent Ukrainian banks from entering the international markets. High inflation 
expectations and the poor financial condition of many national enterprises along with 
the strict requirements of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) makes credit provision 
less profitable and more risky than inter-bank market operations. 
Development of Ukrainian banks 
This thesis seeks to shed light on the pressures and processes that have shaped the 
development of Ukrainian banking since 199 I. The thesis draws on banking 
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development literature and the limited literature on Ukraine's economy and on the 
banking system and on a unique series of interviews conducted especially for this 
research. The interviews, with senior Ukrainian bankers from Kiev and other regions, 
were undertaken between 1998 and 1999 and provide a valuable qualitative resource 
that supports the anal ysis of secondary data. 
The thesis itself is divided into six major chapters and is supported by a number of 
appendices: 
Chapter 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Description 
Introduction and background. Here the rationale for the study is 
explained and a broad description of the environment within which 
this research and the development of Ukrainian banking itself have 
been undertaken. 
The Ukraine. This chapter develops a general description of the 
Ukrainian political and economic environment. This chapter 
describes the foundation for the modern Ukrainian banking system. 
This chapter reviews literature on banking development in the UK, 
as an example of Western banking development. The Ukrainian 
banking System is compared with this development. This chapter 
describes the banking system in Ukraine in more detail and 
concentrates on the role and function of the National bank of 
Ukraine. The analysis is supported by a commentary on published 
financial data on major Ukrainian banks. 
Development in other post communist states. This chapter studies 
the economic environments of former communist states outside the 
Ukraine. It describes the main directions of market development 
and aims to compare and contrast banking system developments. 
Research methodology and findings. Here the methodology of the 
research is explained and the key findings from the research 
interviews displayed, interpreted and analysed. 
Conclusions. In this final chapter the key pressures and processes 
are highlighted and comments made about the future direction of 
Ukrainian banking. 
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Banking Development and Crisis 
The framework against which bank development in Ukraine is reviewed in this thesis 
comes from the literature concerning banking crises in developing economies. 
Banking crises have become increasingly common - especially in the developing 
world in the period since 1980. Over this period at least two-thirds of JYfF member 
countries experienced significant banking sector problems. 
There are two reasons why banking problems in the emergmg economies merit 
particular attention: first, the serious consequences for the local economies and, 
secondly, the fallout on other countries as international financial markets have 
become more integrated. Banking crises in developing countries have been far more 
severe during the past 15 years than those in industrial countries. 
Bank difficulties or failures are presumed to generate more serious negative 
externalities for the rest of the economy than those affecting either other kinds of 
financial firms or non-financial firms. Serious banking problems also create 
difficulties for monetary policy. They may not only distort the normal relationships 
between monetary instruments and the intermediate and final targets of monetary 
policy, but they also compromise the overall stance of monetary policy. 
Banking cnses In emergmg economies can also be costly for industrial countries, 
particularly as the importance of emerging countries in the world economy and 
international financial markets has grown. Developing countries nowadays purchase 
about one quarter of industrial country exports. 
It would be convenient for both diagnosis and prediction if banking crisis and banking 
risk in emerging markets could be attributed to just one or two factors. But research 
on the origins of banking crises strongly suggests that it is not the case. 
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Key risks 
In any economy banks face common risks relating to their core business and their 
position as financial intermediaries. Key risks applicable to all banks, to international 
lending and to banks in emerging economies are summarised in Figure 1.1: 
Figure 1.1 Banking Risks Summary 
BANK RISKS· INTERNATIONAL RISKS2 
• Credit Risk • Credit Risk 
• Liquidity Risk • Liquidity Risk 
• Market Risk • Interest rate/Currency Risk 
• Operating Risk 
• Reputation Risk 
• Legal Risk 
• Regulatory Risk 
• Country Risk 
EMERGING 
ECONOMY RISKS3 
• Credit Risk / Fraud 
• Maturity mismatch 
• Exchange Rate Risk 
• Weak management, 
distorted incentives 
and accounting 
weaknesses 
• Government control 
• Macroeconomic 
volatility 
Notes: 1. Federal Reserve Board Recognised Risks (Koch & MacDonald, 2000) 
2. Lewis & Davis (1987) 
3. Goldstein & Turner, (1996) 
The three "models" of risk have some striking similarities but also highlight important 
differences, especially since the risks facing developing economies, as reported to the 
BIS (Goldstein & Turner, 1996), show the key relationship between the regulator, the 
government and the banking industry. 
The main risks summarised in Figure 1.1 are now expanded upon and discussed with 
reference especially to Ukraine: 
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Credit Risk 
This relates to the quality of assets and can be influenced by general economic 
conditions, especially where loans are made into the consumer and commercial 
sectors. Government securities are generally less risky. For the purposes of this 
analysis the risk of default on commercial loans is assumed to be mainly dependent on 
the state of the Ukrainian economy. Added complexity is injected by the poor 
functioning of the legal system with respect to insolvency and bankruptcy. Ukraine 
does have a bankruptcy law, passed in 1992, but it is not often used in the resolution 
of insolvency situations. 
Credit risk can be reduced by the use of a number of strategies including the use of an 
efficient credit assessment system, experience of historic loan losses, portfolio lending 
and even syndication of larger loans. 
In Ukraine macroeconomic activity over the period 1991 to 1999 made credit risk 
assessment less accurate. This research also indicates that the legacy of bad debt 
inherited by privatised commercial banks, the lack of portfolio strategies, the dearth of 
good quality data and the weakness of management in this area also contributed to a 
heightened level of credit risk. 
Ukraine saw much "connected lending", loans extended to banks' owners or managers 
and to their related businesses. The risks inherent in this are primarily ones of lack of 
objectivity (sometimes even fraud) in credit assessment and undue concentration of 
credit risk. The failure of a few large related borrowers, or a collapse of a particular 
sector of the economy, can wipe out a bank's capital. 
Liquidity Risk 
The main risk here comes through the mismatching of maturities of assets and the 
liabilities that fund them. This too can be affected by macroeconomic conditions as 
the real value of deposits reduces and the availability of "secure" core deposits is 
minimal. 
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When domestic interest rates are high, the temptation for the banking system and bank 
customers to denominate debt in foreign currency can be particularly strong. For 
instance, banks may have recourse to short-term, foreign-currency-denominated 
borrowing in the interbank market to fund longer-term bank loans. Such strategies can 
come badly unstuck when devaluation occurs. 
A large unhedged debtor position in foreign exchange not only makes banks and their 
customers more vulnerable but also makes it harder to deal with a banking crisis once 
it occurs. 
Similarly, the risks of maturity mismatches are typically higher for banks in the 
emerging markets because the have less access to longer-term sources of funding (on 
the liability side). Typically they receive less assistance from securities markets in 
increasing liquidity and in spreading risks (on the asset side) than do banks in the 
industrial world. 
There are strategies that can be used to reduce the impact of liquidity risk such as 
good liability management and credit control. In Ukraine banks have fought hard to 
gain customer trust and acceptance in order to attract core deposits, since this is 
cheaper than borrowing from the central bank (NBU). This has resulted in a volatile 
reliance on short-term funding. 
Currency devaluation, inflation and the continuing use of non-bank alternatives for 
deposits make this risk very real for a number of Ukrainian institutions. The absence 
of securitisation of assets and syndication of lending in the Ukrainian market also 
limits the banks' abilities to reduce this risk. 
Market Risk 
Market risk refers to the actual and potential risk to earnings through shifts in interest 
rates and securities prices. The key risks considered under this heading are: 
• Security Price Risk 
• Interest Rate Risk 
• Currency / Exchange Rate Risk 
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Banks are vulnerable on a number of fronts depending on the terms and conditions 
applied to loans and deposits and the proportion held in local or foreign currencies. 
Ukrainian banks are heavily dependent on the NBU for funding as it channels State 
Savings bank deposits to the commercial sector through the medium of the discount 
or re-financing rate. These rates have proved to be volatile themselves and dependent 
on the stability of Ukraine's currency. Interbank funding is particularly susceptible to 
the same movements. 
From 1991 to 1999 Ukraine saw the value of its temporary "coupon" and replacement 
"hrivna" currencies fall dramatically. This had severe implications for those banks 
with foreign currency exposures. 
The exchange rate regime can affect vulnerability to speculative attack, it can also 
affect the way in which the real value of impaired bank assets is adjusted downwards 
and the ability of the central bank to act as lender of last resort to illiquid but solvent 
banks. 
Fixed exchange rate regimes have also been criticized for increasing the fragility of 
the banking system to external adverse shocks; it will lead to a balance-of payments 
deficit, a decline in the money supply and higher domestic interest rates. With a fixed 
exchange rate, the central bank must ensure that any liquidity it injects into the system 
to provide temporary assistance to illiquid but solvent banks does not undermine its 
exchange rate obligations. 
There are several possible policy measures that can significantly reduce the incidence 
of each of these factors underlying banking crises. Close monitoring of lending by 
weakly capitalized banks would similarly limit vulnerability to lending booms, asset 
price collapses and surges of capital inflows. Adopting a cautious attitude towards 
short-term, foreign-currency-denominated borrowing can limit banks' liquidity of 
currency mismatches and discourage runs on both bank and government liabilities. 
Several countries are going through a difficult period of banking sector restructuring, 
and are attempting to address the consequences of earlier failures of prudential 
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oversight. These failures, and the lessons learnt from banking difficulties worldwide, 
have naturally prompted national authorities almost everywhere to take a good look at 
their safeguards against banking crises and other systemic financial problems. 
Refonns need to be more widely shared and deeply rooted than was the case in the 
past. Fixing the problems of the banking sector will require a sustained commitment. 
The ways that international co-operation, in several guises, can encourage or sustain 
this commitment is clearly an issue that requires urgent consideration. \ 
Operating Risks 
This is the risk that costs will exceed revenues with a consequent implication for 
profit and net worth. This will affect differently capitalised banks differently but a 
system of crisis prevention can be expected to operate well only if the main actors 
face the proper incentives to control costs, to discourage excessive risk-taking and to 
take corrective action at an early stage. 
At least three factors affect the incentives faced by bank owners: bank capital, their 
share in the costs of any bank restructuring, and the franchise value of the bank. 
Ensuring that banks maintain good credit and internal risk management systems is the 
job of bank managers and directors: poor management has often been singled out as 
the leading cause of bank failures. 
The potential contribution of bank depositors to market discipline in emerging 
economies is limited by the quality of accounting systems and by the extent of public 
disclosure. 
Ukraine's largest banks work under the disadvantage of the legacy of wide branch 
networks and untrained staff, with few opportunities to train or re-train them in 
market disciplines. Bricks and mortar investment and maintenance is costly and cost / 
income ratios have taken a long time to come under control (see Chapter 3). 
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In Ukraine the former Soviet accounting systems were replaced by International 
Accounting Standards in 1998. For much of the period of this research, therefore, the 
ability of banks to hide high costs and bad loans was significant. 
To the extent that the institutional structure in which banks carry out their businesses 
is weak, their performance will be adversely affected. In many countries, the 
accounting conventions for classifying bank assets as impaired or non-performing are 
not tight enough to prevent banks from making bad loans look good by lending more 
money to troubled borrowers ("evergreening"). 
Added to these more common banking risks are two areas of particular importance to 
emerging economies: 
• The degree of regulatory / government control 
• Macroeconomic volatility 
Bank Regulation 
As most former Soviet republics Ukraine was unprepared for financial liberalisation 
in 1991. Financial market reforms inevitably present banks with new risks, which, 
without the proper precautions, can increase the danger of a banking crisis. When 
interest rates were liberalised, banks lost the protection they previously enjoyed from 
a regulated term structure of interest rates that kept short-term rates below long-term 
rates. Lifting restrictions on bank lending often releases pent-up demand for credit in 
the liberalised sectors. Lowering reserve requirements permits banks to accommodate 
increased loan demand, as does the inflow of foreign capital, often attracted by 
reforming economies. 
Political influence, resulting in too tight or too loose regulation, also has a part to play 
in banking crises too. Both tight and loose regulation factors have played an important 
role in the generation of banking crises because they allow the political objectives of 
governments or the personal interests of bank insiders (owners and directors) to 
intrude on almost all aspects of bank operations. This can lead to damage for bank 
profitability and efficiency. Despite increased privatization, state-owned banks still 
retain a significant and sometimes even dominant role. This is especially true in 
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Ukraine. Governrnent involvernent in (or implicit taxation of) the banking sector 
extends well beyond the operation of state-owned banks. 
Even when banks are privately owned, government may still influence the allocation 
of credit to particular sectors, extend favourable loan discounting privileges to certain 
borrowers and prevent private banks from engaging in certain profitable banking 
activities. They may also require banks to hold government bonds at below rnarket 
interest rates, impose high reserve requirements or taxes on banks, and direct banks to 
borrow in foreign currencies and assume the currency risk. 
Finally, there is the old argument that the political and legal background may 
encourage bank regulators to delay the closure of an insolvent bank or the imposition 
of corrective measures. Given the greater government involvement in banking in 
emerging economies and the extent of banking or industrial connections, pressures on 
bank supervisors for regulatory forbearance may well be greater than they are in 
industrial countries. 
Macroeconomic Volatility 
The very nature of banks makes them vulnerable to large relative price changes and to 
losses of confidence. Volatility in emerging markets derives from several sources -
both external and domestic. 
Volatility in international interest rates, and the induced effect on private capital 
flows, is another important external factor. Not only do fluctuations in international 
interest rates affect the cost of borrowing for emerging markets, but they also alter the 
relative attractiveness of investing in emerging markets. Incompletely sterilized 
capital flows boost bank deposits and tempt banks to increase lending even at the 
expense of lower credit quality. Because economic forces in those countries drive 
creditor-country interest rates themselves, some of the volatility of private capital 
flows facing emerging markets is beyond their control. 
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Real exchange rate volatility can cause difficulties for banks either directly (when 
there is a currency or maturity mismatch between bank liabilities and assets) or 
indirectly (when exchange rate volatility creates large losses for bank borrowers). 
Sharp real exchange rate appreciation typically precedes a banking crisis. One reason 
for this may be the adverse effect on the profitability of the tradables sector. Another 
may be that the high real domestic interest rates often associated with real exchange 
rate appreciation or with disinflation encourage residents to denominate their 
borrowing in foreign currencies, thus exposing themselves to large foreign exchange 
rate risks. 
On the domestic side, both growth and inflation rates are often highly volatile. 
Assessing credit risk becomes harder when growth and inflation rates fluctuate 
widely. Volatility of growth and inflation rates was on a rising trend over the 1990-
1994 period for countries experiencing systematic banking crisis over the period, 
while no such trend was evident for countries experiencing less severe or no banking 
difficulties. 
According to one school of thought, excessive credit creation and unsound financing 
during the expansion phase of the business cycle cause banking crises. Both bank 
lending booms and declines in equity prices have often preceded banking crises. 
Conclusion 
Change has proved to be painful in Ukraine and this thesis chronicles the growing 
pains of this independent state's commercial banking sector. 
The commercial banking sector has been bedevilled by political stalemate, lack of 
reform, a legacy of inappropriate Soviet systems and an underlying economy in need 
of urgent resuscitation. 
Of the risks inherent in banking credit and liquidity risks added to market risks in the 
1990's. Only through a combination of central support and, ultimately, good 
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economic management by the NBU has the Ukrainian banking sector emerged into 
the 21 SI century with the potential to develop further. 
This thesis looks closely at the development of the banks in Ukraine during the 1990's 
and places the successes and failures of the sector in clear perspective. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
UKRAINE 
Introduction 
The first decade of Ukraine's independence has been overshadowed by the legacy of 
former Soviet times. An overwhelmingly conservative electorate watched the "roller 
coaster" of independence as the euphoria of 1991 evaporated and the grim realities of 
political stagnation and economic decline took hold. 
A particular problem was that Ukraine was not prepared for independence in 1991 
since 70 years of control from Moscow had robbed it of the vital central mechanisms 
for the formation and implementation of economic policy (Frydman, et ai, 1993). 
Moscow, as the centre of Soviet activity, had subordinated Ukrainian development to 
that of the Union as it had with so many other aspects of Ukrainian life, including the 
unique Ukrainian language. 
This chapter reviews the political and economIc environment of the independent 
Ukraine. An understanding of these important factors is necessary for underpinning 
the development of the Ukrainian banking system. This chapter also provides a 
valuable background to the empirical study conducted as part of this research. The 
timing of interviews with senior bankers is important to note since it followed an 
economic and currency crisis and political stalemate, which were about to be put to 
public reckoning by Parliamentary elections in May 1998 and a Presidential election 
in 1999. 
Set at the "cross-roads" of Europe and Asia Ukraine maintains strategic and economic 
importance for that region. Tom and divided by Russian immigration, Soviet 
centralisation and internal cultural differences Ukraine has struggled in its first decade 
of independence but now stands at a "cross-roads" of its own. 
The map on the following page shows Ukraine's key cities and neighbours. 
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The Politics of Independence 
1991-1994 New beginnings 
Following the attempted coup d'etat in Moscow on August 19, 1991 and acting in 
pursuance of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of 
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic proclaimed the independence of Ukraine on 
24 August 1991. By the end of 1991 the newly independent Ukrainian state was 
recognised by 152 countries. Diplomatic relations were established with 138 states 
and 54 embassies and 6 separate international organisations were accredited in 
Ukraine. 
The territory of Ukraine had became indivisible and inviolable. Henceforth only the 
Constitution of Ukraine and laws of Ukraine would have had legal strength in the 
territory of Ukraine. 
On December 1, 1991, a referendum took place, involving 84% of the Ukrainian 
population, of which 90 % supported the Independence Act of August 24. The 
accompanying Presidential election saw 61.6 % of the votes elect Leonid Kravchuk as 
the first President of Ukraine. 
At a summit meeting in Belovezhskaya Pustcha from December 7-8, 1991 leaders of 
the States of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine signed a Treaty on the formation of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), thus putting an end to the USSR. 
Ukraine had been doing its utmost to increase its voice within the CIS and express the 
autonomous nature of its interests. Although the country was a founder member of 
the CIS in 1991, it has now reduced its status to that of an associate member (Mellow, 
1994). 
Ukraine only participates in joint activities that it regards as serving its interests. For 
example, Ukraine has not signed the collective security treaty for the CIS - in line 
with the principles of neutrality. It was also a key player in the adjournment of a 
decision on joint peace-making military units and protection of common borders 
(Pearce, 1995). In 1992 Ukraine gained membership of the European Conference on 
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Security and Co-operation, the International Monetary Fund and the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development. Ukraine is also one of the founding members 
of the Organisation for Black Sea Economic Co-operation. 
With a focus on its own security Ukraine joined the Working Group of the North 
Atlantic Council and in 1993, became a member of the Council. In 1994 Ukraine 
joined NATO's Partnership for Peace Program. 
Over a short period a new system of state administration was created, along with the 
National Armed Forces, the Security Service and law enforcement authorities. New, 
broader horizons opened for political freedoms; practically all restrictions on the 
spiritual progress of the Ukrainian and other nations were lifted. The Ukrainian state 
had entered the international community as an equal partner. 
However, as in all other post-Communist states, the process of social reforms in 
Ukraine took a winding and thorny path, in conditions of a pitched battle between the 
old and the new. Among the aggravating factors were the differences between the 
legislative and executive branches of government. The legislature was dominated by 
old style communists and agrarian reformers, who associated themselves with the 
communists. The executive had a more reformist stance but failed consistently to 
bring reforms into being. Fortunately, a democratic way out of the resultant political 
crisis was found as Parliamentary and Presidential elections were held in 1994 
(Economist, 1994a-g, Euromoney, 1998, Cowley, 1994, lones 1994). 
1995-1999 - Stalemate 
Leonid Kuchma, a reforming former military factory boss with roots in the industrial 
east of Ukraine became the new President in 1994, winning 52.14 % of the vote in the 
second round of polling. Ukraine had entered a new phase of its development, when 
strenuous efforts were made to create an effective economic system, along with 
advancing the institutions of democracy, and raising the country's prestige in the 
international arena (Gianzero, 1994). 
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By voluntarily rejecting its recent status as the world's third nuclear power, Ukraine 
took the first historic step toward a nuclear-free, peaceful future, showing a new way 
to strengthen international confidence and co-operation, bringing mankind closer to 
the long-cherished goal, total nuclear disarmament. In December 1994 the President 
of Ukraine signed the START I treaty once security guarantees had been given by the 
USA, Russia, Britain and France. Verkhovna Rada ratified the Treaty (Jones, 
1 995a,b). 
An agreement on Partnership with the European Union in Luxembourg was signed in 
1995 and Ukraine began to look outwards from its 42 embassies, 4 permanent 
representations, and 8 consulates general. Ukraine's prestige increased considerably 
after it acceded to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. 
Kuchma's· "honeymoon" was long enough to secure sweepIng new Presidential 
powers from the communist dominated legislature. Ukraine announced huge reforms 
but there were doubts whether Kuchma would use his special powers or whether 
Parliament would water down the reforms (Economist, I 995c,d). Whilst Kuchma 
maintained his position as president his administration saw a steady succession of 
Prime Ministers and deputy Prime Ministers, all of whom, at some stage, were blamed 
for failures and ousted (Economist, 1995a,b). 
The panacea, it seemed at the time, was privatisation. In this way the burden of state 
owned industry, most of which was insolvent, badly run, underfunded and rife with 
labour problems, could be lifted (Takla, 1995). In 1995 privatisation of 8,000 state 
firms was announced but the pick of Ukrainian industry had already been sold to 
workers in the first tranche of privatisation (including the banks). Other "strategic" 
industries were protected by the parliament, lest they should fall into foreign hands. 
In this way the reforms were stifled and foreign investment halted. 
By 1996 the slow pace of reform, the brewing economic crisis (see later) and the 
tolerance and involvement in corruption at the highest levels of the administration 
resulted in political stalemate. Some western observers called this "The wild, wild 
east" (Economist, 1996c, Euromoney 1996c). Kuchma presided over a country where 
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political assassination was rife, corruption endemic, intrigue abundant and regional 
frictions threatening to undermine the fragile independence. 
At the same time Kuchma had done enough to woo the IMF and had persuaded the 
USA that Ukrainian independence was necessary to prevent the re-union of the Soviet 
bloc (Economist, I 996a,b). 
Things had come full circle by the time of Parliamentary elections in 1998. The 
administration wanted reform but the legislature was overwhelmingly conservative 
and now seemed to have more support from the population who had seen savings 
vanish and no economic miracle. The elections in 1998 showed that Ukraine was 
being pulled in many directions at once. No one party gained an overall majority, 
although the communists were the largest. Instead one in four seats went to 
independents. Reformers lost out as the population indicated that it had had enough 
and re-unification with Russia was once again on the agenda (Economist, 1998b). 
Perhaps the 1999 presidential elections would break the stalemate? In the period 
leading to the October 1999 elections Kuchma trod a delicate tightrope between the 
nationalist west and the Slavic east of Ukraine that largely wanted the "good old days" 
to return. Kuchma's main success, in foreign policy, was scorned by the communists 
but a Kuchma-controlled media meant that his small advantage was enough to secure 
a further four year Presidential term (Economist, 1999). 
Having secured a further presidential term Kuchma promised much but his record on 
delivery has failed to support his statements. One positive move according to 
observers, was the appointment of Viktor Yuschenko as Prime Minister in May 2000. 
Yuschenko, former National Bank of Ukraine chairman and largely credited with the 
successful introduction of the hryvna in 1994 and the management of int1ation, has 
won parliamentary support for his long-term plans of privatisation and other reforms 
(Economist, 2000). 
The overwhelming picture of Ukrainian politics since independence in 1991 is very 
foggy. No clear mandate has ever been given for reform and corruption and 
"cronyism" have sullied the image of privatisation considerably. The communists 
21 
should have a considerable power base yet cannot secure administrative power. 
Whilst reform is slow observers consider that Ukraine has done enough to gain 
external support and to give itself a breathing space so that economic recovery can 
occur. 
Many observers have pointed out that a strong Ukraine is Western Europe's best 
guarantee that this former Soviet Republic will not fall, once again, into the orbit of 
influence of Russia. 
Economic background 
Historically the two factors that determined the development of Ukrainian lands were 
the presence of fertile chernozem soils (Ukraine boasts approximately a quarter of the 
globe's black topsoil) and its remarkably convenient geographic location on the cross-
roads of international trade routes. 
The Ukrainian agrarian "gubernias" began to transform as agrarian-industrial regions 
only in the second half of the 19th century. The Donetsk Coal basin (Donbas) and the 
Kryvyi Rih Iron Ore basin became Russia's leading industrial venues. In 1890, 
Ukraine extracted 70% of the Empire's pit coal and produced 52% of its cast iron. In 
the early 20th c. all of Russia's grain export came from Ukraine. 
Many Russians live in this region. Russia has promised to defend the interests of 
ethnic Russians wherever they live (Cowley, 1994). So political activity in this region 
is the highest in Ukraine 
Industrial structure 
Ukrainian industry has a strong bias to basic materials and heavy industry such as coal 
mining, iron and steel while the consumer goods industry is little developed. Aircraft 
manufacture and rocket technologies are also important. Besides meeting local 
demand, capacities were formerly geared to the needs of the other Soviet republics, 
which procured raw materials and semi-manufactures from Ukraine. Finished 
products accounted for only 20% of this trade. Many of the metal-operating plants 
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Table 2.1 Ukraine's Nuclear Power Stations 
Location Number of Units 
Zaporozhye 5 
Pivdennoukrainsk 3 
Rovno 3 
Chernobyl 2 
Khmelnitsky I 
Fuel elements and parts for these stations have to be imported from Russia. Payment 
problems from the Ukrainian side hold up this supply. In 1994 a large number of 
reactor faults were discovered in Zaporozhye and Khmelnitsky. A major hazard is 
posed by the use of the units in Chernobyl in the immediate vicinity of the reactor 
where the disaster took place. The whole complex urgently needs to be closed down. 
In March 1996 Ukraine announced that power had been cut to 7,000 factories, and 
more than 40,000 businesses. Unpaid bills amounted to almost $ I billion dollars. At 
varying speeds today and over the next few years, foreign investment in private power 
is currently accepted in several CIS countries as the most favourable way to emerge 
from this difficult transition period (Krikorian, 1996). 
Ukraine's ecological situation is critical. lt has the biggest environmental problems of 
the former Soviet republics. Most of its nuclear power plants are considered unsafe. 
12% of the area in agricultural use was polluted by radioactive fallout from the 
Chernobyl disaster in 1986. Large areas of farmland remain contaminated by 
pesticides, nitrates and other pollutants. 
The Donets-Dniper industrial region is one of the worst areas of air and water 
pollution in Europe. This is due to obsolete iron and steel-making plants, power 
generating plants and neglect of environmental protection measures. 
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Agriculture 
Agriculture IS Ukraine's traditional mainstay. Natural conditions are ideal for 
efficient and wide-ranging production. Roughly two-thirds of the country are covered 
by extremely fertile black-earth soils. As a result of this and the favourable climatic 
conditions Ukraine came to be known as the Soviet Union's "granary". 
All the typical livestock and crops of the Northern Hemisphere are produced. The 
main crops, besides grain. are: potatoes, sugar beet and linseed. In the south it is 
possible to grow grapes and, to small extent, citrus fruits. 
Ukraine's agricultural sector was once the most efficient of the former Soviet Union 
but was still far less productive than North America's and Western Europe's. 
Productivity had declined in recent years at the still mostly collective or state-owned 
farms. 
The present economic crisis has also spread to the agricultural sector. Output of some 
products declined at double-digit rates in recent years. In 1994 meat production sank 
by 12%, milk production by 6% and egg production by 23%. Ukraine, formerly an 
exporter of foodstuffs, is threatened with becoming a food importer. 
However, private farms, though still not numerous, increased their meat production by 
42%, milk production by 40% and egg production by 54% in 1994. So far private 
farms only account for about 1.5% of the total area in agriculture use. The 
subsidisation of state owned farms throughout the 1990's was to have severe 
economic consequences and would damage the agroindustrial bank - Bank Ukraina. 
Capacities for processing farm products are limited. Vegetable oil and sugar are 
major industries and important export products. Farming areas occupy 41.9 million 
hectares of Ukraine's more than 60 mln h of dry land of which the arable soils cover 
33,3 mln h. Statistically, every family has a farming plot of 4.5 hectares. Upward of 
4 million persons are employed in the agrarian sector. 
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Crop production is the most important farming branch (e.g., rye, wheat, corn, sugar 
beet, sunflower, leguminous plants, tobacco, fibre flax, fruit, vegetables, etc.). 
Animal husbandry is the second (e.g., cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, horses, et.). 
Ukraine's agriculture remaInS dominated, however, by illiquid and unprofitable 
collective farms, bolstered by government but still offering a poor investment 
environment (Gregory, 1999). Structural, transportation and investment issues all 
need to be addressed before Ukrainian agriculture can attract outside investment. 
Construction 
This industrial branch plays an important role in creating the Gross National Product 
(GNP), placed third, in terms of manpower, after the heavy industries and agriculture. 
The technological base is quite strong, even though somewhat outdated. There are 84 
housing construction complexes, plants and large panel construction workshops with 
a total output capacity of 9,6 mln sq. m of living space per year, and 537 ferro-
concrete manufacturing enterprises. The construction network includes 2,900 
independent construction organisations. At present, separate building enterprises are 
being reconstructed and new modem construction technologies introduced. At the 
end of 1994 the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers adopted the State Concept of Housing 
Policy envisaging basic reforms in this sphere of the economy. Apartment 
construction is to become a top priority in the national socio-economic policy, a factor 
to help stabilise the country's economy. 
Transport and communications 
Ukraine operates every type of modem transport - railway, air, motor, sea, fiver, 
pipeline and subway. In 1994 a total number of 939 million tonnes of cargo units 
were carried using all means of transport. The passenger turnover was 119 billion 
passengers/km. 
Ukraine's transportation system is geared primarily to goods traffic. The rail and road 
networks are centred on the capital of Kiev. The need for modernisation is 
tremendous. Railways are the principal link in the transport chain. Their total 
operational length is 22,800 km. There are 265,000 km of roads, most of which are 
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hard surfaced. Ukraine is traversed by international highways (Kyiv - Moscow; 
Moscow - Kharkiv - Simferopol; Odes sa -Kyiv - St. Peterburg and Kyiv - Lviv -
Warsaw). 
Special attention is paid to the reconstruction and building of hard roads, particularly 
modern motorways, along with increasing the modern motor pool. However, 
maintenance to the high standards required by modern motors is not always carried 
out. 
Ukraine is a big coastal state. Ukraine's shorelines total 2.000 km, and the Black Sea 
and the Sea of Azov play an important role in coastal and international traffic. The 
major seaports are Odessa, Illichivsk, Mykolaiv, Mariupol, Feodosia and Izmail. 
Air transport requires modernisation, in terms of reconstruction of airports and adding 
new aircraft models. The biggest airports are Kyiv, Simferopol, Kharkiv, Odes sa, 
Donetsk and Lviv. 
Ukraine operates a well developed system of pipeline transportation. Ukraine is 
traversed by capacious transcontinental pipelines (e.g. "Soyuz", from the Urals to 
Europe; Urengoi-Pomary-Uzhgorod, from Western Siberia to Europe). 
Trade and consumer services 
These important national economic branches are making their first tentative steps. 
Over half of them still fail to meet consumer needs in retail trade enterprises and 
consumer service facilities, and the available ones do not meet modem technological 
and aesthetic standards. Over the past several years the retail trade and paid consumer 
service turnovers have registered a noticeable decline. 
Most of these enterprises and facilities are corporate entities, but the process of 
privatisation is far too slow and the administrative and legal barriers to business start-
ups mean that few new corporations are created. 
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As a measure of confidence emerges in the Ukrainian economy foreign investments 
have increased. The larger cities in Ukraine now boast modem western-type stores, 
restaurants and cafes. 
Foreign economic activities 
External trade is of outstanding importance for the Ukrainian economy. Up to 1991, 
approximately one third of gross domestic product (GDP) was generated by deliveries 
to other Soviet republics and abroad. Traditionally, merchandise trade with the 
former Soviet republics was dominant. Only a relatively small proportion of exports 
went to other markets. The collapse of the USSR brought a far-reaching change in 
this situation. Procurement and sales relations were no longer by Moscow centre but 
were now increasingly subject to market forces. 
Trade with the CIS states still dominates, and Russia is the largest trade partner. 
Apart from the fact that former customers have turned more to other markets, the 
main reason for this was the basic change in the terms of trade. The jump in import 
prices for energy sources to the world market level within a relatively short period of 
time had put an enormous strain on the current account. 
Ukraine's enterprises conduct business transactions with partners in 137 countries. 
Major export items are: metals, ores, coal, electricity, nitrogenous and phosphate 
fertiliser, soda, cement, glass, construction materials, machines, equipment, sugar, 
vegetable oil. 
Major import items are: oil, gas, timber, non-ferrous metals, cars, machines and 
equipment, knitted wear and garments, top quality foodstuffs, medications. 
Exports to states other than CIS account for only a small part of the total. So far, 
Ukraine has succeeded in only very few instances in expanding its range of 
competitive products for sale on western markets. Export to these countries continues 
to be dominated by raw materials and semi-manufactured goods products. In 1994, 
the EU concluded partnership agreements with Ukraine to normalise trade relations 
(Enders and Wonnacott, 1996). 
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Ukraine's leading partners are: Russia, Germany, the USA (Bergquist, 1995), Italy, 
China, Turkey, the Czech Republic, Belarus, Turkestan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Poland and Bulgaria. Barter deals and export under federal contracts make up 
some 43% of the foreign trade turnover. 
In 1993, external trade suffered particularly from the fact that, alongside the market 
exchange rate, a so-called official exchange rate had initially been introduced for the 
carbovanets (temporary currency) against the US$. This was then declared the sole 
valid exchange rate from November 1993 and its level was fixed by the authorities. 
Exporters, who were obliged to sell a fixed percentage of their foreign exchange 
revenues (1992: 70%, 1993 - 1995: 50%) to the state, received as equivalent an 
amount which was converted at a rate well below the market rate. This contributed to 
an increase in capital flight, avoidance of formal declarations of income and unofficial 
exchange bureaux. According to Ukrainian estimates, between US$1 0 bn and US$15 
bn in Ukrainian funds were held on accounts abroad at the end of 1994. The lack of 
investment within the Ukraine suggests that capital is still fleeing the ungenerous tax 
regIme. 
From October 1994 all export contracts were to be registered because of the need to 
monitor adherence to import quotas to the EU. In the future, Ukraine, which is 
applying for WTO membership, plans to regulate its external trade exclusively via 
tariffs. The WTO membership will help to avoid anti dumping duties which foreign 
countries apply to protect the market against unfair competition (Laurenson, 1994). 
The increased incidence of barter trade has developed into an acute problem. Above 
all, the acute shortage of foreign exchange but also the desire to avoid taxes and 
controls is encouraging more and more traders to conclude barter trades. In 1994, 
barter trade still accounted for only roughly 40% of total exports, but in 1995 and 
1996 the figure threatened to pass the 60% mark. To curb barter trade, a presidential 
decree dated February 1, 1995 obliges exporters to hedge their imports by acquiring 
so-called import custody accounts at authorised banks. 
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Balance of Payments 
The difficult economic situation of Ukraine has been exacerbated by a huge balance 
of payments deficit and a growing external debt. The basic shift in the terms of trade 
had worsened Ukraine's balance of payments with the other former Soviet republics, 
reversing the surplus position at the end of 1991. The trade balance showed a deficit 
of US$ 2 bn in 1994 (2.4% of ODP). The largest deficit had arisen in trade with 
Russia and Turkmenistan, which supply natural gas. These two countries are now, 
also because of unsettled invoices from previous years, among the largest creditors of 
Ukraine. Relations between Russia and Ukraine were often strained by the unpaid 
energy bills (Cowley, 1994). 
High import requirements and rising debt service obligations on loans taken up 
previously pushed the amount needed to square the payments balance in 1995 to more 
than US$ 5 bn. (3.2% of ODP) (See also Chart 2.1). 
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Ukraine remains heavily dependent on financial help from abroad to close the gap in 
its payments balance. Apart from IMF credits in a total volume of roughly US$ 1.9 
bn, further income of a World Bank credit with a total volume of US$500 m are to be 
used and possibly recourse to World Bank loans. Furthermore, Ukraine is hoping for 
bilateral loans granted by the EU and western governments. 
IMF, World Bank and EU loans and credits come, however, with conditions attached. 
The IMF wants to see greater progress on reforms before tranches of credit are 
released whilst the EU wants to see Chernobyl closed down completely. Neither is an 
easy task for the Ukrainian government. 
At the beginning of 1995, Ukraine's total external debt came to close on US$ 7.5 bn. 
The lion's share comprised claims by Russia totalling approximately US$ 4 bn (of 
which more than US$ 2.7 bn for petroleum and natural gas) and by Turkmenistan 
totalling roughly US$ 900 m. Agreement in principle has been reached on a debt 
rescheduling with both Turkmenistan and Russia and also with the Russian gas 
conglomerate Gasprom. 
Repayment of loans is also an expected outcome for the international lenders and 
failure to adhere to this basic condition has not only delayed IMF credits but also 
further World Bank loans that are triggered by IMF covenants (Economist, 1998a). 
Foreign investments 
The largest investors in Ukraine include the USA (Forbes, 1994) with an investment 
volume of more than US$ 65 m, Germany - more than US$ 55 m and the United 
Kingdom - more than US$ 20 m, followed by Cyprus and Switzerland. By far the 
biggest investor within the group of CIS states is Russia. 
The West must keep trying to locate and encourage Ukrainian individuals and 
business concerns with good prospects for developing sustainable free-market 
enterprise (Jaicks, 1994; Washio, 1995). Uncertain political conditions, the poor 
economIc situation as well as contradictory legal conditions subject to frequent 
change have so far - in international comparison - meant that Ukraine has not been 
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very attractive as an investment location for foreign investors. Although Ukraine 
could still boast fairly generous rules governing foreign investment in 1992 compared 
to other CIS republics, numerous amendments, which also resulted from a temporary 
disinterest in stronger opening, have watered down the country's original advantages 
(European Focus, 1998). 
This situation was also caused by some amendments to the still valid "Decree on the 
regulation of foreign investments" dated May 1993, which replaced the corresponding 
laws from 1992. It was, for example, stipulated that companies are only considered 
foreign investments from a foreign equity stake of at least 20% or US$ 50,000 (for 
banks US$ 100,000) and receive preferential treatment accordingly. At the same 
time, however, the possibility was granted to extend the exemption from taxes on 
profit for five years. Additionally, at the start of 1994 the "Act governing the state 
programme to promote foreign investments in Ukraine" came into force; the act was 
an attempt to steer foreign investment into sectors considered on particular 
importance. 
Since the end of 1994, there has been growing recognition in Ukraine that foreign 
direct investment brings positive effects with respect to modernisation and the transfer 
of know-how (Aviation Week, 1994, Rosenbaum, 1995). Foreign nationals can 
already purchase title to buildings and plant. They are, however, still prohibited from 
purchasing land and real estate. 
There is still a great need for investment in Ukraine. Ukrainian industry needs capital 
and management expertise to make it competitive (Euromoney, 1996a). A sustained 
upturn in foreign direct investment is, however, probably contingent on stabilisation 
of the economic situation. Then, however, there should be very attractive 
possibilities, above all in the field of energy conservation and conversion, agriculture 
and food processing as well as transportation and telecommunications. The steps 
towards the stabilisation and new refonn that were taken by President Kuchma have 
considerably increased the interest of potential investors in Ukraine as an investment 
location. 
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Total direct foreign investment, estimated at just over US$ 750 million by the end of 
1995, is a trickle compared with the US$ 40 billion or more that the Ukraine says it 
needs for economic reconstruction (The Banker, 1996). 
Economic policy since independence 
The collapse of Ukraine's traditional economic ties with the fonner Soviet republics 
so shortly after the Soviet Union's sudden disintegration left little time for Ukraine to 
detach itself as smoothly as possible and build a national economy of its own. The 
surge in energy prices since mid-1992 came as a further shock for the Ukrainian 
economy, from which it has not yet recovered. Production was declining, state 
industries remained unsold, and investors were largely kept away (Mroz and Pavliuk 
1996). The only way Ukrainians could prevent a collapse from coming was by 
deciding that they wanted to live in an independent country. (Cowley, 1994). 
There was no alternative to the type of comprehensive reform program that 
emphasised three pillars of stabilisation, privatisation and liberalisation. Without 
these three components, socialist economies would have not made the transition to the 
market. Ukraine needed only to look to the experience of Russia, Poland, Chile and 
Taiwan to see what it could expect from different approaches to reform. Stabilisation, 
privatisation and liberalisation were not only separate aspects of an overall refonn 
strategy, they were indeed mutually interdependent and cannot be applied in isolation 
(Tedstrom, 1995) 
Taxation 
Ukraine's economic situation would probably present a brighter picture if the results 
achieved in the fast-growing private sector and the "underground" economy, which 
did not find adequate reflection in the official statistics, were taken into account. It 
was estimated that, if included, this sector would increase the official GDP figure by 
over half. The shadow economy had became so rampant in recent years not only 
owing to bureaucratic obstacles to free enterprise but also because of a stifling tax 
policy (Cowley, 1994). 
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The previous tax system strongly resembled confiscation. It was based on extremely 
high corporate taxation in comparison with other countries, which consisted mainly of 
a tax based on a company's total gross earnings from the sale of goods and services, 
from VAT and the Chernobyl levy. At the same time, though, it provided for 
numerous exceptions for certain sectors and companies. Since many entrepreneurs 
considered this tax policy unfair, it contributed to the massive exodus of small and 
medium-sized businesses to the underground economy. 
The government therefore decided to introduce a tax structure which promoted 
economic activity. On January I, 1995 the previous corporate tax system was 
replaced by a tax on profits. At the core was the establishment of lower tax rates and 
the simultaneous widening of the tax base, above all by abolishing the numerous 
exceptions. The new rate for companies and banks was set at 30%, regardless of the 
form of business organisation. A higher rate applied to agency work and gaming. 
The taxation of incomes and wages was relatively insignificant, accounting for 
approx. 6% of total revenues. Salaries and wages were taxed progressively, with a 
10% starting rate for monthly wages of more than UAK 1.4 million. The top rate was 
40%. 
The rate for V A T, which will likely remain the most important source of revenue, was 
reduced from 28% to 20%. New sources of revenue were tapped by, for example, 
introducing royalties on the extraction of natural gas and oil, imposing a property tax 
for industrial companies and a stabilisation tax (3% of a company's gross turnover). 
The new tax policy would probably result in a decline in overall revenues amounting 
to approx. 10% of GOP for fiscal 1995 versus 1994. 
When the budget for 1995 was drafted the government had also changed its approach 
to financing the deficit. Plans now called for only 55% of the deficit, estimated at 
close to 7% of GOP, to be financed via central bank loans. Some 40% were to be 
covered by funds from abroad, and roughly 5% of domestic savings. The 
government's plans to issue state bonds in this connection had been delayed, however, 
so in the first quarter of 1995 it again had to borrow more heavily from the National 
Bank. 
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Resuming the process of price liberalisation was a prerequisite for cutting subsidies to 
the corporate and agricultural sector (Sundakov et ai, 1994). 
In mid-November 1994 controls on prices, except for bread, which are to be raised 
only gradually, were lifted. The prices of natural gas, oil and petroleum products, 
coal and electricity for industrial users were allowed to converge with the 
international level. Higher prices for natural gas, coal and electricity also took effect 
for private consumers at the end of 1994 and in early 1995; these used to be 
subsidised partly through the budget and partly by companies. Moreover, the first 
stage of the planned increase in rents, district heating and water fees as well as public 
transport fares came into force on February 1, 1995 for private consumers. These 
prices were to be raised gradually during 1995 to the point where they covered costs. 
Price liberalisation was flanked by salary and wage hikes. However, these failed to 
offset the increase in household expenditure. It was therefore decided to index the 
pay of public-sector employees to a maximum of 80% of the price hikes; companies 
were left to decide themselves on the extent of pay adjustments in accordance with 
their own situation. The state plans were to introduce a system of social services for 
lower-income brackets to alleviate social hardship. 
Price liberalisation was one of the reasons for the renewed inflation surge at the end 
of 1994 and the beginning of 1995. An absence of competition, delays by companies 
in adjusting to changed demand structures and substantial side-effects were 
prolonging the development of fair market prices (Moodgal, 1996). 
Stability-oriented monetary policy 
The National Bank of Ukraine flanked the stabilisation efforts of the government with 
a policy of tight money. It limited lending to the government to finance the deficit as 
well as on the permissible cash deficit. The central bank is discontinuing the practice 
of issuing loans to the state corporations and agriculture (Bofinger, 1996). To support 
attempts to attain the inflation target it plans to keep monetary growth far below the 
nominal increase of gross domestic product (Patterson, 1994). The rise in the money 
supply is to be confined to 80% (nominal GDP + 130%) in the first half of each year 
and to about 35% (nominal GDP + 50%) in the second half. Real interest rates are to 
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remain positive. Forecasting money supply and velocity is, however, very difficult 
and inconsistent in Ukraine (Ihor and King, 1998) 
The commercial banks' ability to refinance themselves with the central bank was to 
be geared more strongly to the market. This meant that they could no longer distribute 
credit resources, but they would be able to obtain them in future at central bank 
auctions. Another way for the commercial banks to refinance themselves is by 
discounting first-class paper (including government debt papers). 
Exchange rate policy to battle inflation 
Exchange rate policy was also geared to battling inflation. A big step in this direction 
was the programme started in summer 1994 to gradually achieve the convergence of 
the official exchange rate (for non-cash transactions) with the more market-related 
auction rate. This was followed in October 1994 by unifying the exchange rates for 
foreign currencies. The concurrent re-opening of the Kiev foreign exchange market 
helped in the process. 
The National Bank of Ukraine was committed to a floating exchange rate policy for 
the time being. An account of the pressures on this policy as a result of a currency 
crisis in 1998 are covered in Chapter 3. 
Privatisation 
The privatisation process made little headway up to 1994. Between the start of 
privatisation in 1992 and the first quarter of 1994 a total of 1857 businesses were 
turned over to the private sector - only 3% of the 68,000 earmarked. 80% of these 
privatised businesses were smaller companies with a book value of up to UAK 700 m 
as at August I, 1993 (McCollum and Gentle-Marsh, \995). Only 50% of citizens 
have redeemed their privatisation vouchers (Gordon-Walker, \996). 
One factor curbing privatisation were the privileges granted to a company's 
workforce: 65% of the plants privatised so far have gone to the staff members, 29% 
were auctioned off and only 6% changed owners via tender. As a rule, businesses 
acquired by the workforce operate rather inefficiently after privatisation, and their 
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owners tend to complain about liquidity difficulties more than outside buyers who 
have acquired their businesses by auction. 
In December 1994, parliament had approved a list of more than 6000 companies to be 
excluded from privatisation. These were primarily companies which represent 
national interests in the military/industrial complex as well as oil and energy. On the 
other hand, the government felt that only few companies including nuclear power 
stations, railways and some military factories should remain in state ownership. 
Parliament also wanted to hand over 4,270 agribusinesses to directors of collective-
farms (Jenkins, 1995; Economist, 1995e). 
A law was also passed granting privatisation certificates (similar to vouchers) to 
Ukrainian citizens from January 1995. These certificates were to replace the 
unwieldy owner-related privatisation accounts with savings banks previously used, 
thus making Ukrainian participation in privatisation more transparent. The new 
certificates enabled Ukrainians to obtain corporate stakes via investment funds or 
trusts. 
A presidential decree triggered the resumption of the privatisation process at the end 
of January 1995. Plans called for the privatisation of approximately 8 000 medium to 
large businesses in 1995, with more than 6 000 already named. The World Bank had 
set ambitious targets for Kuchrna's privatisation program, tying the release of each 
transfer of $ 3 I 0 million enterprise development loan to the results of privatisation 
auctions (Jones, 1995a). 
The legal framework 
The Ukrainian parliament had passed three laws to lay the groundwork for the 
privatisation of state operations by March 1992: 
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1. National law on the privatisation of the assets of state-run businesses 
(privatisation of large businesses) 
This law was applied to the privatisation of enterprises with total assets of over 20 
million roubles as of May 1992 as well as monopolies, military and industrial plant, 
and properties to be sold to non-residents. It was Ukraine's general privatisation law. 
2. National law on the privatisation of small state-run businesses. 
This applied to businesses with total assets of less than 20 million rubles as of May 
1992. Ukraine's small privatisation law was conceived as special legislation with 
respect to the disposal of assets via tender and auction. 
3. National law on privatisation certificates. 
In addition, parliament had to debate and pass a new state privatisation programme 
annually. To prepare an object of sale for privatisation the competent institution had 
fonned a commission whose chief task was to work out a privatisation plan. The plan 
provided for 
- the method of privatisation; 
- the starting price for negotiations; 
- the percentage of the purchase price (to be covered by privatisation certificates) 
The process could commence once the plan had been approved by the competent state 
property fund, i.e. sales to those with pre-emptive rights, as well as tenders and 
auctions. Unlike the privatisation of "large" operations, no privatisation plan is 
required for "small" businesses. 
The State Property Fund and its regional branches and representatives serve the state 
by conducting the privatisation of state-run companies. The Fund is put under control 
of the parliament, with officials reporting directly to it. Munici pal businesses are 
privatised via local bodies. 
The prerequisite for privatising a company was to submit a relevant application to the 
competent institution. To speed the process of privatisation the network of regional 
centres was created at the beginning of 1995 to conduct the auctions. The new 
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privatisation round was opened in January 1995 in the regional centre Zhitomir with 
representatives of the EU and the World Bank in attendance. 
Any resident or non-resident (natural or legal person) can participate in Ukrainian 
privatisation. However, the conditions relating the foreign investors have not been 
advantageous. For example, the price of stakes acquired up to autumn 1994 was 
calculated using a special exchange rate of UAK 420\US$. In practice this 
unfavourable rate substantially curbed foreign participation in the privatisation 
process. 
Economic Performance 1991-1999 
Chapter 2 ends with a summary of Ukrainian economic performance from 1991 to 
1999. The data is drawn from NBU data to ensure as much consistency as possible 
although it does need to be noted that this period saw a failure to collect data and the 
existence of a large and unrneasured "black economy". 
Commentary on the changes in major macroeconomic indicators is contained within 
chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis. In reviewing the data the parlous state of the economy 
under centralised control from Moscow must be remembered together with the 
inability of successive administrations to convert ideals into practical reforms. 
Table 2.2 summarises the NBU data available. 
Inflation 
The Consumer and producer price inflation figures for Ukraine are shown clearly in 
Graph 2.1. The enormous surge in producer prices in 1992 was magnified by 
Consumer Price inflation in the following year. Fuelled by the standard "Soviet" 
response in monetary terms - to print money, the inflation rate reached 4,738% in 
1993 and helped to damage the temporary "coupon" currency fatally. 
A failure to police currency exchange effectively meant that consumers staged a flight 
from Ukrainian currency and into hard currencies (the US dollar being the favourite). 
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Table 2.2: Ukraine Macroeconomic Indicators 1991 - 1999 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
GDP (UAH ml.) 0.3 5 148.3 1203.8 5451.6 81519 93365 102593 127126 
growth rate 1566.67% 2866.00% 711.73% 352.87% 1395.32% 14.53% 9.88% 23.91% 
real growth -4933.33% -3362.60% -81760.34% 126.43% -2791.58% -145.47% -111.10% -124.78% 
Consumer Prices Index 390 210 10160 50 280 139.7 110.1 120 119.2 
inflation % -46.15% 4738.10% -99.51% 460.00% -50.11% -21.19% 8.99% -0.67% 
Production Price Index 260 4230 9770 870 270 117.3 105 135.3 115.7 
producer inflation% 1526.92% 130.97% -91.10% -68.97% -56.56% -10.49% 28.86% -14.49% 
Unemployment at 31 Dec (%) 0.03 0.25 0.3 0.29 1.27 2.33 3.69 4.3 
State Budget deficit (% of GDP) 13.8 5.1 8.9 6.6 4.9 6.6 2.2 1.5 
Balance of Payments (% of GDP) -2.4 -3.2 -2.7 -2.7 -3 
Source: NBU 
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Graph 2.1: Ukrainian Inflation 1991-1999 
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The picture after 1993 shows greater stability, leading to greater confidence and the 
successful launch of the new hryvna currency_ The NBU has learned to use other 
methods to try to control prices although the effect on exchange rates, especially 
against the strong US dollar is not always helpful as Ukraine relies so much on 
imported goods. 
Gross Domestic Product 
I~ .. 'producer inflation% I 
~inflation% 
Nominal GDP shows consistent and sometimes spectacular growth since 1991 yet the 
caveat on data integrity must be remembered. 
Starting GDP growth in real terms reveals a real decline in this key indicator over the 
period of independence. Ukrainian industry began the decade in a poor state and 
Ukraine lacked manufacturing capacity for many of her basic needs. This legacy of 
central control and a wartime exodus of production capacity eastwards to avoid the 
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German advance, that was not reversed once victory was obtained, will only be 
reversed once confidence returns to the economy and bureaucratic and fiscal barriers 
to enterprise are reduced. Privatisation is one means of achieving this but foreign 
investment is also necessary. 
Against this background, therefore, any comparison of Ukrainian economic progress 
with Western European countries becomes meaningless. Graph 2.2 simply states the 
nominal and real growth of GDP whilst Graph 2.3 plots the relationship between 
inflation and nominal GDP growth for 1995 for Ukraine and many of her neighbours 
and former Soviet republics. There is a negative relationship between inflation and 
growth although in one country with growth above 100% (Armenia) GDP increased. 
Research has shown that the general level of inflation compatible with GDP growth 
(rather than decline) is 120% and that price stability and reform will play a major part 
in helping GDP to grow in the long-term (Petryk and King, 1998). 
Unemployment 
Unemployment is one of the most acute problems in Ukraine, largely due to the 
failure to achieve real economic growth. Always a visible and emotive statistic the 
unemployment rate has been blamed on many individuals and institutions, including 
the monetary and credit sector (Mortikov and Volonkin, 1999). This is logical, in 
part, but it is the overall failure of government and the NBU to create conditions 
whereby commercial banks can be used as a conduit for credit to encourage enterprise 
that is really to blame. 
Table 2.2 shows that unemployment has increased over the 1990's. Against a 
background of no official unemployment under central control this is a serious decline 
in expectations and standards. 
As mentioned above the government must create conditions of stability and encourage 
investment in new jobs -rather than in the old and inefficient industries that held the 
country to ransom in the past. Encouragement of enterprise is possible and it can be 
seen that Russia is well ahead of Ukraine in this regard (Filatochev et ai, 1999). 
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Graph 2.2: Nominal and Real GDP growth 1991-1999 
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Conclusion 
In the year 2000 Ukraine can look back at a decade of turbulence, stagnation, 
inaction, muddle, frustration and some minor successes. 
Ukraine is now enjoying a political honeymoon with its new Prime Minister and re-
elected President but the ability to stifle reform is ever-present. Reform, however, is 
the path chosen by Ukraine and on it relies not only the short-term benefit ofIMF and 
World Bank credits but also the longer-term stability and economic growth. 
44 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE UKRAINIAN BANKING SYSTEM 
Introduction 
In this chapter the focus shifts to the development of the Ukrainian banking sector. 
Since this sector of the national economy was given the role of the country's 
"Lighthouse" in the development of a market economy, the priority of the economy's 
development and the biggest hopes of the major authorities rest with this sector. 
The chapter opens with a brief overview of bank development in the UK. This is 
provided as an example of western bank development and a useful backdrop against 
which the development of Ukrainian banks can be reviewed. In this chapter the key 
variables that have influenced banking development and banking crises (as outlined in 
Chapter I) are developed. 
The chapter goes on to review the five distinct stages of Ukrainian bank development 
from 1990 to 2000. 
The chapter also looks, in detail, at the role of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) 
and the control mechanisms it has put into place. It is a significant feature of the 
NBU that it has remained relatively immune to political influence and, as such, can be 
viewed as an independent regulator. 
The Russian banking crisis of 1998 is reviewed in detail and the chapter concludes 
with a review of the key financial ratios of Ukrainian commercial banks. The data on 
which the analysis is based is probably as comprehensive as any published 
information on Ukrainian banks since most banks did not begin to report results in 
International Accounting Standard format until 1997/98. 
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An Overview of UK Banking Developments 
UK banks have had a long and unhurried development over the centuries. They have 
developed from small local goldsmiths to global financial institutions. A brief 
appreciation of the stages of development is provided in Figure 3.1: 
Figure 3.1 The development ofUK Banking 1400 - 2000 
Institutions Goldsmiths Local banks Regional National Clearing Global 
banks banks bank banks 
oligopoly 
Transactions Gold Paper Cheques Cheques Plastic cards Electronic' 
Money 
Functions Credit Intermedia Intermediati Intermediati Intermediati 
creation tion on on on 
Products Business Loans Loans Personal and Equities 
loans busi'ness Wholesale 
credit Retail 
Broking Insurance 
services Etc. 
1400 - 1600 1600 - 1800 1800-1900 1900 - 1950 1950-1980 1980 - 2000 
Time c::> 
(Distilled from Pond & Lipscombe, 1999) 
Banking in the UK began with the goldsmiths who facilitated trade transactions 
locally. This developed into the use ofreceipts, paper money and cheques in the 
1600s. Since much trade was local or regional so too was banking and numerous 
small banks arose to facilitate trade in their locality. 
By the 18th century bankers realised that they could create credit by the prudent 
lending of deposits, since depositors did not want all of their funds back at once. 
Whilst this was a risky business banks protected themselves by inter-bank borrowing 
and lending (there being no "lender of last resort" at this time). As this business 
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developed mergers between banks and take-overs of weaker banks took place to 
strengthen capital positions and make credit creation a profitable core business. 
Banking products in the 18th century were rudimentary as the demand from customers 
was unsophisticated. Bank failures and the occasional "run on the bank" fuelled 
mergers between banks and the forerunners of today's large institutions came into 
being. These bigger banks were better managed and better capitalised and more able 
to meet the requirements of an industrial society as it expanded. 
As intermediaries the larger regional and national banks were more able than smaller 
local banks to carry out their functions: 
• Aggregation 
• Maturity Transformation (short term loans were the norm.) 
• Risk transformation (secured lending was the norm.) 
• Geographic spread 
(Brighouse and Hontoir, 2002) 
It was in the late 19th and early 20th centuries that bank mergers reached a peak. The 
increasing demands of increasingly sophisticated customers meant that sound 
capitalisation of banking institutions was crucial to their survival. Communication 
had also improved and the larger banks (mainly London based) established branch 
networks both to garner deposits and to facilitate money transmission. 
Bank growth and bank mergers were a direct result of the competition and funding 
needs brought about by the four broad sets of forces identified by Llewellyn: 
I. Changes in the level of demand for financial intermediation services. 
2. Evolving portfolio preferences of the users of the banking system and its 
components. 
3. Changes in the market environment to which financial institutions and 
markets respond and 
4. Changes in the objectives and portfolio behaviour of financial institutions. 
(Llewellyn, 1985) 
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The changing demand for services 
Increasing trade, increasing economic activity and wealth and the growing needs of 
personal and business customers have all acted to increase demand for financial 
intermediation services in the 20th century. This has accelerated in the late 20th 
century as communication, educational factors and banking technology have 
improved. 
Evolving portfolio preferences 
By the end of the 20th century large numbers of individuals had quite sophisticated 
demand for financial intermediation services and products. Life Assurance, pensions, 
Investments and savings have all been encouraged by tax concessions. Home 
ownership and house mortgages have also been incentivised although this is no longer 
the case. For business customers the awareness of risk and the need to manage and 
hedge risk has developed too. Competitive forces in industry have put pressure on 
costs and profits causing businesses to utilise their assets more efficiently. In this way 
the demand for asset finance, in particular, has developed. Businesses also seek 
longer - term finance, equity funding and bond finance. In some cases corporate 
finance raising can by-pass banks altogether (dis-intermediation). 
The changing market environment 
Within the UK the steady move towards de-regulation has had dramatic effects on the 
activities undertaken by banks. Banking is now only part of the portfolio of enlarged 
financial institutions that trace their origins back to the goldsmiths. 
De-regulation in the 1960's and 70's caused instalment credit companies to be 
absorbed by banks (The London Clearing Banks, 1977) and in the 1980's share-
dealing, insurance, investment services, house mortgages etc. were added. In 2000 
around half of all profit earned by banks such as Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland 
and Lloyds related to lending. The remainder was generated by non-lending products 
and services. 
Greater capital requirements and market share advantages led to a further round of 
mergers amongst former building societies and banks, leaving a small number of huge 
institutions dominating the banking scene at the end of the century. 
48 
Externally the move towards floating exchange rates led to opportunities in 
international banking. Banks had always used correspondent networks abroad bur 
now saw the need to acquire banks in other countries including the U.S and Asia. 
Global presence also helped competition since the large U.S. banks already had a 
global reach. 
Changes in bank objectives 
Some banks in the late 20th century compete globally whilst others concentrate on 
domestic markets. The global banks, such as HSBC, can offer sophisticated 
international services to increasingly sophisticated customers. They can enjoy 
economies of scale and improved efficiency in the use of their capital. 
In overview the development of UK banking has accelerated, especially in the latter 
half of the 20th century. The key drivers of change were economic growth, de-
regulation and technology. Information costs have been reduced as information 
availability has increased. Competition has increased in some areas, causing larger 
banks to focus extern all y. 
An Overview of Ukrainian Banking Development 1988-1998 
The establishment of a market economy in Ukraine ordained the appearance of 
commercial banks. Before Ukrainian independence the banking sector was amongst 
those heavily influenced by the centralised administrative-bureaucratic system. 
Overcoming the economic difficulties of inflation and decreasing levels of production 
inherited from the former regime would depend on the effective activity of the 
commercial banks. As with all other market economies the Ukrainian economy 
required (and still requires) the maintenance of effective payment systems, investment 
in enterprise and the proliferation of banking services. Commercial banks would be 
the vehicles to deliver innovation and improve the quality of wealth creating projects. 
By 1998, however, the Ukrainian economy was still unstable and showed continued 
decline in the industrial sector, especially in consumer goods production. Whilst the 
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establishment and development of a modern Ukrainian banking system may have 
avoided the worst aspects of this crisis the resultant situation cannot be blamed on 
banks alone. Bank development in the 1990' s was carried out in conditions of social-
political crisis, legislative instability, low levels of trust, high inflation and a division 
of cash and transfer money. 
An analysis of the key elements of banking activity between 1988 and 1998 can 
determine five separate stages of Ukrainian banking system development (See also 
Sochan, 1998). 
First stage (1988-1990) 
The first stage is characterised by a restructuring ofthe Soviet banking system in Kiev 
into the following functional sectors: 
• Ministry or structural banks (over 15 banks) Mirunontage, Derzhpostach, 
Minboodmat and others. 
• Mixed banks, different government and co-operative institutions (over 20 banks) 
Ukrinbank, Gradobank, Percombank and others. 
• Moscow banks' branches: Incombank, Skhidinvestbank and others. 
• Government equity banks: Prominvestbank, Ukraina, Ukrsotsbank, 
Oschadbank, and Ukreximbank. 
This was really an extension and rationalisation of the central planning system. Banks 
in the Ministry sector concentrated mainly on execution of the national budget. Banks 
in the Goverrunent equity sector, which dominated the "commercial" side of the 
industry, concentrated their lending and customer base in specific industry sectors. 
Prominvestbank catered for heavy industry and Ukraina for the agricultural sector. 
Oschadbank, one of the Ukraine's oldest and largest banks had a more balanced 
portfolio, a particular strength in the years to come. 
As a basis for market - oriented banking this functional approach was both impractical 
and potentially de-stabilising as the revenues and stability of individual banks relied 
on the success of their designated industry sector. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
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independence would have severe consequences for traditional markets for Ukrainian 
goods and these industry based banks would need to seek diversity. 
Second stage 0991-1992) 
After 2nd of October 1991 all banks had to be re-registered in the new Ukrainian 
Banks' Register. In this second stage of banking system development in Ukraine 
privatisation of Government owned banks took place (according to the Decree of 
Cabinet of Ministers "About transfer of ministries' equities to Ministry of finances"). 
The ownership of banks switched from Government to equity holders with bank staff 
and major clients making the bulk of the investments. Banks such as Prominvestbank, 
Ukraina, and Ukrsotsbank became commercial banks. This early privatisation came 
before the main privatisations of 1992-93 when ordinary resident citizens would be 
encouraged to convert savings into equity in enterprises. Banking equity, therefore, 
remained in a limited number of hands, experienced in the old structures but with 
huge new challenges ahead. 
The two-tier system of banking was created with the foundation of the National Bank 
of Ukraine (NBU) in 1991. A number of decrees established its authority over the 
commercial banks (Sochan, 1998). 
Examples of larger banks are given in case studies in Appendix 2. Of these Ukraina 
and Prominvest are typical. By 1997 the early dominance of individual shareholders 
created in 1991 was still apparent with the following proportions being held: 
Table 3.1 
Individuals 
Firms 
Bought back 
Sharcholdings in large Ukrainian banks 
Prominvest 
92% 
8% 
Ukraina 
70% 
27.5% 
2.5% 
(21.8% employees) 
(0.9% government) 
At this time also other banking institutions separated from the Soviet structures and an 
independent central bank for Ukraine (NBU) was created (see later in this chapter). 
A necessary part of the banking system, the interbank loan market, was also 
established at this time. The new commercial banks required a speedy accumulation 
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of credit resources. From the beginning, however, the interbank market was 
dominated by government policy enacted by the NBU to support insolvent state 
enterprises. 
Third stage (] 992-1993) 
With independence established and key structures in place the extension of 
privatisation brought about the establishment of "new wave banks". These banks 
attracted private capital, new government and non-government funds. Modem 
looking banks such as Aval, Inko, and Transbank appeared. 
During this period the macroeconomy was characterised by hyperinflation and high 
interest rates and margins. This assisted the creation of a lot of small "pocket" banks. 
By the end of 1993 over 100 commercial banks had been registered and hundreds 
more were to follow. Most of these new banks had attracted private capital although 
many with sufficient capital to only cover creation expenses (creation expenses of 
such banks estimated as equivalent to purchasing a 3-room apartment). Many of these 
banks subsequently failed through under-capitalisation. 
In 1993 the Ukrainian Interbank Currency Exchange (UICE) was formed. The UICE 
is one of a number of formal structures created to facilitate interbank transactions. In 
this case transactions in foreign currency would have implications for the setting of 
the UAH/$ exchange rates too. The UICE remains a principal NBU policy tool where 
abrupt exchange rate fluctuations can be recognised and remedied. 
The interbank market was used in this period to divert huge credit resources to the 
non-effective sector of bankrupt state-run firms. This affected the liquidity of new 
wave banks seriously as they struggled to find adequate funding. 
Fourth stage (] 994-1996) 
This stage is characterised by the successful reduction in inflationary processes by the 
National Bank and the establishment of effective regulation procedures. As interest 
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rates and margins fell and the national currency was placed on a surer footing the 
"new wave" banks and "pocket" banks were found lacking. 
Many under-capitalised and poorly managed banks were exposed and failed, the NBU 
no longer willing (or able) to support individual banks with problems. This caused a 
crisis in the banking sector and the collapse of many commercial banks. In 1994 
twelve banks failed and in 1995 a further 20 banks, including the biggest commercial 
banks Inko, Vidrodzhennya, Econombank and Leasbank. In 1996 45 banks entered 
bankruptcy and a further 60 banks were technically insolvent. 
Subsequent investigation of banks such as Inko would reveal huge mismanagement, 
corruption and fraud. Poor credit decisions and the false picture of profitability 
painted by traditional Ukrainian accounting in a period of super-inflation and high 
interest rates were also blamed for the collapse (Pond, 1998). 
During 1994-95 the volume ofUS$ trading through the UICE grew from US$7Im to 
US$ 981m, establishing the market as a key tool of monetary policy. During 1995 
over US$8 billions were traded as the foreign exchange market was further 
liberalised. 
Balance Sheets and Income Statements for the UICE are shown in Appendix 2. 
A fall in reserve requirements from 25% to 15% in 1994 led to a decrease in interbank 
loan activity. Lower reserve requirements still were allowed for those lending to 
agriculture. 
Late 1994 saw a reversal in demand for interbank loans as a credit ceiling was 
imposed by the NBU. No new credit was allowed and so banks with liquidity needs 
turned again to the market. At the same time profit tax increased from 35% to 55%, 
causing further reductions in credit availability. 
Strict funding limits of twice issued capital were imposed on interbank loans in 1995. 
The NBU supported a number of commercial banks in crisis but for some the "roller 
coaster" of regulation and government policy had taken a severe toll. 
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Chart 3.1 Commercial banks registered in Ukraine 1992 - 1999 
Source: NBU 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Year 
Fifth stage (1996-1998) 
Once macroeconomic stability had been re-established and inward investment laws 
enacted there began a period of registration of many foreign bank branches and banks 
with foreign capital. Only three new banks registered in 1998, all of them with 100% 
foreign capi tal. 
The largest foreign owned banks in Ukraine now include: 
• Credit Lyonnais Ukraine (France) 
• Societe Generale Ukraine (France) 
• ING Barings Ukraine (Netherlands) 
• Kreditanstalt (Austria) 
• Raiffeisenbank Ukraine (Austria) 
• Depositowo-Kreditovy bank (Poland) 
• lncombank Ukraine (Russia) 
• BNP Dresdener bank (France/Germany) 
• Citibank Ukraine (USA) 
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This stage also saw the restructuring, combining and selling of commercial banks and 
their branches (almost 70) and registration of new commercial banks (only 5). 
The UICE celebrated its 5th anniversary in 1998 but the improvement in interbank 
transactions and the licensing of commercial banks for currency trading operations 
saw its share of currency trading fall from 38.2% of the total in 1995 to 9.3% by the 
end of 1997. Diversification led to UICE having a broader range of products, 
including stocks and futures. 
Having partly created the crisis in 1994/95 the NBU began to liberalise the interbank 
loan market in 1996 and 1997 in order to allow financially sound banks to expand 
agam. REPO operations were introduced in 1997 and the requirement of fixing 
commercial bank rates by reference to the refinancing rate was abandoned. This 
made the sector more liquid and interest rates more flexible. However, there were 
further storms to weather. 
The period 1988 to 1998, therefore, was characterised by opportunities being opened 
up by economic liberalisation in a system ill prepared to cope with market forces. 
Opportunities were also presented by the poor state of macroeconomic variables, 
especially inflationary pressures, and this influenced bank registrations too. As the 
government and NBU stabilised the economy so the banking "bubble" burst and 
consolidation took place (see Chart 3.1). It was at this time that well prepared foreign 
banks saw that conditions were favourable enough to enter the market. 
The forces shaping commercial banks in this period were largely government policy 
created. As different instruments of monetary policy were enacted and crises 
remedied the commercial sector rocked and reeled. Only the strongest banks survived 
and the interbank markets were discredited. 
Ukrainian and UK banking development compared 
No meaningful comparison can be made of the physical development of Ukrainian 
and UK banking. The latter happened over centuries against the backdrop of market 
forces, growing economic wealth and capitalist objectives. The former has happened 
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over a lO-year period. Change in Ukraine has been rapid and pragmatic. The 
backdrop has been a stagnant economy, government control and the market distortion 
of "privatised" banks, thinly disguised "system" banks of the Soviet era. To a smaller 
extent poor communication and poor financial education have also influenced 
development in Ukraine. 
Instead the comparison between the systems will use Llewellyn's "four forces" model 
from 1985: 
1. Changes in the level of demand for financial intermediation services. 
2. Evolving portfolio preferences of the users of the banking system and its 
components. 
3. Changes in the market environment to which financial institutions and markets 
respond and 
4. Changes in the objectives and portfolio behaviour of financial institutions. 
(Llewellyn, 1985) 
The changing demand for services and evolving portfolio preferences 
In 10 years there has been little change in the domestic market in Ukraine. Short-term 
lending and short-term deposits continue to dominate the credit market. The 
intermediary function of aggregation is well developed but maturity transformation 
less so. Inter-bank lending increased as central control and funding loosened. Banks 
have also sought to develop other market instruments (especially in the currency 
markets) but the market has proved to be very narrow and prone to instability. 
For most banks the portfolio choices of customers have been limited. Large "lame 
duck" industries feature amongst the largest borrowers, other customers are 
unsophisticated in their requirements. The credit market is not innovative and where 
credit cards have been introduced issue has normally been against cash deposits. 
The changing market environment 
This is by far the major area for discussion. The Ukrainian banking system has been 
dominated by governmental and central bank (NBU) decree. At times the banking 
system has represented that in Soviet times. 
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Since its creation in 1991 the NBU has regulated the banks very strongly. The NBU 
record is sound over the 10 years in its management of the economy via monetary 
policy but has shown signs of weakness in the day-to-day regulation of the banks. 
The rapid incorporation of new banks in 1992/93, followed by their equally rapid 
demise in 1994/95 was not a success story for the regulator. Shortcomings in 
reporting were exposed, leading partly to the introduction oflnternational Accounting 
Standards in 1998. 
The Ukrainian economy, largely flat but no longer in decline, was troubled with 
hyper-inflation in the mid 1990's. Those that lost their savings would take time to 
trust banks again with their funds. As the economy (especially inflation) came under 
greater control after 1995, the banks began to stabilise and most withstood the shift to 
IAS in 1998. A healthier economy also aided expansion into currency related 
products and increased activity in the UICE. 
Soon competitive pressures will be a priority for banks. Already a small number of 
foreign banks have established a presence in Kiev (see also chapter 5). 
The changing objectives of banks 
Over the period under consideration the key objective has been survival. The large 
former "system" banks have managed this well, dominating their chosen market 
sector and benefiting from the huge "endowment" effect of holding government and 
local government budgets. 
The really big change in objectives came in 1991 when the "system" banks were 
privatised. No longer would they serve the state but they would focus on profit for 
shareholders. But old habits die hard and it is not until 1998/9 that economic recovery 
and clearer regulation combined to allow opportunities to meet the changed 
objectives. 
In overVIew the Ukrainian banking system has hardly developed at all. It has 
survived the 1990's intact and has learned what it can and cannot do. A stronger 
economy will, however, allow the demand side of the equation to be developed. 
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The Banking Crisis in 1998-99 
The macroeconomic situation in Ukraine in 1998 did nothing to advance the 
development of Ukrainian banks or for production and the financial-economical 
sector in general. The banking system of Ukraine, being a part of the financial-
economical sector, weathered severe storms as 1998 progressed. Much of the work of 
consolidation over the period 1991 to 1997 counted for nothing as the sector was 
plunged into further crisis. 
The severe problems faced by banks were: 
• Interest rate instability 
• Currency devaluation 
• Poor credit portfolio quality 
At the same time commercial banks were working hard to modernise their systems, 
investing in new computer hardware and software and were introducing corporate 
reporting under International Accounting Standards for the first time. 
Interest rate instability 
The main negative influences on the financial markets in 1998 were produced by 
price instability of financial instruments. This was made worse by movements in the 
government bond market. The currency crisis (see later) had caused withdrawals from 
the value of free resources. Liquidity losses from conversion of government OVDP 
bonds I to KOVDP (hryvna denominated) were estimated by the NBU at 700 million 
hryfsvnas (US$ 233m). 
The discount rate fluctuated within the range of 35-82 % between November 1997 
and May 1999 as shown in Graph 3.1. The highest point was reached in August 1998 
when the discount rate topped 82 % and the refinancing rate 92 % (rate of refinancing 
of commercial banks under government bonds' pledge). 
I OVDP = Internal Government Obligatory Bond (OVDP uses the Ukrainian acronym). 
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Explanations for these movements can be seen in the next chapter on currency 
devaluation. The devaluation had serious effects on the quality of credit portfolios 
too. 
Practical effects of these movements were significant for banks and commercial 
borrowers. Interest rate rises were swiftly reflected in rates charged to customers 
since many loans were covered by funds attracted from the interbank market. Interest 
rates for borrowers became more flexible thus shifting the interest risk from banks to 
borrowers. 
Some banks used a high-risk strategy in order to gain profits at this time and, as can 
be expected a number suffered losses as a consequence. The high-risk strategy was to 
place long term interbank loans (2-3 months is long term in the Ukrainian market) and 
to match these with short term (2-4 week) liabilities. Successful forecasting of rates 
was essential for profits to be made. 
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Currency devaluation 
The continuing pattern of foreign investors repatriating capital and the continuing 
budget deficit forced the NBU to engage in OVDP purchasing. By the end of 
February 1998 the NBU faced the necessity of a serious hryvna devaluation in order 
to avoid depleting the currency reserves. As a result, the hryvna official rate started 
collapsing under the strict control of the NBU. From its stable rate of 1.899 
hryvnas/dollars since the launch of the currency it slumped to 2.13 hryvnas/dollars in 
mid-August. 
The decline was strictly controlled by the NBU and was supported by the 
establishment of a "Currency Corridor". The government set the "corridor" within the 
range 1.8 - 2.25 hryvnas/dollar (the planned devaluation was approximately 21 %). 
However, the remainder of 1998 saw further decline following the crash of the 
Russian financial system in August. Within the following 2 months the hryvna 
collapsed a further 60 %. This situation had only been seen before during the 
hyperinflation of 1993-1994. 
The quickening of hryvna devaluation in September-October 1998 led to a serious 
danger of market instability. The NBU had to review its policy of spending US dollar 
reserves for stabilisation of the national currency within the previously established 
"currency corridor" range and close the interbank exchange market. The whole 
market was under big pressure of administrative restrictions, especially the system of 
anti-crisis procedures which brought stricter reserve requirements, economical ratios, 
ratios of bank's capitalisation and tighter control over currency positions. The new 
currency corridor was announced at that time was to be 2.5-3.5 hryvnas/dollar. 
In this situation the risk management experience of commercial banks (their ability to 
control currency and interest-based risks) played a very big role. Almost every bank 
had incorporated into the bank's structure a special department in order to provide 
adequate control and detailed analysis over currency positions. These departments 
also recommended the optimal balance of currencies and financial instruments. 
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Constant monitoring of the resource market helped to diversify commercial banks' 
assets in time and avoid or minimise losses from their activities. 
Banks began to use more OVDP instruments on the interbank market. These were 
attractive as holdings of government bonds are considered in calculating the cash 
holding reserve. There was also an increase in foreign currency (largely US$) activity 
in this period. Although this depressed the amount of credit available it did shield 
banks from currency risks as the hryvna devalued. 
Poor credit portfolio quality 
The main principles of the credit-investment activity of the Ukrainian banking sector 
were traditionally based on asset quality and liquidity. However, the problem of credit 
portfolio quality had appeared in the banking sector whilst the currency and interbank 
market crisis was progressing. The value of overdue loans increased to 349 million 
hryvnas (US$ ll6m) in September (29 % of the total outstanding), including overdue 
interbank loans of38 million hryvnas (US$12.7m). 
In September - October 1998 the interbank market was barely functioning. It 
functioned only within very limited range. The key reason for this was a lack of trust 
of counteragents. In addition the number of participants was quite small, and resource 
supply was limited as well. The main facilities available were in the "super-short" 
category (loans up to 3 days). The hard currency deficit produced a situation such that 
only national currency was available for dealing by the end of the year. Hryvna 
supply had exceeded all predictable levels by December 1998 and the commercial 
banks' rates dropped under discounted rate of National Bank of Ukraine (60 %) by 
1.5 - 2.5 times to attract demand for hryvna denominated credits. In fact the NBU 
discount rate began to bear much less commonality with market rates, being 
determined by government policy and not by actual supply and demand 
considerations. 
During the year special attention was paid to increasing the range and quality of 
banking services and improving the existing procedures of credit granting, finding 
61 
new ways to service clients' credit including bills and export financing on the basis of 
bank guarantees. 
A group of Ukrainian banks (including "AGIO", "AVAL", Privatbank) created special 
departments of micro-crediting, long-term crediting of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (under international programs featuring Federal Government of Germany 
and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development). 
Whilst loan conditions were getting stricter (see the NBU decree on loan loss reserves 
in appendix 2 and summarised later in this chapter) the banking system did not reduce 
the value of issued loans in total for the year. In the second half of 1998 granting of 
credits denominated in foreign currency grew as a response to the inflation 
expectations in Ukraine. In total this segment showed slow growth of interest rates to 
levels 15-30% above NBU discount rates. The pressure on the hryvna was growing. 
The market crisis forced commercial banks to move away from interest income as a 
source of corporate profit and more towards commission and fees. This made 
commercial banks work more to upgrade their client bases in 1998. This meant further 
improvement of services, installing of new communication technologies and 
informational systems. Many commercial banks began to introduce new clearing 
products in order to attract deposits. Cheques, plastic cards and even Internet banking 
were offered. 
In 1998 some problems of the commercial banks' operation in Ukraine became more 
serious and negative tendencies began to appear. These tendencies can be seen in 
many banking crises around the world as weaker banks revealed capitalization 
problems. The crisis did noting to aid the resumption of trust in banks from ordinary 
citizens and the poor quality of some banks' credit portfolios was exposed. This was 
made clearer by the implementation of the NBU decree on provisions and reserves for 
loan losses. By the end of 1998 almost one third of all commercial banks were among 
the "problem" category. 
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International Accounting Standards 
At the beginning of 1998 there was a real challenge for the whole banking system. 
The main problem besides balancing and auditing of the year's results was changing 
the accounting principles in the banking sector to international standards. Some 
"pilot" banks had started practising this system since autumn 1997 but even so the 
change produced a lot of problems for most of commercial banks. The problems were 
mainly because of poorly functioning software. This paralysed the whole functioning 
of the banking system for a considerable time. Along with the cessation of 
transactions some commercial banks could not initialise their accounting packages in 
the first days of operation. 
The Ukrainian bank data presented in appendix 2 illustrates the impact of IAS on the 
largest banks, the missing data showing the small number of "pilot" banks before 
1998. 
The major difference between Ukrainian and IAS accounts is the publication of a loan 
loss reserve and provisions for bad and doubtful debts. Under the Soviet system risk 
in lending was not apparent since all funds were generated by the state and returned to 
the state via the banks. Commercial banks such as Inko were flattered by the use of 
Ukrainian accounting since this did not reveal the extent of loss or poor lending. Inko 
subsequently failed as mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
The NBU decree at appendix 2 is included not only as an example of NBU law 
making but as the definitive statement of loan loss reserve calculation. The salient 
points of the decree dated 27 March 1998 were as follows: 
• Commercial banks had to form a loan loss reserve covering all credit 
activity with immediate effect. 
• Quarterly reporting of reserves and accounting entries based on reserve 
volume was initiated. 
• Reserves have to be calculated according to NBU rules (basically 
prudential/due diligence review of the borrower's financial position) and 
comparison with key ratios (for corporate clients): 
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Total liquidity ratio above 2.0 - 2.5 
Acid Test ratio above 0.2 - 0.25 
Gearing ratio under 1.0 
Net long term liabilities ratio above 0.5 
• Borrowers have to be categorised from "A" to "E" according to NBU rules 
(summarised in Figure 3.2) and supporting records retained for 3 years. 
• Reserve levels for different categories have to be adhered to. 
• Rules regarding use of reserves must also be obeyed. 
• NBU can impose fines and order corrective action where loan loss reserves 
do not comply with the decree. 
Figure 3.2 Loan categorisation 
Good 
Standard 
Under control 
Substandard 
Doubtful 
Non-recoverable 
Very bad 
substandard 
doubtful 
non-recoverable 
non-recoverable 
non-recoverable 
In this context class "A" borrowers indicate a very good and sustainable financial 
position, "B" indicates good condition with possible future problems whilst "c" and 
"0" indicate average or poor financial positions. Class "E" indicates non-recovery of 
capital and interest. 
The classes are further subdivided into "good", "poor" and "very bad" according to 
the likelihood of interest payment and capital repayment with "good" representing 
complete repayment (only one refinancing allowed) within 90 days. Anything less 
than this stringent standard is classed as "poor" or worse. 
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The reserves required for each category ofloan are: 
Category 
Standard credits 
Credits under control 
Substandard credits 
Doubtful credits 
. Non- recoverable credits 
After-effects of crisis 
Reserve level (risk) 
2% 
5% 
20% 
50% 
100% 
The reactions to crisis of the NBU and the government have had some far-reaching 
effects in 1999. As the commercial banks reacted to change their structures and to 
develop expertise in risk management so the NBU has acted to change the 
environment in which commercial banks operate. 
In early 1999 the Exchange market was liberalised, a lot of administrative restrictions 
were cancelled, and Interbank Exchange Market was opened. The procedure of US 
dollar rate formation was liberalised. Currency dealings on Ukrainian and Crimean 
interbank exchange markets were stopped for some time. 
After the August 1998 crisis and default on repayment of government bonds the 
market in government bonds had practically perished by February 1999. This situation 
forced commercial banks to concentrate even more on commission income. This 
produced serious competition for good quality and solvent clients in 1999. 
The NBU's main focus in 1999 was to support hryvna stabilisation and to slow down 
inflation. It was hoped that this could be achieved by budget balancing and foreign 
creditors' support. Otherwise this will cause currency reserves loss and uncontrolled 
devaluation. 
In 1998 the National Bank of Ukraine was introducing a weighted monetary policy, 
holding the speed of money supply growth in real terms. The real monetary base 
increased by 2 % in 1998 and the real value of "wide" money by approximately 5 %. 
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A big budget deficit without real resources to cover meant that the NBU extended 
lending to the government in 1998. Thus the NBU increases its inside net assets faster 
than any other monetary aggregate in real time. These assets had grown by 80 % 
within just one year. 1999 would see much stricter monetary control. 
Recently the National Bank of Ukraine has been using the "pulsing" money supply 
procedure: for 1 - 2 months it is monetary narrowing policy and after, in the end of a 
quarter period it is monetary expansion policy - to provide successful payment of 
debts, accumulated in this period. Table 3.2 shows the various monetary aggregates 
and the effects (in early 1999) ofNBU action. 
Table 3.2 Monetary aggregates 1997-1999 (hrv.mn.) 
Money aggregates 1997 1998 Jan 1999 Feb 1999 Mar 1999 
MO 6132 7158 6705 6747 6714 
Risk speed ratio, % 152 109 94 100.6 99.5 
Ml 9050 10133 9838 9872 ---
Risk speed ratio, % 143 108 95 100.3 ---
M2 12448 15432 14880 15090 ---
Risk speed ratio, % 138 106 96 101 ---
M3 12541 15718 15185 15366 15940 
Risk speed ratio, % 134 106 97 101.2 103.7 
From the middle of 1996, real money supply volume has been constantly increasing in 
spite of production decline. Financing of government expenditure and support of 
insolvent enterprises had withdrawn all the resources from banking sector that could 
be spent on effective companies' needs. If budget deficit in 1999 reaches I % of GDP 
it would be possible to supply good clients with credits worth 2 billion hryvnas (US$ 
667m) (from 3 billion (US$ I bn.) of planned "wide" money growth). 
In 1998 commercial banks were keeping a stable level of lending in real terms, 
especially oriented on insured (secured) clients. Credit volume for small and average 
enterprises was limited because of the high interest rates and unwillingness of banks 
to increase their credit risk within a crisis period. 
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At the end of 1998, because of devaluation and increased inflation, the deposit base 
started to shrink. Despite the high speed of devaluation, most citizens started to 
withdraw their money from banks and invest it into US dollars or other hard 
currencies. This sharp decrease of deposit value during the crisis period, compared to 
huge amount of cash turnover, reflects a continuing lack of tru'st in the banking sector. 
Ukrainian banking in 2000 
The 1990's have seen the need for commercial banks to function in conditions where 
government institutions no longer support certain economic sectors and the private 
sector is growing. Commercial banks are, therefore, required to provide a sound 
financial-economic base for all businesses. More detail on the specific plans of 
individual banks is shown in the research findings chapter (Chapter 5) 
Some commercial banks are also expanding by opening new branches, a sure sign of 
confidence. At the same time other banks are closing down or selling their branches 
because of management problems. In a market economy the bureaucratic 
management style of the Soviet era is no longer sufficient protection against the 
pressures of business. 
Most commercial banks are also trying to improve the quality of their operations. 
Modern commercial banks are becoming a part of international clearing systems, 
signing up as agents of the international plastic card institutions and absorbing world 
banking experience, especially in the field of staff training and management. The 
introduction of new technologies and modern software is also evident. 
Current payment procedures (especially advance payment) are not ideal and are 
slowing down the development of market activity. Commercial banks and enterprises 
are at the forefront of distributing new methods of payments. 
The banks also have to cope with non-bank competition In core services as non-
banking organisations (different funds, financial companies, financial-industrial 
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associations and others) can attract and distribute money. Basically, they provide the 
same services that commercial banks do, but without licenses. 
Competition with deposit and non-deposit financial institutions produces new 
products and opens new market sectors. Competition pushes commercial banks' 
management to more effective planning. It also makes bank management more 
innovative. 
One key factor apparent in 2000 and related to future growth of Ukrainian banking is 
that Ukrainian banks do not enjoy the trust of the population. Although commercial 
banks have strengthened their position in the face of economic adversity they lack the 
essential ingredient for growth based on increasing consumer deposits (Sochan, 
1998). 
In Soviet times banks were mere conduits of government policy, an executive branch 
of the central Bank. This perception is no longer valid, especially as the NBU has 
enacted monetary policy without the concurrence of banks. Indeed, commercial 
banks have largely survived due to their ability to avoid the strictures ofNBU control. 
The perception of commercial banks being an arm of central policy still persists, 
however. It is strengthened by the feeling that the banks were the perpetrators of 
hyper-inflation (Sochan, 1998), since many pre - 1991 savings and deposits became 
worthless at that time. 
A legacy of stricter control 
The NBU now apply especially strict control procedures to the solvency of the 
banking system because of the crisis in 1998. The procedures of liquidity support are 
provided only for commercial banks with a satisfactory solvency ratio (and in some 
cases - for former state banks, that lose their liquidity temporarily). Following this 
policy will insure the whole banking sector against loss of liquidity or bankruptcy 
risk. The big role of the NBU in the future is to provide restructuring of the banking 
sector in order to gain early warning of bank insolvency. The main problems that 
require solving are: 
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• which banks have to be closed down; 
• which banks need assistance for improving; 
• which banks can be allowed to combine; 
• what procedures are to be applied for improving the economy; 
The current situation in the Ukrainian banking sector is that of the 275 banks 
registered since 1991 only 217 remained registered by April 1999. Out of this amount 
only 171 bank have licenses (158 have licenses on operation with foreign currencies). 
Table 3.3 summarises the structure of Ukrainian banking in 1999: 
Group 
* 
** 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Table 3.3 Ukrainian banks in April 1999 
Group criterion No. of Share of 
banks GBA* 
Assets over I billion hrv (US$ 333m) (System banks). 7 52% 
Assets over 100 million hrv (US$ 33m). 27 25.6% 
Assets under 100 million hrv (US$ 33m). 99 15% 
Assets under 10 million hrv (US$ 3.3m). 23 0.7% 
Problem banks** 61 6.7% 
totals 217 100.00% 
Total gross banking assets 
17 "Problem banks" account for 6.3% of GBA. Of the 61 banks 20 were in 
the process of financial improvement, 5 had lost their licences and 36 were 
being liquidated. 
The future for Ukraine 
The program "Ukraine 2010" was elaborated by the Cabinet of Ministers in 2000. It 
stipulates the main topics of Ukrainian banking sector economic improvement being 
contemplated by government: 
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Over the next few years Ukrainian banks should see: 
• Improvements in the existing system of bank registration and issuing of licenses 
for banking operations; 
• The provision of an effective currency policy; 
• The further development of banking transfer services; 
• The restoration of liquidity in the banking market. 
• Better laws relating to the liquidation of banks and the bankruptcy of firms. 
Whilst it is encouraging to see a focus maintained on this important area of economic 
activity the lessons of the recent past must be learned and the firm control of the NBU 
maintained alongside relaxations to encourage the sector to expand. 
Government regulation of commercial banks' activity 
The effectiveness of the commercial banking system in Ukraine depends on effective 
and efficient government regulation. As a newly independent state of the former 
Soviet Union, Ukraine needed a "proprietary" banking system. This was launched in 
March 1991, with the enacting of the Law of Ukraine " About Banks and Banking 
Activity ". The law was provided for two-tier banking system composed of the 
National Bank and commercial banks of all forms of ownership. A brief history of 
the NBU and the major changes it has undergone is shown in Figure 3.3. 
Functions of the National Bank of Ukraine 
The NBU is hugely influential and powerful. It performs many of the normal central 
bank functions together with the responsibility for issuing decrees and regulations. 
The NBU Governor is responsible directly to the Verkhovnaya Rada (Parliament). 
The term of Governor's service is 5 years unless any external circumstances take 
place. The Parliament can replace the Governor by special decree. The Governor 
manages the National Bank of Ukraine via the Banks Council. 
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Figure 3.3 A brief history of the National Bank of Ukraine 
Date Event 
March 1991 Foundation 
October Re-registering of commercial banks that were registered by former 
USSR State bank. 
Jan 1992 "temporary" coupon currency introduced 
August Establishing ofNBU Currency Stock Market 
September Ukraine's entry to the IMF and World Bank 
October Ukraine's entry to the EBRD 
Feb 1993 Approval of the NBU as leading monetary institution 
June Establishment the Central Clearing Department of the NBU 
July 
November 
Restructuring of the NBU Stock Exchange to Ukrainian Interbank 
Stock Exchange 
Establishment of electronic reporting system 
Jan 1994 Implementation of the National Clearing System using electronic inter-
bank clearings 
April Application of the daily reporting procedure for commercial banks and 
whole banking system 
Feb 1995 Approval of the cash operation procedures 
March Approval of thc agricultural households credit granting procedures 
June Installation of commercial banks' cash operation procedures 
September Introduction of the commercial banks' licensing procedures 
March 1996 Approval of accounting and reporting procedures for Ukrainian banks. 
Interbank Clearing Procedures Decree is approved. 
Implementation of the new Ukrainian currency - hryvna 
May Approval of new procedures for national and foreign currency accounts 
in commercial banks. 
1997 - 98 Introduction of numerous procedures to regulate commercial banks' 
activity 
1999 The Law of Ukraine about the NBU is approved 
Being one of the most important financial institutions of independent Ukraine, the 
National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) is the direct successor to the republican branch of 
the former State Bank of the USSR. According to the Law "About Banks and 
Banking Activity", the NBU is Ukraine's central bank whose main function is to 
pursue the integral state policy in the money circulation and lending area, and to 
ensure the stability of the national currency. The NBU maintains the Republican 
register of banks, currency exchanges and other financial and lending institutions. 
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As a money emission centre, the NBU also enjoys a monopoly right to issue money 
and to provide cash for the national economy. In this role it masterminded the 
establishment of the Ukrainian hryvna in 1996 which replaced the temporary 
"coupon" currency used since independence. Currency printing and coin production 
is also a profit making initiative with international orders being received. 
The NBU is a state currency agency that exercises currency policy within the overall 
framework of the economic policy of the country using currency asset reserves 
retained at the National Bank. The NBU is empowered to define the means for setting, 
pegging and using foreign currency exchange rates in terms of the currency of 
Ukraine, and to monitor the enforcement of currency legislation. 
The NBU also carries out the banking supervision function, and it is responsible to the 
society at large for the banking system operation; in addition, the NBU co-ordinates 
and controls commercial bank compliance with banking regulations. To support the 
banking system stability, the NBU refinances commercial banks performing the role 
of the bankers' bank and "lender oflast resort". 
As a state bank, the NBU organises and carries out the cash execution of the State 
budget of Ukraine via authorised commercial banks. It also organises inter-bank 
settlement arrangements. 
Under the Constitution of Ukraine, the NBU enjoys the right to initiate laws and 
regulations (an example of such a law is reproduced in appendix 2). 
This hugely powerful and influential state agency also compiles two macroeconomic 
data systems: monetary and banking statistics and the balance-of-payment statistics. 
Development of a banking control system in Ukrainee 
Banking control is a part of NBU' s statutory role. The Banking Control Department 
carries out its control functions according to Ukrainian legislation and is in charge of 
depositors' and creditors' protection and maintenance of confidence in the financial-
banking system. 
72 
The key methods of control used by NBU are: 
• Registration and licensing; 
• Inspection and topical checking; 
• Establishment and checking of prudential and liquidity ratios; 
• Punishing commercial banks for violating banking legislation. 
The NBU has set up systems and procedures to support its work: 
• Early warning procedures for failing banks. 
• Reporting of economic ratios of commercial banks; 
• "CAMELS" rating system of commercial banks' activity. 
CAMELS stands for: 
Capital adequacy 
Asset quality 
Management quality 
Earnings 
Liquidity 
Sensitivity to market risk 
The NBU also acts to improve the financial condition of commercial banks by 
managing restructuring and mergers of banks. 
The NBU carries out control over observance of banking legislation and NBU 
regulations by commercial banks and is authorised to decide the procedures that 
should be applied to commercial banks. It has the power to increase the ratio of 
obligatory reserve of cash holdings, to cancel licenses for some (or all) banking 
operations, to dismiss a bank's management, to apply to the arbitration court with 
charges against banks in case of violations and to apply other procedures according to 
Ukrainian legislation. 
The obligatory reserve (cash holdings) requirement is an affective instrument of 
money volume regulation. It is established by NBU and formed by requiring banks to 
keep some money on corresponding account and in cash. If a commercial bank does 
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not maintain the required volume of cash holdings it is penalised by the total of the 
interest income received from the amount of the cash holdings that were missing. 
This cash reserve obligation was relaxed in July 1999 by decree number 332. 
Analysis of major Ukrainian banks 
Comparative statistics on all Ukrainian banks are both incomplete and subject to bias 
introduced by the providers of data and of the annual reports of the banks from which 
the data are derived. This latter bias should diminish from 1998 onwards as 
Ukrainian banks adopted International Accounting Standards (lAS) during 1997. 
This chapter analyses Ukrainian bank data contained in the Bankscope database 
(Bureau van Dijk, 1999). This database contains information of 10,000 commercial 
banks from all over the world, including Ukrainian commercial banks, it is used 
within Ukrainian banks to analyze the financial condition of commercial banks both 
as potential borrowers and as correspondents for international trade finance. 
The Bankscope database contains information based on IAS only. Since Ukrainian 
commercial banks changed to IAS in 1998, most of the data, provided here for 1997, 
1996, 1995 is not complete. The development of the Ukrainian banking system is 
analysed on a base of the 23 largest banks by asset value. These banks have been 
dominant in establishing and developing the Ukrainian banking system. These banks 
also form the core of the Ukrainian banking system. The data is reported in appendix 
2. 
The following analysis looks at key measures of bank performance encapsulated in 
parts of the CAMELS system. The analysis focuses mainly on the vital areas of 
liquidity, capital adequacy and profitability. Detailed data are not available to analyse 
asset quality or management quality and so these aspects must be implied from 
financial ratios alone. In addition the data do not allow for comparison with 
prudential ratios found in similarly sized Western banks or under the Basle 
agreement. In particular, the breakdown of assets for risk weighting is not possible 
since the data is aggregated before it is reported into the database. However, the 
progress or problems of individual banks is highlighted using their own published 
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accounts, press releases and detail from the interviews conducted as part of this 
research. 
Liquidity measures 
Assets 
The total absolute volume of Ukrainian commercial banks' assets has been growing 
since 1995. In general this means that the stability and activity of the banking sector 
has been improving over the period. 
Within the data the volatile nature of banking assets in Ukraine can be determined. 
Changes in total asset values of over 50% in one year are not uncommon. Individual 
banks show dramatic growth, dramatic decline or dramatic reversals of fortune in the 
space of one year. 
The dominance of former state owned banks (Ukraina, Prominvestbank, Ukrsotsbank) 
has been threatened by the dynamic asset accumulation seen in a number of banks. 
Among these are: Oschadbank, A val, Privatbank, Credit Lyonnais Ukraine, 
Ukrgazprombank and VaBank. Smoother asset growth is seen in Praveks, Ukraine, 
ZUKB, Perkombank, Kiev, Grant and Pivdenny. 
Despite these dramatic changes of size the dominance of the 7 "System" banks has 
not been interrupted as they still account for over 50% of all assets. The strengths of 
individual banks within "Group 1" have altered, however. Individual banks can be 
highlighted to illustrate this: 
Oschadbank has seen very dramatic growth of assets since 1995. Customer and 
short-term funding volume has been increasing since 1996 - as a result of growing 
trust amongst ci tizens and customers. The bank has been showing a stead y decrease in 
Net LoanslTotal Assets ratio. In 1996 its ratio was well above average at 38.52 (av. 
27.93). By 1998 this had reduced to well below average at 21.78 (av. 35.16). 
Oschadbank's growth and the attraction of customer funds have been brought about 
by two separate factors: growth in the branch network and a cautious lending policy. 
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The latter (whilst not supported by data on profitability available in the database) is 
felt to encourage the attraction of funds, especially when consumers compare its 
record with the failure (and loss of customer funds) of similarly sized banks. 
Bank Ukraina had been showing asset decline until 1997 and then rapid recovery 
and growth. The lending performance had been more prudent up to 1997 and based on 
its core agricultural customers but in 1998 the bank started to expand its credit 
portfolio dramatically. The effects of this expansion are seen in the sharp net income 
decline in 1998 (10% of 1996 levels), largely due to the halving of net interest 
margins between 1997 and 1998 in order to attract funds and attract borrowers. In 
addition the risk profile of the bank has worsened as Net Loans/Total Assets ratio is 
constantly increasing. In 1998 this ratio reached level of 50. I 2 %, which greatly 
exceeded the national average. 
Prominvestbank has seen assets decreasing since 1995. At the same time the Net 
Loans/Total Assets ratio has been growing rapidly. The ratio reached 64.83 % in 
1998, which exceeded the average level almost twice. The data indicate that the 
credit policy of the bank worsened the risk profile of the institution but no data is 
available on loan loss reserves for 1997 and 1998 to corroborate this. The bank 
mainly suffered from bad lending to old industries that were in decline. This lending 
took huge amounts of resources and worsened the bank's capital adequacy position. 
Liabilities - Customer & Short Term Funding 
According to the data provided it is clear that the total volume of Ukrainian 
commercial banks' Customer & Short Term Funding has been increasing since 1995. 
Almost all commercial banks show this tendency. The sharpest increase is seen in 
Ukrgazprombank and Perkombank, although this was from a relatively low base. The 
largest volumes of deposits and short-term funds are seen in the former state owned 
banks. These banks benefit from having the most developed net of branches all over 
the country. These are: Ukraina, Oschadbank, Aval and Ukrsotsbank. Clearly 
availability of branches is important in the garnering of deposits and from analysis of 
the research interviews it comes as no surprise to find smaller banks planning to 
expand domestic coverage as an important part of their growth. 
76 
Some banks' Customer & Short Term Funding has fallen since 1995 as customers 
avoid riskier investments. The banks worst affected are: First Ukrainian International 
Bank, AGIO and Bank Kiev. This decline eliminated lending funding and was one of 
the causes for the dramatic reduction in assets over the same period. 
Chart 3.2 reflects NBU data on activity in the interbank market showing a slowing of 
interbank lending as a proportion of funds sources between 1992 and 1998. The data 
also reflect the growing importance of household deposits. This shows some return of 
trust in the banking system by the general population. 
A different picture is painted when the Capital Funds/Liabilities ratio is reviewed. 
Here Prominvestbank, First Ukrainian International Bank and Agio show comfortable 
ratio levels whilst Ukraina, Oschadbank and Ukrsotsbank show very low capital 
cover. 
Most of the larger banks appear to be reliant on short term rather than long term 
funding - a situation that cannot be allowed to continue unchecked by the NBU. 
Net LoanslTotal Assets 
The total average volume of this ratio has been growing steadily since 1995. This 
shows that the credit portfolios in reviewed commercial banks have been growing, 
since most banks also show increasing assets. The credit risk profile of the banks has 
also changed. There has been more active lending in the Ukrainian banking sector 
since 1995 although this brings with it some negative aspects. Along with the 
increasing volume of this ratio we can expect a worsening of credit portfolio quality 
in the future since Ukraine's economic situation fails to improve. 
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Chart 3.2 Sources of Ukrainian Commercial Bank funding 1992 - 1998 
hrivna (m) 
1993 
1992 
hrv. millions 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Corporate Deposits 17 244 2208 3729 4197 4050 5061 
Household Deposits 3 30 214 642 1289 2400 3217 
Interbank and NBU Deposits 8 460 2018 2424 3261 5261 5864 
TOTAL 28 734 4440 6795 8747 11711 14142 
% % % % % % % % 
Corporate Deposits 60.7% 33.2% 49.7% 54.9% 48.0% 34.6% 35.8% 
Household Deposits 10.7% 4.1% 4.8% 9.4% 14.7% 20.5% 22.7% 
Interbank and NBU Deposits 28.6% 62.7% 45.5% 35.7% 37.3% 44.9% 41.5% 
growth 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 
Corporate Deposits 1335% 805% 69% 13% -4% 25% 
Household Deposits 900% 613% 200% 101% 86% 34% 
Interbank and NBU Deposits 5650% 339% 20% 35% 61% 11% 
OVERALL 2521% 505% 53% 29% 34% 21% 
A growing Net Loans/Total Assets ratio is seen in: Bank Ukraine, Grant Bank, Credit 
Lyonnais, Prom invest bank, Ukrsotsbank and Privatbank. The NBU is sure to keep a 
watchful eye on the categorisation of their loans. Some banks have managed to 
reduce the level of this ratio. Among these Ukrinbank and Bank Kiev have decreased 
the size of their of loan portfolio volume. Alone, Oschadbank has affected the ratio 
by increasing its assets too. 
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Net Loans/Customer & Short Term Funding 
The finer focus afforded by this ratio indicates that this key measure of risk is 
impacted more by short term than long term funding. It shows that the dependency of 
the Ukrainian banks' credit policy on Customer & Short Term Funding is becoming 
more serious. 
Only a few banks have chosen a policy to decrease this ratio (Oschadbank in 
particular mainly by a sharp increase of funding volume, Ukrin Bank, on the other 
hand, by a decline of credit activity). The other commercial banks show the tendency 
of loan volume accumulation despite the slower increase of Customer & Short-Term 
Funding volume. 
As reported above, Prominvesbank's decline in Customer & Short Term Funding was 
one of the main reasons for their ratio increase. Privatbank and Credit Lyonnais, on 
the other hand, have been increasing lending activity. Bank Ukraina has increased 
both its Short Term Funding and its lending portfolio quite dramatically. 
Loan Loss Reserve/Gross Loans 
Governed by IAS criteria and the NBU decree of March 1998 regarding loan 
categorisation and the creation of loan loss reserves, this is a broad ratio of asset 
quality. The former Ukrainian accounting system failed to provide for potential loss in 
this way and, therefore flattered banks with poor lending records. 
The data provided are sparse and cover only 9 of the 23 banks reported (four of the 
seven group I banks, four group two banks and one group three bank). Of the Group 
I banks (Assets over hrv. I billion (US$333m)) Bank Ukraina, Bank Kiev and 
Ukrsotsbank all show improving asset quality whilst Privatbank shows a worsening 
picture. Of the four Group I banks Bank Ukraina alone carries reserves over 20% of 
gross loans (a legacy of its connections with agriculture). Ukrinbank shows the 
poorest lending record with a reserve ratio of 45.12% in 1998, due largely to the 
specialised nature of its lending. 
79 
In the future this ratio will become an important benchmark for asset quality but now 
serves to underline the irrelevance of comparison with similarly sized Western banks 
that enjoy growing economies and significantly smaller loan loss reserves. 
Capital adequacy 
Equity 
Considering the fact that most data are not available for 1995 and 1996, the total 
tendency of Ukrainian banks' in equity capital since 1995 is clear. Reversal and 
slowing of this growth in 1998 is mainly explained by the national currency crisis 
and, as a result, equity depreciation. Among commercial banks this situation is not the 
same. Some banks display pretty rapid equity accumulation (Ukrsotsbank, Aval, 
Ukraina, Credit Lyonnais, Perkombank, and Ukrgazprombank). Others have show 
less tendency to increase equity. A few banks decreased their equity by 1998 
(Prom invest bank Agio), Ukrinbank had even decreased its equity to negative 
US$3,545,000. 
Prominvcstbank has seen equity levels rise substantially in 1997, caused by share 
distribution among staff and other buyers, and then fall again in 1998. The bank's 
ROAE ratio has shown a decreasing tendency over the past 4 years and the level of 
Net Interest Margin has been decreasing as well. These figures show that the decline 
in equity was caused by other factors in addition to the currency devaluation in 1998. 
These factors included: trading losses in the face of competition, poor credit portfolio 
quality and huge expenditures on a substantial network of branches - largely without 
the desired objective of branches to gamer deposits. The Capital FundslLiabilities 
ratio of this bank was upset by the surge in equity formation in 1997 but re-
established its downward trend by 1998. 
Oschadbank has been constantly decreasing its equity since 1995. Despite success in 
attracting deposits and short-term funds its lending has been cautious. Soviet-era 
management has shown its ineffectiveness in a modem banking sector. Overstaffed 
branches (most of them non-profitable) have lowered the bank's flexibility and 
prospects for earnings. Overall the bank shows its low competitive abilities and this is 
reflected in low investor confidence. 
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Privatbank has been increasing its equity over the past 4 years despite the currency 
crisis of 1998. Even though that bank's ROAE ratio was declining along with other 
commercial banks, it still remains at quite high level and well above the average 
figure. Privatbank has been very competitive in maintaining a low net interest margin. 
Net Income has been growing over this period due to a combination of higher than 
average lending against short term funds, a lower bad debt ratio and evidence of some 
degree of cost control. This paints a picture of a bank with increasing turnover, more 
active operations and assets growth. 
The banks are under pressure from the equity requirements of the National Bank of 
Ukraine. In order to meet required levels of cover all commercial banks will push 
their businesses towards the capitalization of reserves and increase in equity. This, of 
course, assumes profitability, which, as can be seen, cannot be certain. 
The average value of the Equity/Average Assets ratio has been increasing steadily 
among Ukrainian banks: since total assets and equity have both been growing, with 
equity growing faster. This is largely due to the equity requirements of the National 
Bank of Ukraine. 
Total Capi tal Ratio 
Compared to the international standards the average total capital ratio of Ukraine's 
banks is quite high, which. explains the investment attractiveness of Ukrainian 
banking sector to foreign capital. The whole picture is not quite clear, however, 
because of the lack of data for most commercial banks. 
Profitability 
Net income 
The total income of Ukrainian commercial banks has been decreasing over the period 
1995 to 1998. Profitability of the banking sector in Ukraine has been falling too. As a 
result of the reduction in inflation and stricter NBU regulations the banking business 
in Ukraine has, however, been getting less risky. 
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Some efforts have been made to reduce cost/income ratios but ineffective 
management, a large network of non-profit-making branches along with the poor 
quality of credit portfolios caused sharp income declines in the former state-owned 
and some commercial banks as shown in the following summary: 
Table 3.4 Net income in key Ukrainian banks 1995 to 1998 
Bank 1995 (US$) 1998 (US$) Change 
Prominvestbank 153,177,000 17,975,000 -88% 
Ukraina 25,400,000 4,500,000 -82% 
First Ukrainian 10,500,000 700,000 -93% 
International Bank 
IAS Bank (11,270,000) 3,846,000· 
-
Overall average·· 198,622,000 127,834,000 -36% 
• 1996figure used, 1995 not avmlable in IASjormat. 
• All reported banks 
Net interest margin 
Almost every Ukrainian commercial bank has been moving towards reducing their net 
interest margins. From the time that the overall economic situation had been 
improving and stabilizing, mainly through the reduction in inflation, most commercial 
banks started to cut their net interest margins. 
The reduction has resulted in a short-term decline in profitability and has contributed 
to the weakening of the former Soviet banks' oligopoly and market dominance. This 
measure shows that, overall, competition between banks in providing better services 
and cheaper rates is increasing. But still this ratio is quite high compared to foreign 
banks. 
Return on Average Assets (ROAA) 
The average volume of this ratio has been constantly falling (from 8.38 in 1995 down 
to 6.28 in 1998). Former state-owned banks again support the suggestion that their 
management is poor by returning very low ROAA ratios between 0 and 2.8, which is 
under the average volume of ROAA for Ukrainian banks. The best result in 1998 so 
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far was in Ukrgazprombank, which had raised this ratio from 11.04 in previous year 
to 30.70 in 1998. The Return on Average Assets ratio is very high compared to 
international requirements. This explains both profitability and the associated high 
level of risks in the Ukrainian banking sector. 
Return on Average Equity (ROAE) 
As the average ROAA volume, this ratio had greatly dropped SInce 1996 (from 
120.26 down to 31.60). All this shows is that profits of commercial banks are down. 
Some banks, such as Ukrgazprombank, Ukrsotsbank and Bank Kiev have shown a 
sharp increase in this ratio. It is felt that this indicates an improvement in the quality 
of management. At the same time many commercial banks, including Privatbank, 
Perkombank and Ukraina saw a decline in this ratio. Despite the whole picture of 
pessimistic decline of return on average equity situation, this ratio remains very high 
compared to international standards. 
Cost to Income Ratio 
The overall average cost/income ratio had been increasing until 1997 but in 1998 it 
fell by 6 %. Decreasing of net interest margin and the lower resultant incomes mainly 
caused the decline. 
Higher costs are seen in Ukrinbank, Ukraina, Privatbank, Pravex and Ukrsotsbank -
mainly the banks with big market shares and can be explained by a set of related 
factors: 
• Most of these banks have wide net of branches and as a result very costly 
operation. 
• Large numbers of staff makes it hard to reduce costs. 
• Bad management and low qualification of staff increases operational costs. 
Of the commercial banks Bank Kiev and Credit Lyonnais have shown constant and 
stable improvement in Cost-Income balance. The total picture shows that commercial 
banks are beginning to control their expenses. 
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Conclusion 
The Ukrainian experience has shown that commercial banks can develop and function 
in unstable economic conditions and social-political and psychological crises. Since 
banking reform started in 1991 most of commercial banks have focused their interest 
on the more effective functioning of the banking system. It is still too early to talk 
about a developed banking system that can be related to a real market economy, but, 
despite instability in political-economic and social-psychology sphere, the foundation 
is good and signs of successful banking system development are apparent. 
The key to the successful introduction of commercial banks is the creation of a 
competitive environment. This encourages the growth of commercial banks and other 
financial organisations. According to this situation it is important for both large and 
small banks to concentrate their efforts in certain sectors of the financial market and 
provide flexible and competitive services. It is also important to provide personal 
services for some clients. Further growth of commercial banks will also cause a 
decline in the market influence of former state banks in this sector. 
The brief history of Ukrainian banking has shown that market reforms and effective 
competition have been delayed by the dominance of former state banks. These banks 
display ill preparedness for competition, the legacy of poor management and 
moribund assets. Once macroeconomic conditions recovered the frailties of these 
banks were exposed and more able banks began to grow and increase their market 
shares. 
All businesses are interested in the development of commercial banks. The principle 
that a stable business relationship with a commercial bank will lead to profit for both 
enterprise and bank is well understood. 
Another legacy of the centrist policies of the former times is that larger banks are 
concentrated in and around the capital, Kiev. Smaller banks tend to "fill the gaps" in 
the regions where the larger bank networks fail to provide adequate cover. The 
smaller banks tend to finance small and middle-sized enterprises and usually treat 
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every client in a personal way. These banks are closer to businesses and families and 
it makes positive prospects for their future development. 
To attract Ukrainian investment and to stabilise the Ukrainian economy the NBU has 
moved increasingly towards tighter prudential and regulatory control. A principal 
pressure on commercial banks, in particular, is the increased capital requirements. 
Measures are also in place to ensure the increasing of solvency, stability, efficiency 
and competitive ability of commercial banks and, by implication, the return of 
investors' trust. It is likely that this will lead to the combination and selling of smaller 
and weaker banks. 
The creation of commercial banks is a direct result of transforming the administrative 
- centralised system to a market economy. The banking sector requires change in the 
structural and functional spheres too. In a market economy banks operate in an open, 
free environment, without bureaucracy and corruption. This state of affairs is yet to 
be found in Ukraine. Accordingly the quality of the commercial banks' management 
is very important in this situation. 
Perhaps the major external constraint on the development of a commercial banking 
system in Ukraine during the 1990's was the country's monetary policy, chosen as the 
main lever in stabilising the economy in Ukraine. It was planned to achieve the 
economic improvement only by monetary methods through the banking system 
without using other important mechanisms. This situation caused the following 
complications: 
• Lending to loss making sectors of the economy by Government and commercial 
banks (this was supported by policy of the National Bank of Ukraine); 
• The transfer of capital into loss making enterprises and, as a result, a lack of 
investments for other sectors; 
• An inflation boost was mainly caused by uncontrolled monetary policy; this had 
implications for credit quality and interest margins - both of which declined. 
• The diminution of citizens' trust in the national banking system and government; 
• Aggravation of bureaucracy and corruption in government administrations; 
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Ignoring the other methods of non-monetary influence caused the most dangerous 
changes in the Ukrainian economy: killing off consumer and industrial as well as 
agricultural production by high taxation, corruption and unstable legislation. 
In 1998 Ukrainian banks weathered their worst storms so far. At a time when the 
exposure of bad debt losses, through the introduction of IAS accounting, influenced 
profitability and investor confidence commercial banks acted strategically to make 
full use of the short-term capital available. 
Whilst assets grew in 1998 this was because of short-term deposits rather than long 
term investment. Those banks with efficient, low cost and well-positioned branch 
networks fared better than most. 
As the Ukrainian commercial banking sector enters the new millennium it faces a new 
set of challenges that will allow it to cast off the historic and restrictive influence of 
former times. These challenges come from within and outside the industry: 
• Finding ways to improve capital positions and to raise equity finance in order to 
meet NBU requirements. Capital growth is the key measure of success cited by 
interview respondents (see chapter 5). 
• Finding ways to recover problem banks, through take-over, merger or 
recapitalisation. This is a longer-term problem too as the professional training of 
bank staff and the recruitment of good quality management is also needed to 
maintain recovered banks. 
• Re-establishing stock markets and financial markets following the devastation of 
currency and macroeconomic instability. 
• Developing consumer trust in commercial banks. 
• Developing commercial banks as an integral part of monetary policy transmission. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DEVELOPMENT IN OTHER POST-COMMUNIST STATES 
Introduction and rationale 
In 1991 Ukraine was not alone in embarking on the transition from central control to 
market economy. Most eastern European states had begun reforms either before or at 
the same time as Ukraine. 
This chapter reviews the experiences of post-communist regimes after 1991, drawing 
comparisons between selected states and areas and Ukraine in order to contextualise 
development in the political and economic environments and in the banking markets. 
The states focused on in particular are selected to illustrate the dichotomised 
experiences of the area and can be categorised into "early" and "late" market 
reformers as shown in Figure 4.1 : 
Figure 4.1 Selected post-communist states 
States 
Early Reformers Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Poland 
Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) 
Late reformers Belarus 
Russian Federation 
Comparative data for Ukraine is also included. The conclusion of Chapter 2 of this 
thesis puts Ukraine firmly in the "Late" reformers camp. 
Categorisation by bank reform progress shows Ukraine having made "some progress" 
as with many CIS states. "Substantial progress" is seen in Eastern Europe and the 
Baltic states. No former communist regime (by 1996) had what The Banker described 
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as "Well functioning systems" (The Banker, 1996). Figure 4.2 shows the full listings 
provided by The Banker: 
Well functioning 
systems (1) 
Key: 
N 
o 
N 
E 
Figure 4.2 Bank reform progress 
Substantial Some progress 
progress (2) (3) 
Croatia Albania 
Czeeh Republic Bulgaria 
Hungary Belarus 
Macedonia Armenia 
Poland Azerbaijan 
Romania Kazakhstan 
Slovakia Moldova 
Slovenia Russia 
Estonia Ukraine 
Latvia Uzbekistan 
Lithuania Kyrgystan 
Georgia 
Little progress 
(4) 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Substantial deepening of financial markets; well functioning competition; nearing BIS standards of 
prudential regulation & supervision. 
2 Full interest rate liberalisation; significant presence of private banks & lending to private firms; 
substantial progress in establishing prudential regulation & supervision. 
3 Interest rates significantly influencing credit allocation. 
4 Little progress beyond establishing two-tier banking system. 
The similarities and differences between "early" and "late" reformers and between 
other states and Ukraine will be highlighted in this chapter. A note of caution must be 
made, however. Comparing progress since 1989 is not to assume that all communist 
regimes were similar prior to this date. Reform in areas outside the former Soviet 
Union was already underway in 1989. In addition, the imposition of centrist policies 
dated back to the end of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) in westernmost areas 
rather than back to the communist revolution of 1917. 
An interesting but un-researched difference is also apparent in the religious schism 
apparent between the western "Roman Catholic" countries and the eastern "Orthodox" 
ones (Hill, 1999). 
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The Political environment 
The political environment and the speed to refonn are major factors in understanding 
the economic progress of post-communist states. In addition to the differing initial 
economic conditions in 1989 three key political factors can be identified 
(Gaworzewska,2000). These three factors are inter-linked and, in some ways, 
inseparable: 
• Limited external aid 
• Differing political conditions 
• Diverse refonn strategies 
External aid 
Post-communist states soon realised that Western encouragement to seek 
independence was not to be backed up by substantial financial aid. Sources of aid 
were limited and instead the European Union, The European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, 
among others, offered technical and knowledge-based aid alongside limited financial 
assistance. 
Aid was often linked to the reform process (as seen in Ukraine) and some debt re-
structuring was seen. Again there was a divide in Europe with earlier reformers 
benefiting more from aid. Of the early beneficiaries ofEU "Phare" assistance 
(Eastern Europe and the Baltic states) most have now applied for membership of the 
enlarged EU. None of the "Tacis" states (fonner Soviet Union) has thus far applied to 
join. Both "Phare" and "Tacis" funding have been targeted at structural, 
environmental, energy and infrastructure assistance together with cross-border co-
operation issues. The EU "Tempus" funding was specifically eannarked for Higher 
Education. An example of this is detailed in Chapter 2 where a ECU900,000 three 
year programme to improve the Banking faculty at Kiev State University of Trade and 
Economics was undertaken with UK and French Higher Education support. 
It is, however, doubtful that additional aid would have improved economic 
perfonnance in a marked way. The infrastructure problems and transition from 
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centrist to market based policies meant that transition was always going to be a slow 
process. It must also be questioned whether transition economies could successfully 
absorb large-scale resources in the way envisaged (Gaworzewska, 2000). 
The EBRD, founded in 1992 with the purpose of assisting transition economies in 
eastern and central Europe, had provided in excess of ECU 19 billions by the end of 
1999 in a mixture of loans, guarantees and equity participation. Projects have been 
funded up to 100% with average participation around 25 - 35%. Table 4.1 details the 
investments made in the transition states highlighted in this chapter. 
Table 4.1 EBRD funding in transition economies 1994-1999 
ECU million To 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
Poland 711 107 207 264 272 272 1833 
Hungary 657 406 133 lOO 41 108 1445 
Czech 352 lOO 50 405 67 227 1201 
Republic -
Baltic States 242 142 119 124 134 146 907 
Belarus 141 21 0 11 0 0 173 
Russian 906 811 882 1054 272 222 4147 
Federation 
Ukraine 155 148 115 232 14 I 281 1072 
Sub-total 3164 1735 1506 2190 927 1256 10778 
Others 1834 1120 1321 1824 1076 1292 8467 
TOTALS 4998 2855 2827 4014 2003 2458 19245 
Source: EBRD Annual reports 1995 to 1999. 
EBRD support has been a key factor in economic reform in many states with an 
average 42% of funding annually going to the banking and financial sector. A major 
example of this was the 1997 equity funding of GE Capital Bank Prague at ECU 359 
million. In other states loans and equity financing have funded credit provision, 
including consumer credit (Jenkins, 1996). A further 24% ofEBRD funding goes on 
infrastructure projects (transport and telecoms) whilst primary industries and energy 
generation get around 18%. 
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Political conditions and refonn strategies 
Experience appears to show that the earlier and more committed the reformers in the 
transition states the more successful they have been, in economic tenns, in the last 
decade. Whilst the next chapter deals with the economic perfonnance of the 
transition states selected in this study a clear divide can be seen between Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic in Figure 4.3 and Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. The 
Baltic states were early refonners but suffered through their closeness to Russia and 
their links with the Russian economy. 
Figure 4.3 Stabilisation programme implementation dates 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 1999 
Poland and Hungary were amongst the earliest refonners but their approach was 
different. Poland favoured the "Big Bang" fast refonn approach whilst Hungary 
wished to avoid the potential disruptive effects of this by adopting a more gradual 
approach. 
Numerous research studies indicate that "Big Bang" reformers have fared better than 
"Gradualist" ones over the decade (Fischer and Sahay, 2000). "Big Bang" took 
advantage ofthe changed political environment to enact a series of fundamental 
refonns simultaneously whilst "gradualists" felt that reforms had to be correctly 
sequenced. In states that delayed refonn the job was made more difficult by the 
additional time given to entrenched and reactionary groups to gain parliamentary or 
commercial power in order to distort markets and reforms to their own advantage. 
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In both Russia and Ukraine the persistence of corruption is in no small measure due to 
the political lethargy following independence. 
There are exceptions to the general observations about fast and gradual reformers and 
early and late reformers. Belarus began its reforms very late (November 1994) but 
benefited from reasonably favourable economic conditions in the earlier years of the 
decade. The cost ofthe lateness ofreforms is now to be seen as growth slows. 
Overall many observers would agree with the EBRD's conclusion that: 
"The political process has shown robustness in the Jace oJ crises and hardship. 
Strong commitment to market reJorm and democratic processes has been shown 
across the political spectrum and has been maintained across changes oJ 
government. There is little likelihood oJ a return to the old political structures." 
(EBRD, 2000) 
The economic environment 
The former communist states have taken very different economic journeys during the 
last decade. The following diagrams (Graph 4.1 through 4.4) illustrate the trends in 
key macroeconomic indicators. 
Graph 4.1 shows that only Poland, from amongst the selected states in this chapter, 
enjoys a higher real GDP level than in 1989. Like its neighbours it saw GDP decline 
in the early 1990's as the transition to a market economy emerged. As an early 
reformer and a state with clear economic advantages in geographic location and 
natural resources quickly saw its wealth rise and continue on an upward trajectory. 
Eastern Europe, as a whole, has recovered more strongly in the latter half of the last 
decade than its neighbours in the former Soviet Union. Russia and Ukraine have both 
deteriorated sharply (along with the rest of the CIS). 
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Although GDP has not improved in the CIS states it has, at least, stopped falling in 
real terms. Only political will to push through reforms will help to sustain and 
improve on this position. 
Graph 4.2 plots the inflation rate of Ukraine (see also Chapter 2) against those in other 
states. Ukraine certainly suffered the worst effects of inflation but was by no means 
alone in having problems in 1992-1994. The knock-on effects of Russian inflation on 
the Ukrainian economy is clear to see and the link to Belarus from Ukraine's problems 
evident. 
Inflation is now largely under control in all transition states, a feature that adds 
considerably to the picture of stability. 
Current account balances in Graph 4.3 show a divergent position between selected 
states too. Russia's 1998 crisis can be seen clearly, with its recovery equally clear. 
On the whole eastern Europe has seen substantial capital outflows, this not being as 
marked in the CIS states since much of their trade is between themselves. 
This picture is supported by the final Graph 4.4 where Russian, Ukrainian and 
Belarussian positions on capital formation are typified by capital flight and a 
reluctance of foreign investors to invest. Polish capital formation has been boosted 
tremendously by German and other foreign investment. 
Poland 
In 1993 the Polish Government implemented an economic program called Strategy 
for Poland, a macroeconomic blueprint for the period between 1994 and 1996. The 
principle aims for the government's policy were, and continue to be: 
• to ensure the conditions for a high GDP growth rate 
• to reduce inflation 
• to reduce budgetary imbalance to a budget deficit not higher than 2.5% of GDP 
and to a level of public debt not higher than 60% of GDP for the coming years 
• to improve people's living standards, including an increase in real wages, and to 
reduce unemployment. 
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Graph 4.2 Consumer Price Inflation (annual rate) in selected ECE transition economies 1990-1999 
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The combination of a massive one-off devaluation in 1989 with subsequent constant 
gradual devaluation and strong productivity gains has allowed a substantial 
undervaluation of the zloty to persist. 
In 1996 the currency was still about 3% firmer than the central parity rate, so the 
National Bank of Poland (NBP) initiated a policy of consecutive intervention against 
its own currency. Interventions had a strong comeback during the summer of 1996 
and since then a level of roughly 3% under parity has been accepted as the tolerance 
limit of the NBP. Overall, the zloty lost roughly 12.4% versus the dollar and 6.3% 
versus the Deutschmark during 1996. Considering that the managed devaluation 
alone should account for roughly 12.7% in the same period, the zloty has performed 
rather well and, in the light of the continuing surge of both direct and indirect foreign 
investment, is expected to continue doing so. The extraordinary growth of the NBP's 
official currency reserves is a good illustration of this. 
In terms of both exchange rate and monetary policy, the NBP has proved and 
continuously defended its independence, as laid down in the Central Bank Act of 
1989. Notwithstanding increasingly vociferous demands for export-oriented 
devaluation in the face of nominal balance of trade problems, the Central Bank has 
stuck to its guns and thereby strongly assisted the growing community of foreign 
investors. In terms of interest rate and money supply management, the NBP relies 
mostly on the frequent issue of its own bills, the more or less regular offer of repo 
transactions and recently the outright sale of Treasury bonds from its portfolio. 
Given the quantity of underperforming assets on the books of most domestic banks, 
the market has been rather risk-averse over the last years. The result has been a strong 
preference to invest liquid funds in government and NBP securities and the interbank 
deposit market rather than to lend to corporate customers. As a consequence, the 
domestic money market has tended towards a state of constant excess liquidity, with 
the exception of the dates at which minimum reserves are calculated. On those days, 
the whole market is regularly caught scrambling for funds. So far, the NBP has been 
honing its skills in mopping up excess liquidity in an environment of high nominal 
interest rates, but it remains to be seen how it would cope with a prolonged scarcity of 
funds. 
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Hungary 
Hungary has achieved a spectacular progress in transition since the beginning. After 
establishing the institutional framework of a market economy, a stabilization-cum-
reform policy program was introduced in March 1995. 
As a result of policy efforts, the rate of growth was forecasted to achieve 3.5 - 4 % in 
1997 and remained around 4 - 5 % in the coming years. This growth had been 
generated by the private sector, which accounted for 75 % of total GDP. The 
acceleration of economic activity had been led by the improving export performance 
of Hungary and increasing investments of the business sector. The most sizable 
increases in production and exports have been recorded in the high value-added 
industries. 
One of the most important elements of the transition of process in Hungary was the 
change of the microstructure of the economy due to liberalization and privatization. 
As a consequence of a well-designed privatization program focusing on finding 
strategic investors, Hungary became an attractive destination for foreign capital. 
Fiscal adjustment resulted in a significant drop of government deficit from 9.6% of 
GDP in 1994 to a forecast 4 % of GDP in 1997. The fiscal reform had implemented 
changes in the financing and settlement system of the government and restructuring of 
expenditures. In 1996-97, the total amount of government deficit was financed 
exclusively from the market. Tight fiscal policy and the declining deficit 
caused growing confidence of investors, which was reflected in declining interest rate 
both on domestic and foreign state debt. 
The credibility of present economic policy has been bolstered by consistent monetary 
policy. This concentrated on sustainable cut of inflation as a final target. The 
exchange rate regime aimed at supporting the fight against inflation and creating a 
predictable environment for economic activity. 
Concerning interest rate policy, monetary policy had to meet multiple requirements. 
While the existing exchange rate regime and the goals of policy in stabilization 
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detennined the level of domestic interest rates, the NBH strove to stimulate domestic 
savings and at the same time to prevent the excessive inflow of speculative capital. 
As a result of the development of the Hungarian economy and the financial sector, 
Hungarian money markets became highly liquid. They provide a wide range of 
information for policy purposes and allow the NBH to use indirect instruments of 
monetary policy. 
The improving economic conditions and strengthening of the corporate sector were 
reflected in the worldwide notable perfonnance of the Hungarian capital markets. The 
Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE) experienced a 53 % increase of prices in dollar tenns 
and this growth was fundamental in nature. 
Czech Republic 
Efficiency in Czech enterprises has not improved to the same extent as in Poland or 
Hungary. Two key reasons for this are the implications of voucher privatisation and 
high wages. 
The privatisation process of the Czech economy was driven by voucher privatisation, 
which resulted in a diluted shareholder structure and problems concerning corporate 
governance. Without strict bankruptcy laws in place and applied, the threat of closing 
down companies was modest. The relatively low unemployment rate is partly a result 
of this policy and must also be seen in this context. 
The productivity of Czech companies is also hampered by high wage increases. After 
an increase of9.8% in the first half of 1996, real wages for the first time reached the 
level of 1989. Over the period from 1993 to 1996, the increase in wages was faster 
than that in labour productivity. Moreover, the rapid wage increases have stimulated 
overall demand and consumption growth, including imports; and added to inflationary 
pressures. 
To strengthen competitiveness, the restructuring process needed moved ahead. The 
government intended to support the macroeconomic refonns, and to propose modest 
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wage Increase. This process could result in higher unemployment and bankruptcies 
and could temporarily slow down economic growth. In the longer run, however, 
stable growth rates can only be achieved through continued reforms at the corporate 
level, which cannot always ensure a socially soft landing. 
The Baltics 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, together, The Baltic Republics, held similar economic 
positions in 1991 but have trodden different paths over the last decade. 
The fall in Estonian GDP to an index level of 78 in 1999 (1989 = 100) is actually 
healthier than the falls to 59 and 64 of Latvia and Lithuania respectively. Estonian 
inflation has stabilised after a hyperinflationary episode in 1992/93 but at a higher 
level than that seen in the other two repUblics. 
Lithuania is typical of the three states and illustrates the caution and care with which 
economic transition has been engineered. Since 1992 the reformist Slezevicius 
government has presided with considerable success over Lithuania's economic 
transformation and recovery from the post-Soviet shake-out. Fiscal discipline has 
been commendably tight, with the budget deficit kept to less than 2% of GDP. 
Privatisation, including voucher privatisation, had been pushed ahead after a slow 
start. 
Despite huge expenditure cuts, the government had to concede more than a doubling 
of its budget deficit target for 1995 to the equivalent of3.2% of GDP, compared with 
a 1.7% deficit in 1994 and a 1 % surplus in 1993. The country's short-lived economic 
recovery was also stalled. GDP fell by 0.35% in 1995, disappointing follow-ups to the 
2% increase recorded in 1994. However, in the five years to 1999 GDP has staged a 
steady recovery in real terms and inflation in consumer prices has almost disappeared 
(0.8% in 1999). 
All three Baltic states have applied to become EU members, showing their confidence 
in the reforms and economic transition over the last 10 years. 
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Belarus 
Ukraine still remains one of the most important business partners for Belarus. The 
total value of turnover between Ukraine and Belarus is second only to Russia. 
Ukraine's trade policy towards NIS countries has affected this situation. Ukraine 
started to integrate into European and other international markets outside NIS. 
Ukraine's turnover with NIS countries besides Russia had increased by 38.8 %, export 
- by 17.6 %, import - by 58.2 % (11 % - with Belarus). As a result, export to Ukraine 
had decreased from 20.7 % in 1995 down to 7.6 % in 1996. 
Analysis of the Ukrainian goods import structure to Belarus shows that 1998 supply 
was mainly oriented to the real sector of economy demand and was financed by 
enterprises, not by direct budget funds. Most ofthe import value from Ukraine is 
oriented on intermediate goods - 67 % (power supply, seeds, medicals, non-treasure 
metals) and investment products - 24 %. Consumer goods import from Ukraine in 
1998 was 9 %. 
Russian Federation 
The Russian Federation is an impressive country. Not only it is the largest country in 
the world, with 17 million square kilometres, it also brings together completely 
contradictory climatic conditions within one country, with arctic conditions in the 
north and hot, dry, steppes in the south. The Russian Federation also has marked 
regional cultural, ethnic, political, and economic variations, which only became clear 
with the dissolution of the former USSR at the end of 1991, and which put an end to 
the image maintained for decades of one large political and economic unit in the east. 
Today, this territorial diversity of Russia is not only one of the problems, but it is also 
an essential strength, for, in spite of the overall decline in the national economy, there 
are definitely regions which can be regarded as "regions of hope" and which could in 
future develop into flourishing economic centres. Such centres would enable Russia 
to make appropriate use of its wealth of natural resources and its considerable 
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economic potential within the foreseeable future. 
The political and economic disintegration of the former USSR in 1991 and the 
attendant breakdown of economic relationships between the individual republics, in 
addition to the difficulties in implementing the policy of reform, have meant 
significant declines in economic output in Russia. 
The liberalisation of prices in January 1992, together with an expansion of the money 
supply, the increase in loans granted and growing budget deficits, initially led to an 
enormous increase in price levels. The inflation rate in 1992 was about 1500% and 
was therefore at hyperinflation levels. Since then the rate of inflation has fallen 
continuously up to financial crisis of 1998. 
The privatisation process, which has been implemented primarily in Russia so far, has' 
been mass privatisation in the form of employee privatisation. However, the 
efficiency of companies has not significantly improved as a result of privatisation, due 
to the absence of new capital and new management. The second stage of privatisation, 
which began in mid-1994, therefore made increased use of tender procedures, 
auctions and direct sales. In autumn 1995 there was a new development in the 
Russian privatisation process. It became possible for share packages of specific 
companies to be mortgaged by the state in return for the acceptance ofloans. 
Banking markets 
In the command economy there were no securities markets and banking was purely a 
passive instrument of the central plan. The household savings circuit was kept 
separate from the credit allocation circuit. Interest rates were nominal and credit 
assessment did not exist. Cost and profit were irrelevant. Bankers were book-keepers 
not financial assessors and disciplinarians. 
When the command system collapsed, commercial and central banking functions had 
to be separated in a two-tier banking system. This meant that a legal, regulatory and 
supervisory framework had to be enacted and bedded in. In addition banking and 
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supervisory management and staff had to be recruited and trained and equipment, 
systems, and premises updated. For the infrastructure national payments and money 
transfer systems had to be installed and markets in money, foreign exchange and 
government paper opened up. 
These were only the first steps, however. More difficult to resolve without 
undermining the slowly emerging disciplines of prudential banking in a market 
environment was the problem of dealing with non-performing bank credits inherited 
from the command system. This problem was worsened by the additional bad loans 
that the new post-reform commercial banks had themselves subsequently incurred, 
plus the lengthening chains of unpaid inter-firm bills. Various methods have been 
used in different countries to clear up this overhang, and the related problems of 
restructuring loss-making firms, re-capitalising the banks with poor quality loan 
portfolios, and then privatising them. 
Polish banking 
Poland benefited from early reform to a two-tier banking system and a buoyant 
economy that allowed banks to grow their capital through profits. Banks were very 
attractive to foreign investors. 
The key factor determining the health of the Polish banking system, apart from the 
general economy, is that fact that over 70% of Polish banks are owned by foreigners. 
Germany has the largest share. Foreign banks are attracted by good economic 
potential as well as proximity to western Europe. 
Only about 25% of Poles have bank accounts, giving huge growth potential in 
domestic markets. Deutsche Bank is particularly interested in exploiting intemet and 
direct banking in this market. Polish corporate business is sluggish, however. Polish 
companies have generally weak capital positions and are unable to make long-term 
commitments. 
The privatisation of the state savings bank PKO will be the next major change in the 
banking market. It is doubtful if this can take place without foreign involvement and 
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banks are queuing up to look it over. PKO has about 30% of the credit card market 
and dominance in other financial products too. 
Hungarian banking 
The Hungarian financial sector has undergone rapid change and development in 
recent years. Changes that commenced in the 1980s continued into the 1990s, 
establishing a multifaceted, broad-based industry regulated by legislation aimed at 
harmonising the Hungarian financial sector with that of the EU. 
The financial sector counted some 44 retail, commercial and consumer finance banks, 
over 80 investment companies and brokerage houses and 30 or more representative 
offices of foreign banks and financial institutions in 1997. Recent years have seen 
substantial growth in the industry, with banks expanding their range of services and 
networks. Foreign banks have been strong in establishing themselves in the market 
either through joint ventures or by buying into the market through the privatisation 
process. 
The lending business has been generally short-term in nature - both as regards forint 
loans and foreign currency loans. However, margins continue to fall along with forint 
base rates. A syndicated bank loan market has been subject to rapid growth, despite 
aggressive pricing, and many facilities have been oversubscribed, with European and 
Asian banks keen to book Hungarian business. Project and structured finance is 
becoming more common and not yet subject to lower margins and lower return on 
equity. 
Banks have heavily promoted electronic payments services and systems in an attempt 
to bind corporate customers and establish client loyalty. Such services continue to be 
developed to cater for additional client needs such as concentration accounts, 
electronic statements and cash pooling. 
With the development and installation of electronic banking services at the customer 
end, banks are able to generate new business and to win over new clients throughout 
the country, without the need to establish costly branch networks to cover corporate 
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clients. Even so, a substantial amount of business - both domestic and international -
is still undertaken on a cash basis and this is likely to continue for the foreseeable 
future. International payment systems are equally advanced - with certain institutions 
offering same-day processing and same-day value. This is surely a service area, that 
will continue to be developed with banks investing heavily in new systems and up-to-
date technology. 
Given the geographic location of Hungary, its existing business links to other central 
and eastern European nations and the advanced state of the financial sector, Hungary 
is becoming a hub for business-between Western Europe and the east. Existing 
businesses that have been trading with eastern European partners for decades often 
serve as counterparts for east-west trade, and maintain a different risk perception to 
their western counterparts. Eastern European political risk may be more easily 
absorbed by the corporate sector and the commercial banks in Hungary than by their 
west European counterparts. 
The competition between banks has become tougher, with joint venture banks and 
large privatised banks seeking to establish market share in one of central and eastern 
Europe's smaller and yet more advanced regions. Regulatory changes - which are 
ongoing - have forced the sector to respond with new strategies, products and 
services. The question arises as to whether the market is large enough to sustain the 
number of financial institutions in Hungary. No doubt some will adjust their 
strategies, others may establish alliances and some may fall by the wayside. 
One thing seems certain - lending business at low margins cannot generate the growth 
needed to expand and develop in the Hungarian market. Product and service 
innovation and development - in treasury, trade finance, investment banking and other 
areas - may be the key. EU membership will bring with it changes in the banking 
sector and at the same time contribute to greater competition. 
Czech banking 
The explosive growth of leasing in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and other countries 
in central and east Europe, is helping to bridge the acute shortage of external 
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investment finance, particularly for small and medium-sized finns. These are 
shunned by risk-averse local banks virtually throughout the region. Western 
manufactures' finance arms, such as Ford Credit, GMAC, VW, GE Capital, and 
AT &T Capital are entering the region in force, in some cases (GE Capital and Ford 
Credit for example) taking over small local banks so as to quicken their way into the 
local vehicle and consumer finance markets. 
For the larger, robust local companies, another option which has been opening up 
lately, as credit ratings improve and more countries attain current account 
convertibility under the International Monetary Fund's article VIII, is the GDR 
(global depository receipts) and ADR (American depository receipts) routes into 
tapping the global debt markets. In this and other ways the situation is easing for 
some. But it is the basic development of longer-term local-currency financing sources 
that is needed, and in most parts of the region that prospect remains hostage to 
inflation fears. The time it is taking to build up well functioning banking and financial 
markets in these countries is not surprising. 
None of the 27 countries has yet reached the end of the road on this matter (Appendix 
5.14), not even the Czech Republic, where bank balance sheets have been cleaned up 
but industrial restructuring was largely left to be tackled until after privatisation had 
been substantially completed. Another tricky task on which different countries have 
come up with different solutions has been that of framing a policy on the licensing of 
new banks which balanced the objectives of promoting competition while maintaining 
the stability of the financial system. In the Czech Republic, for instance, stability was 
at first given primacy on the reasoned grounds that a stable banking system was vital 
while so much else in the economy was being changed. But there, and in Poland, 
Bulgaria, Slovenia, the three Baltic states, the Russian Federation and many other 
former Soviet republics, the granting of new banking licences became quite liberal, 
excessively so in some cases. As a result, much effort has had to be put into rescuing, 
merging, or closing failed banks, some of them quite large in relation to the local 
market, and into pursuing fonnal bank consolidation schemes. Minimum capital 
thresholds and capital adequacy standards have been progressively raised in most 
countries as part of a general tightening of regulatory and supervisory requirements. 
These are all essentially problems of transition. 
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The next stage is to deepen banking and financial markets. On the corporate side, this 
means banks catering for medium-sized and even smaller companies as well as the big 
"blue chip" companies. At the top end of the corporate banking market, margins are 
already shrinking as competition intensifies. In the retail market, it means more banks 
spending heavily on electronic systems and improved customer services so as to 
garner their own retail deposits as a cheaper funding source than interbank and other 
wholesale funding markets. 
Foreign bank competition will become a progressively stronger driving force, 
especially in those countries that aspire to European Union membership and are 
committed to further banking and financial liberalisation under their EU association 
agreements. Western banks like Citibank, ING, ABN-Amro, and Creditanstalt, which 
have already become major players in the region, are looking for ways to descend the 
corporate ladder below the blue chip level, and not only in investment banking 
services. Many are also aiming to have a retail presence. Citibank, for example, now 
has a retail network in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, providing high 
quality services and targeting the better-off customers. Potential market size is also 
becoming a factor in determining future strategy. 
The Czech Republic has been outshone by only two other post-communist countries, 
Poland and Slovenia, in the speed and extent to which its economy has bounced back 
from the recession which engulfed the region after the collapse of the central planning 
system at the beginning of the decade. 
In many ways Czech banking is the most advanced in east and central Europe. 
Because inflation is relatively low, Czech banks are prepared to lend longer than 
elsewhere; and market penetration, in terms of total bank deposits and total banking 
lending as percentages ofGDP, is well up to west European levels. But a total of 12 
bank failures in recent years have raised concern. They were all small banks, 
involving less than 4% of total banking assets (before the Agrobanka affair 
(Economist (1996d). But in retrospect it is clear that too many new banks were 
licensed in the early days of market reforms before banking regulation and 
supervision had been developed to the point where they could reasonably cope. The 
system has now been considerably tightened up, and capital adequacy thresholds have 
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been raised. The potential for shocks persists however (Economist, 1997b). After 
selling part of Investicni Postovni Banka (IPB) to Nomura in 1997 emergency 
measures saw a government appointed administrator in charge in late 2000 
(Euromoney,2000). Bad loans consistently covered up by complex financial 
reporting caused a run on the bank. 
Admittedly, the Czech Republic is not the only Central European country with rickety 
banks. All three Baltic states also have in recent years experienced banking crises· 
triggered, in part, by fraud. In 1995 four big banks toppled in Latvia alone. The mess 
was resolved by letting the troubled banks collapse, without government 
compensation for depositors. Upon learning the Czech problems, the governor of 
Latvia's central bank, Einars Repse, offered this advice: "If dishonest or poor 
financial strategies are involved, there's no use in helping any bank because it will 
only consume taxpayers' money" (Economist, 1996b). 
After sending interest rates skywards and blowing around $ 3 billion on efforts to 
keep the koruna within its trading band against a USD/DM basket, the central bank 
abandoned its semi-fixed exchange rate and let the koruna float freely. Since early 
1996 the Czech economy, once considered the region's sprinting hare, had shown 
serious sights of stress. 1996 current account deficit, at 8.6 % ofGDP, was among the 
world's biggest, driven by a trade deficit of $ 6 billion. 
Hungary had then what the Czechs did not have a finance minister, Lajos Bokros, 
hell-bent on austerity. He introduced an 8 % import surcharge, backed by tax hikes 
and deep spending cuts. Real wages fell by IS %, but the package worked. 
Government spending fell from 61 % of GDP in 1994 to about 50 % in 1996, and the 
budget and current account deficit was swiftly narrowed. 
Another big difference between the Czech Republic and its neighbors lies in their 
approaches to industrial restructuring and institutional reform. Hungary had killed off 
over 30,000 companies. In Poland, too, banks had been made to liquidate or 
restructure ailing clients. In the Czech Republic there has not been a single major 
bankruptcy since communism collapsed. Hungary's wave on bankruptcies crippled its 
banks. The government reacted by privatizing them quickly and inviting in 
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foreigners, thus speeding modernization: some 40 % of Hungary's banking capital is 
now in foreign hands. In Poland, too, financial prudence and sophistication had been 
imported. Several state-owned banks were sold. 
Only a third of Czech problem loans were thought to be covered by provisions. The 
hidebound nature of Czech banking had stymied industrial restructuring. Some of this 
was because of the form Czech privatization had taken. The big banks set up 
investment fund arms during the voucher-for-shares mass privatization programme of 
1992-94, which transferred stakes in some 1,600 companies to the public. 
Hungary's approach to privatization was different. It sold state companies for cash, 
often to foreigners, rather than handing out shares to citizens. (Economist, 1997a). 
Banking in the Baltics 
The Baltic countries inherited the Soviet monobank system under which specialised 
state banks serviced specific branches of the economy. All three countries moved 
quickly to establish a two-tier banking system with the central bank at the core. None 
of the Baltic countries had personnel skilled in modern banking practices or an 
appropriate legal, regulatory, and supervisory framework. Moreover, a strategy had to 
be devised to handle the remnant of the Soviet banking system. At the same time, the 
Baltic countries had to face the twin challenges of encouraging the new private 
banking sector while ensuring that its growth took place in a prudent manner. 
Initially, the three countries took different approaches. In Estonia and Lithuania, the 
specialised Soviet-era banks were reconstituted as state banks and then gradually or 
partially privatised. In Latvia, in contrast, the Savings Bank was reconstituted as a 
state bank but the branches of the remaining Soviet-era banks were privatised. 
Remaining banks were merged, rehabilitated, and then offered for privatisation. 
All three countries have had extremely liberal policies toward the licensing of new 
commercial banks. A large number of banks, it was thought, would quickly generate 
the competition needed to drive down deposit and lending rates and provide the 
lending needed to support the emerging private sector. Many new private banks were 
110 
established by enterprises to gain access to a preferential and much cheaper source of 
funding than was available from existing banking institutions. Little thought was 
given initially to the implications of this policy for bank soundness and supervision. 
When a leading bank collapses the fall-out can be substantial, even in large countries. 
When a big bank collapses in countries the size of the three Baltic republics, whose 
populations range from 1.6 million in Estonia to 3.7 million in Lithuania, the knock-
on effects can be traumatic. 
In Latvia the knock-on effects of the Banka Baltija collapse have certainly been felt. 
One out of five Latvians held a deposit at the bank, of which they had seen back only 
the maximum ofLats 200 (370$) which the government undertook to cover in the 
case of personal deposits. Corporate and other depositors were not so lucky. The 
sharp liquidity crunch which ensued led to a sharp drop in corporate tax payments and 
a drying up of demand for Treasury bills, the government's principal financing 
instrument. 
Estonian banks are today regarded as being among the region's best. The Estonian 
economy has also been moving strongly ahead, giving the republic the best record 
among the three Baltic states, with real growth averaging around 6 % a year since 
1994, a modest current account deficit, relatively low external debt, substantial 
investment inflows, and a strong currency which remains pegged to the Deutschmark. 
Inflation, though declining, has remained stubbornly high. 
Economic recovery will eventually quicken in both Latvia and Lithuania, too. Their 
banking systems will also, like Estonia's, emerge in stronger fettle. Capital 
requirements are being raised substantially in all three republics. In Lithuania, where 
the minimum capital threshold had once been the equivalent of a mere $30,000, the 
threshold has recently been doubled to Lits 10 million ($2.5 million). In Latvia it is 
rather higher at Lats 2 million, which was raised to Lats 3 million in 1998; while in 
Estonia the minimum target for equity capital is being raised in stages to Kroon 35 
million ($3.1 million) by April 1997 and for Tier One capital (equity plus reserves as 
defined by the Basle committee of bank supervisors) to Kroon 75 million ($6.7 
million) by January 1998. 
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The Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are in the vanguard of the 
transition economies. The first fruits of their reform programs are now being seen in 
the revival of growth. But there are a number of factors that have threatened to derail 
the fledgling recovery. All three republics have experienced serious banking crises, 
which have set in train a process of structural change in their banking systems, and 
have, in some instances, had adverse political and economic repercussions. 
The transition from central planning to a market - based system also exposed the 
structural deficiencies in the banking sector and the regulatory environment. The very 
tight macroeconomic policy framework pursued in all three countries created an 
environment that was not propitious for an emerging banking system. Banks, their 
customers, and bank supervisors were unable to monitor and control the risks inherent 
in the new policy environment. 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the Baltic countries' experiences. They 
may have implications for banking reform in other countries of the former Soviet 
Union, especially smaller ones. However, owing to the very specific nature of 
banking sector distress in transition economies, these conclusions should not be seen 
as having across-the-board validity for banking crises in more developed economies. 
Banking distress is inevitable in countries that have had no recent experience of 
market-based banking. This comes from the confluence of risk factors that put 
pressure on the fledgling banking sector. However, it also arises from the structural 
features of the emerging banking systems in the countries of the former Soviet Union. 
In particular, the existence ofa plethora of poorly capitalised banks that are 
vulnerable because their capital is small and that, because of their size, have not 
reaped the benefits of portfolio diversification. Also, new banks are often too small to 
afford the investment in infrastructure that is needed to offer modem services. State-
owned banks are invariably overstaffed, and this drives up their operating costs when 
their salary levels adjust to the higher levels in the private banking sector. These 
factors and the high-risk nature of bank lending in these countries have fostered high 
intermediation margins, and the high lending rates this has generated have further 
added to borrowers' debt-servicing difficulties. 
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Banking distress is likely to be a feature of transition in the countries of the fonner 
Soviet Union for some time to come. Governments in these countries should prepare 
themselves now - by strengthening their supervisory capacity and readying 
themselves for tough implementation decisions - to deal with the inevitable. Even if 
banking crises do materialise, they likely will not have such severe effects on the 
economy as a crisis of similar proportions might have in a more developed, 
traditionally market- based economy (Fleming and Chu,1997). 
Belarussian banks 
The banking system of the republic of Belarus is a two-tier one: the National Bank of 
Belarus and commercial banks. 
The National Bank is authorised to control credit relationship, money turnover and 
has the only right for emission of money. Its functions, targets in financial-crediting 
system, legislative base offunctioning are carried out in accordance to the Law of 
Belarus "About National Bank of Belarus Republic". 
There are 27 commercial banks in Belarus with 10 of them having overseas share 
ownership, I foreign branch (Russian "Mossbusinessbank"). Commercial banks have 
550 branches on the territory of Belarus. 
The banking system has already passed its busiest level of development, when there 
were 10 and more banks registering every year. In 1995 the number of banks 
functioned in Belarus reached 50. But eventually, since most of them did not have 
strong financial and managerial-technical potential, many were liquidated, 
restructured or combined with other banks. 
There is a strong core of main commercial banks in Belarus, so-called "The Big Six": 
Belpromstroibank, Belvniesheconombank, Belagroprombank, Belarussbank, 
Priorbank and Belbusinessbank. These banks are highly developed with strong 
potential, wide net of branches and correspondent relationships. 
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The National Bank has neglected its policy of direct credits to different spheres of 
national economy. This function is more effectively performed by commercial banks. 
The National Bank of Belarus keeps on working on further improving the banking 
system, providing a stable and predictable exchange rate and a positive level of 
interest rates. 
Russian banks 
The development of capital markets and commercial banking presents some of the 
most difficult policy challenges for countries in transition to a market economy. The 
growth of commercial banking in the Russian Federation in the 1990s has been 
dynamic. Russia began economic transition without even the semblance of a banking 
sector as exists in a market economy. By the mid-1990s, over 2,500 commercial 
banks were operating throughout the country, most of which were newly created and 
private. In the last few years, a very strong dichotomy has emerged between a 
handful of rapidly growing large Moscow banks and the rest of the banking sector, 
most of which has been experiencing increasing financial distress. The government 
formed in March 1997 announced goals of reducing or eliminating special privileges 
for these large banks. 
In 1998, after the first decade of development, an absolutely new banking system was 
formed in Russia in the aftermath of crisis. At its core are commercial banks 
technically equipped with newest informational systems and software. The crisis of 
the Russian banking system in 1998 was played out against the backdrop of an 
economy in recession. The main factors that determined the crisis situation in Russia 
in August, 1998 were as follows: 
• A worsening GDP level 
• A currency crisis 
Foreign debt rose in volume and the worsening "flight of capital" was augmented 
by capital outflow to repay debt. 
• Inability to service foreign debts 
Russia had very low foreign currency reserves, which shrunk from $ 24.5 billion 
to $14.6 billion in 1998. This led to an aggravation of the stable relationship with 
the IMF and uncertainty of further systematic financing by the IMF. 
• Political instability 
Boris Yeltsin's "illness" and the rapid turnover of Prime Ministers, as well as the 
strong showing of Nationalists in elections gave the impression of weakness and 
instability at the highest level. This in turn led to destabilization of the domestic 
financial market. 
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During the first week of crisis the government and Central Bank applied set of 
procedures in order to stabilize the situation. 
Strict foreign currency control was enacted with moratoria on repayment of foreign 
loans announced on 17'h August. Other measures included prohibitions on 
investments with a maturity over I year, backed by issues of short-term government 
bonds in an attempt to fund the budget deficit. 
This period also saw the Central Bank provided tight monetary policy. From 24th 
August the refinancing rate was increased to 60 %, liquidity of commercial banks 
lowered to a level of20-30 % compared to the beginning of the year. The overnight 
credit rate was increased to 150 %, and 50 biggest commercial banks were to provide 
the Central Bank with currency position report and to close it daily. 
Unfortunately these actions were not as effective and could not avoid ruble exchange 
rate crash. 
During the Central Bank interventions from 17th till 26th of August 1998, the 
exchange rate fell from 6.29 to 7.86 RURlUSD (down 25 %). The RCB reserves fell 
by $ 5.9 billion. After intervention was stopped - from 26th of August till 2nd of 
September the exchange rate was administratively kept on 7.86 (there were no 
operations on the Moscow exchanges during this period) then evenly decreased to 
9.3301 RURlUSD - still within announced corridor. After that the corridor was 
cancelled and free rate flotation was established. So, the exchange rate devaluated to 
20.825 RURlUSD (by 9th. September 1998), and the total devaluation since the start 
of the crisis was 331 %. 
The main reasons of Russian crisis are still present - whole economic crisis and 
production decline, serious budget deficit, and internal governmental debt. Some of 
these problems have been aggravated. One of the main reasons was sharp devaluation 
of the ruble during first 1 Y, months of the crisis period, which caused serious panic in 
the banking system. 
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The August crisis damaged citizens' trust of Russian banks. The volume of ruble 
deposits (excluding Russian Savings Bank's figures) were decreased from August 
1998 till February 1999 by 45 % (from 33.6 billion rubles to 18 billion rubles), 
foreign currency deposits decreased from 2.9 to 1.7 billion USD, or down 56 %. 
As a fact, after the default in Russia on August 17 1998, the same situation of related 
stock jobbing demand for USD appeared in Ukraine. Fortunately, a set of proper 
procedures, eliminating the arbitrage dealings with foreign currency and enabling the 
faster establishing of proper rate evaluating mechanism than it was in Russia, helped 
Ukraine to avoid such serious losses than in Russia. Thus the stabilisation on 
Ukrainian exchange and financial markets was more fortunate and successful, but the 
problems in Ukraine are still serious and their solution, as in Russia, is impossible by 
monetary or exchange policies alone. 
Conclusion 
The parlous state of the Ukrainian political environment and the knock-on effect on 
the economy are thrown into clear relief when viewed against the progress made by 
other former communist states in the region. 
Belarus alone, from the selected states, has been later and less willing to reform to 
create open markets. Of all the key measures available Ukraine appears to have the 
lowest base from which to improve. In real GDP terms National Income has fallen 
lower than the average for the CIS and considerably lower than Eastern Europe. 
Inflation in 1992/93 was worst in Ukraine although, to balance this, it shows no signs 
of re-emergence, unlike Russia and Belarus. A persistent problem is the legal and 
illegal capital flight from Ukraine, not replaced by foreign direct investment. Market 
reforms are still not advanced enough to stem this outward flow and the low level of 
capital formation goes some way to explaining the avenues for profit that Ukrainian 
banks have sought. 
Banking development has kept pace, more or less, with economic progress as seen in 
this chapter. Foreign investment can be seen as a significant indicator of economic 
and legal reform processes. Poland, in particular, benefits hugely from German 
interest whilst Ukraine banking is still in the hands of Ukrainian capital. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS 
Introduction 
The key objective of this research is to uncover the major forces that have shaped the 
development of Ukrainian banking between independence in 1991 and the new 
millennium. Good research design suggests that if the objective is clear the 
appropriate methodology follows logically (Miles and Huberman, 1984). Miles and 
Huberman made this suggestion, however, against a US economic and social 
background in which information and data are readily available, survey questionnaires 
are commonplace and cultural norms expect transparency from public institutions. 
Unfortunately, for the researcher in Ukraine, certain obstacles and barriers have to be 
overcome before "normal" methods can be adopted. Specific instances of this are 
detailed later. 
This chapter looks at the combination of research methods used in the research 
together with a brief summary of those methods considered but discarded, largely 
because they were unlikely to have worked in the Ukrainian setting. The chapter goes 
on to introduce the key primary research tool used and to discuss the design of the 
interview questions used. Findings from the primary research are displayed in the last 
part of this chapter. 
Primary research findings are used in this research to underpin and amplify 
interpretation from secondary data sources. Although 31 interviews were carried out 
over the period of the research there are no claims that these form a representative 
sample of Ukrainian banks and bankers. Sample design has, however, been 
influenced by the need to gain views from as wide a selection of banks and bankers as 
possible. 
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Research methods used 
Three methods of research and data collection form the heart of this thesis. These are: 
a literature search, interpretation of secondary data on bank performance and survey 
interviews with senior bankers. Each of these methods is dealt with in turn: 
Literature Search 
Very early in this research it became clear that no other specific academic study was 
being undertaken in this area. Whilst some general papers on post-communist 
transition appeared few mentioned Ukraine and fewer still centred on Ukrainian 
banking. Where applicable key papers are highlighted and used but the bulk of 
written information specific to Ukraine is provided from publications such as The 
Economist, The Banker and Euromoney. Where possible data provided in these 
publications has been verified and supported by reference to data from the National 
Bank of Ukraine. 
General literature has been helpful in writing Chapters 2 and 4 of this thesis as they 
rely on factual information in the public domain to build a picture of the economic, 
political and social background. 
Access to literature in Ukraine is limited and this aspect of the research was largely 
undertaken by using search facilities provided at Loughborough University. Most 
literature accessed has been written by Western observers and in English, factors that 
may help to explain the critical viewpoint often taken. In addition the economic scene 
in Ukraine changed rapidly during the period under consideration which meant that 
emphasis on journalism and news rather than scholarly papers was necessary. 
Secondary data 
Secondary data on the performance of the Ukrainian economy and that of Ukrainian 
banks forms the basis of Chapter 3 of this thesis. As with the literature survey the 
difficulty was finding consistent, credible data. For the sake of consistency, however, 
National Bank of Ukraine Economic data is used in Chapter 2. The caveats 
surrounding this are many and are detailed in Chapter 2. The key problem with using 
118 
any official governmental data is that it is incomplete and subject to poor data 
gathering, especially in the years to 1996. The existence of a large unofficial 
economy (black market), caused, in part, by repressive taxation regimes affecting 
legitimate enterprises, also helps to cloud the real levels of ODP and inflation. 
Chapter 2 chronicles the NBU fight against inflation and the legacy of its former 
policy of monetary expansion to stimulate the economy. Once again, the extreme 
levels of inflation in 1993 and 1994 serve to affect other economic factors for some 
years afterwards. 
The use of secondary data in Chapter 3 is also affected by incompleteness of 
information. Chapter 3 relies on a commercial database, Bankscope, which records 
Ukrainian bank reported accounts. A major change in audit systems (to international 
standards of transparency) in 1996 means that data prior to this date may be suspect, 
since it relates only to the less transparent Ukrainian accounting system. Accordingly 
the analysis in this thesis relates to the period since 1996 only. 
As major organs and conduits of state policy in former times, the larger banks 
(including Prominvestbank, Ukrsotsbank and the Oschadbank) retain a tradition of 
conservatism and secrecy. Available data must, therefore, be viewed in this light. 
Lastly, whilst data on individual banks may be consistent, data on all banks is subject 
to the changes in the structural environment brought about by successive bank 
failures. 
Primary data and survey research 
Primary data, in the context of this research includes original NBU documents, 
regulations promUlgated to banks and internal bank information obtained in the 
ordinary course of the author's work. Primary data also includes the survey research, 
conducted amongst senior bankers. 
In order to obtain a fairly representative sample of senior bankers to respond to the 
survey questions it was necessary to review alternative methods of access. It was also 
necessary to ensure that response rates were maintained at a high level. 
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Of the three possible methods available, postal or telephone survey and face to face 
interview the latter was chosen for the reasons given below. Although postal and 
telephoned surveys presented themselves as ways in which larger and more 
representative samples could be gained, the practical and cultural difficulties that 
would have been encountered were insurmountable. Regrettably both postal and 
telephone systems in Ukraine fail to reach the standards of Western Europe. Delays 
encountered and uncertainty of contact combine to make these methods risky for the 
researcher. 
In addition to this the culture of written or telephoned questionnaires is virtually 
unknown in Ukraine and it was judged that potential respondents would have been 
hostile to such impersonal methods. 
Although face to face interviews were likely to be the most time consuming survey 
method they did have the advantage over other methods of allowing more open 
questions and discussion. Having said this, the survey design did use some 
considerable prior instrumentation in order to retain focus and to make best use of the 
limited time made available by respondents (see Research design chapter below). 
One key component of the decision to use an interview methodology was the author's 
unique access to senior bankers by virtue of his own senior position in Bank Ukraina. 
Prior personal and professional knowledge of the bankers interviewed resulted in very 
few refusals. The author's position also added considerable credibility to requests for 
interview. 
In all 31 interviews were undertaken ranging across both Kiev and regional banks, 
large and small banks, former state and new commercial organisations (see research 
findings). It should be noted that the institutional relationship between Bank Ukraina 
and the banks interviewed may impose some bias in the responses but this is not 
considered to be a serious flaw. Questions on macroeconomic and political influences 
are unlikely to have been affected in this way. More sensitive information on future 
plans and strategy may have been coloured, however. For the most part respondents 
restricted themselves to information that was already in the public domain through 
financial reporting, NBU reporting or publicity material. 
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Research design 
Following Miles and Hubennan (1984) the detailed design of the research sample, the 
research questionnaire focused on the key drivers of change and development in the 
banking market suggested by the basic PEST conceptual model and the emphasis 
apparent from the review of literature reported in Chapters 2 and 3. Questions 
naturally concentrated on more recent events but some of the responses show that past 
experience has coloured current strategies. Time allocated by respondents to each 
interview was limited, due to the nature of their jobs. 
Interview desi gn 
The structured questionnaire used as an interview template is displayed at Appendix 
4; Figure 5.1 provides a summary of the areas covered: 
Figure 5.1 Summary of interview topics 
Topic Question Question types 
numbers 
Political situation 1,2 Open ended 
Legal framework 3,4 Open ended 
Economic situation 5 Closed 
Impact of IAS 6 Open ended 
Individual bank development (internal) 7 to 13 and Open ended and 
18,19 closed questions 
Banking competition 14 Open ended 
Staffing issues 15,16 Open ended 
Technology 17 Open ended 
Most of the questions were designed as "Open-ended" in order to extract more 
qualitative and descriptive detail from respondents. The questioning strategy was to 
pose the question and to be ready to prompt in order to open up the response further. 
The Ukrainian character, whilst hospitable, frank and honest is not voluble and so 
mechanisms needed to be adopted to explore and clarify some brief answers. These 
mechanisms were not always successful, however, due to the short time often 
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allocated to the survey by respondents. Interviews typically followed business 
meetings with the author. 
Sample selection 
The greatest concentration of bank head offices is, naturally, in Kiev. All of the 
"System" banks are based there along with a good number of small and medium sized 
institutions. In selecting banks to approach it was felt necessary to include all of the 
largest banks, since their nation-wide presence and economic infl uence would be 
significant. It was also felt necessary to approach a selection of banks outside Kiev. 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 summarise the size criteria and location of all respondents. These 
show a reasonably good spread of respondents both geographically and by size of 
institution, a feature indicative of responses being representative of the population of 
banks as a whole. 
The focus of the research required access to banks at a high level of management, 
commensurate with an understanding of the environmental factors affecting Ukrainian 
banks and the strategic development of individual institutions. Board level 
respondents would appear to comply with these criteria. Table 5.3 summarises the job 
titles of the 31 respondents, confirming that 97% were Board members, with 55% 
holding leading board posts. 
All interviews were carried out in the Russian or Ukrainian language and responses 
recorded manually. Use of tape recording would, it was judged, have reduced the 
level of candour shown by respondents. Transcripts were translated to English by the 
author. 
Size 
Big 
Small 
* 
.* 
Table 5.1 Ukrainian banks in study sample 
Size criterion Sample banks** Total banks 
Assets over 40 million hrv* 12 18 
Assets under 40 million hrv* 19 199 
totals 31 217 
Based on 1998 Asset values (see appendix 2) 
A full listing of respondents is given in Appendix 4 
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% 
66% 
10% 
14.2% 
Table 5.2 Location of banks in study sample* 
Region City Large Small Total 0/0 of 
banks banks banks respond 
ents 
CentrallNorth Kiev 9 11 20 64.5% 
Chernigov 2 2 6.5% 
East Donetsk I 1 3.2% 
Dnepropetrovsk 1 I 3.2% 
Charkov 1 I 3.2% 
Zaporozye 3 3 10.0% 
South (including Simferopol 1 I 3.2% 
Crimea) Odessa 1 1 3.2% 
West Lvov 1 1 3.2% 
totals 12 19 31 100% 
* A full listing of respondents is given in Appendix 4 
Table 5.3 Job titles of respondents 
Job Title Sample banks* % of respondents 
Chairman of the Board 7 22.6% 
Deputy Chairman of the Board 10 32.3% 
Member of the Board 13 41.9% 
Other executive I 3.2% 
totals 31 100% 
* A full listing of respondents is given in Appendix 4 
Interpretation of responses 
The interview responses were written at the time of the interview or immediately 
afterwards in all cases. As the interviews were carried out in Ukrainian or Russian 
language translation to English was undertaken by the author. 
Interpretation of the transcripts was a basic and simple process. Most answers were 
easily classified into "positive", "negative" or "no influence", where applicable. More 
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textual or freefonn responses were classified post-hoc by the author in the tenns 
displayed in the following tables. 
In some cases the interview questions were forwarded to respondents in advance so 
that answers could be prepared. In all cases prompts were designed to allow a 
selection of answers to be chosen although the option to give a response not on the 
selection list was given too. 
Research findings 
Presentation of the survey findings follows the structure of the interview template 
displayed in Figure 5.1. The template itself is displayed at Appendix 4 but questions 
are summarised here too. In each chapter of the findings the intention is to present the 
summary responses of senior bankers, categorised under the size and location criteria 
discussed earlier. No significance is intimated by displaying the responses in this way 
although some commonalties and differences in viewpoint can be highlighted. 
The political environment 
All interviews opened with two questions about Ukraine's political situation in 1998. 
The May 1998 parliamentary elections had not resolved the political stalemate and 
President Kuchma could look forward to little co-operation and little progress of his 
refonns. Presidential elections were still six months away, at least, adding to the 
atmosphere of uncertainty. 
Responses to the questions on the effects on banks of the political situation, generally 
(Table 5.4) and the May 1998 elections in particular (Table 5.5) show that 58% of big 
banks and 47% of smaller banks were affected by the situation. The remainder felt 
there to be no influence at all. One banker suggested that his bank (a large Kiev based 
institution) was "apolitical", a strange claim, given the institution's history as an organ 
of Soviet policy. 
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It is noted that impact of the political situation was felt more in Kiev (55%) than in 
regions (45%) with most of the effects being positive in nature. The importance of 
Kiev in Ukrainian politics is not underestimated in this regard. 
The larger banks reported more negative effects due to the requirement of them to 
continue to fund former state industries that could not repay loans (mainly former 
state banks). Additionally government policy was for greater amounts of debt to be 
financed by these institutions. Such demands reduced liquidity, threatened capital 
adequacy and prevented larger banks from demonstrating a more commercial outlook. 
The overall effects of this were also felt to include a slowing of growth and dampened 
demand for bank services, especially amongst personal customers. Political and 
country risk heightened and this made for higher risk premia on Ukrainian Financial 
Instruments in international markets. 
This table reports the answers to question 1. 
Table 5.4 The influence of the political situation in 1998/99 on banks 
Negative Positive No influence Total % of resp. n=31 
Big banks 6 (50%) 1 (8%) 5 (42%) 12 39% 
S mall er banks 6 (32%) 3 (16%) 10 (52%) 19 61% 
TOTAL 12 4 15 31 100% 
% of resp. n=31 39% 13% 48% 100% 
Negative Positive No influence Total % ofresp. n=31 
Kiev-based 8 (40%) 3 (15%) 9 (45%) 20 65% 
Regional 4 (36%) 1 (9%) 6 (55%) 11 35% 
TOTAL 12 4 15 31 100% 
% of resp. n=31 39% 13% 48% 100% 
Around 33% of big banks and 42% of small banks reported a negative impact of the 
1998 elections on their business activity. A further 58% and 37% respectively felt 
that it had no influence at all. The impact was felt equally in Kiev and the regions. 
Of the larger banks more (55%) reported "no influence" from the 1998 elections than 
they did on the political situation before the elections (45%). At the same time fewer 
(33%) reported a negative impact than before (50%). Whilst this represents the 
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responses of a small number of banks these are amongst the largest in the country and 
the most influential. It also indicates a better political atmosphere post 1998 for the 
larger banks. In contrast more smaller banks (42%) reported a negative influence than 
before (32%). 
Amongst those banks detecting a positive impact on their business activity were those 
that had successfully fielded their own "independent" parliamentary candidates. 
Frustrated by the lack of reform the banks had acted to place their own people in 
positions of influence. 
Table 5.5 reports the answers to question 2. 
Table 5.5 The impact of parliamentary elections on the business of banks 
Negative Positive No Total % of resp. 
influence n=31 
Big banks 4 (33%) 1 (8%) 7 (58%) 12 39% 
Smaller 8 (42%) 4 (21 %) 7 (37%) 19 61% 
banks 
TOTAL 12 5 14 31 100% 
% ofresp. 39% 16% 45% 100% 
n=31 
Negative Positive No Total 0/0 of resp. 
influence n=31 
Kiev-based 7 (35%) 4 (20%) 9 (45%) 20 65% 
Regional 5 (45%) 1 (9%) 5 (45%) 11 35% 
TOTAL 12 5 14 31 100% 
% ofresp. 39% 16% 45% 100% 
n=31 
The shift of opinions following the 1998 elections, however, might be explained by 
the euphoria of parliamentary success rather than the realistic expectation of political 
change. 
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Legal framework 
Amongst the many refonns called for in Ukraine liberalisation of the tax laws is 
considered to be one of the key changes needed to encourage enterprise and growth. 
Income tax and profit taxes combine with Value Added Tax to limit legitimate 
enterprise and to encourage a culture of tax avoidance. Few new enterprises emerge 
since combined taxes can drain away up to 75% of earnings when declared. This is, 
of course, following large start-up fees. 
There are also specific taxes on banks and high duties on imports as the government 
tries to raise revenue wherever it can. 
Respondents agreed unanimously that tax law liberalisation would be one key 
measure that would affect their own and their customers' businesses positively. There 
was less agreement, however, on the specific taxes that needed to be changed, as seen 
in Table 5.6. 
This table reports the answers to question 4. 
Table 5.6 Tax changes sought by respondent banks 
Taxation changes sought No. of % of 
responses* respondents 
(n.= 31) 
Simpler tax structures 22 71% 
Lower bank taxes 16 52% 
Simpler import/export procedures 12 39% 
Lower specific taxes •• II 35% 
Universal tax code in Ukraine 5 16% 
Simplify bank tax laws 2 6% 
Liberalise taxes (no specific feature) 2 6% 
Lower business taxes 1 3% 
Total: 71 
• Banks made multiple responses . 
•• Including lower currency dealing tax (4) and removal of tax on transfer of assets 
by pension funds (6). 
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The clear indication from this research is that banks and their customers seek reform 
with reduced layers of complexity and fewer instances of double taxation. Whilst 
these elements are part of government policy (and a substantial part of the presidential 
manifesto in 1998) the reality of reform is somewhat different. Government is 
constrained by increasing central expenditure but low levels of declared economic 
activity on which to impose taxes. 
Ukrainian bankers have their own shorter-term interests at heart as 52% called for 
lower bank taxes yet only I called for lower business taxes - a feature that would 
stimulate the economy through fiscal means and stimulate demand for bank services. 
The short-term ism is clear from discussions and underlines the way in which banks 
have survived during the 1990's. Banks specialising in trade finance had specific 
regard to the draconian customs duties and time consuming procedures. 
It is noted that during the discussion of reform banks offered no vIews on 
privatisation. Banks, of course, were privatised at an early stage after independence, 
yet still display many of the characteristics of state banks by virtue of the heavy 
regulation placed upon them. 
The economic situation 
The parlous state of Ukraine's economy for much of the 1990's is described fully in 
Chapter 2. When asked about the state of the economy in 1998, however, responses 
were made against a background of improving inflationary control, abandonment of 
monetary expansion as a tool of policy and a currency crisis. The Russian financial 
crisis was also fresh in the minds of bankers. 
Unsurprisingly all of the larger banks and most of the smaller banks (58%) reported 
negative effects of the economic troubles on their businesses. Some smaller banks 
(32%), however, reported some positive effects as shown in Table 5.7. Mainly these 
banks are located in Kiev, and their new management teams could successfully work 
in those difficult economical conditions by taking advantage of opportunities more 
swiftly than regional counterparts. 
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The dichotomised findings shown in Table 5.7 can be explained by the fact that most 
of big banks are system banks, oriented to servicing big corporate clients, usually 
government owned or government supported. These banks were often obliged to lend 
to failing industry sectors, against all prudential considerations. Negative 
consequences were also caused by big holdings of OVDP (Government bonds) in 
their asset structure at the time of the currency and financial crisis. 
Table 5.7reports the answers to question 5. 
Table 5.7 Responses on the impact of the economy on bank activities 
Worse Better Total 0/0 of resp. n=31 
Big banks 12 (100%) 0 12 39% 
Smaller banks 13 (58%) 6 (32%) 19 61% 
TOTAL 25 6 31 100% 
% of resp. n=31 81% 19% 100% 
Worse Better Total % ofresp. n-31 
Kiev-based 15 (75%) 5 (25%) 20 65% 
Regional 10(91%) 1(9%) 11 35% 
TOTAL 25 6 31 100% 
0/0 of resp. n=31 81% 19% 100% 
Smaller banks were more careful with OVDP purchase and had no pressure from the 
government to fund "lame ducks"". Thus 32% of smaller banks questioned reported 
that they had improved their activity since the crisis. These comprised mainly banks 
that focused on servicing exporters and those which had shown their solvency and 
stability in daily clearings during the crisis. 
Bank stability in the time of crisis caused an inflow of clients from less stable banks. 
Thus, Kiev based small and medium sized banks (as in Russia) were the only ones 
that had shown high-class management skills, flexibility and had taken a good 
advantage of the crisis. Smaller regional banks were cushioned from the demands of 
government but were in a less favorable position to benefit from niche markets. 
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The impact of International Auditing and Accounting Standards erAS) 
International pressures from the World Bank and the IMF and the desire to expand 
beyond Ukrainian borders encouraged Ukrainian banks to convert to International 
Accounting Standards in 1996. The key difference between Western and Ukrainian 
accounting practices was in the treatment of bad and doubtful debts. Under Ukrainian 
procedures bad debts were not shown clearly and certainly not judged to be "bad" 
sufficiently. 
This table reports the answers to question 6. 
Table 5.8 The impact of conversion to International Accounting Standards 
No. of 0/0 of 
responses* respondents 
(n.= 31) 
Greater transparency for investors/creditors 13 42% 
Easier to trade with international institutions 19 61% 
Easier to trade on interbank market 5 16% 
Worsening financial ratios 1 3% 
No difference"" 2 6% 
" 
Banks made multiple responses 
** Societe Generale and Credit Lyonnais used IAS before. 
For banks, reliant on good quality assets in order to maintain prudential ratios, the 
switch to IAS was potentially hazardous. Many of the larger banks had inherited 
former state industries as customers and had been obliged to continue to lend to them. 
As a result of changing the accounting system in banking sector to the IAS most of 
the commercial banks have noticed that some banking activity ratios became worse. 
Overwhelmingly, however, the change was welcomed, as Table 5.8 shows. Most 
banks considered that balance sheet data became more clear and transparent for 
management as well as for creditors. This was seen as a very positive effect. The 
simplified procedures of international audit also helped to improve relationships with 
foreign financial institutions. Another positive point mentioned was the reduction of 
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risks on the domestic market due to a better understanding of the banks' own 
operations. 
An example of the impact of IAS on the accounts of Bank Ukraina is given at 
Appendix 4.2. Here the re-stated assets for 1995 showed a decline of 17.7% to $811 
millions as bad debts were provided for. His had the inevitable knock-on effect on 
profits. These fell almost $1 OOm to $25m. 
The Marketplace 
Perhaps the most important aspects of this wide-ranging survey were the questions 
relating to each bank's orientation to the market. The questions in this chapter cover 
deposit attraction, products, foreign and domestic expansion and the threat posed by 
Western and Russian banks entering the Ukrainian market. 
Deposit attraction should be an important part of the expansion of any bank and 
Ukrainian banks are not unaware of this "cheap" source of funding. However, since 
the National Bank of Ukraine implemented reserve requirements on citizens' deposits 
at 17% some commercial banks stopped paying serious attention to this source of 
funds (some of them even gave up their licenses). The majority of banks, however, 
keep on attracting deposits as shown in Table 5.9, underlining the importance placed 
on this by creating a special department at head office to attract deposits. 
A contrast should be made here with the low credit ratings of Ukrainian banks making 
external wholesale deposit attraction relatively difficult. The poor record in wholesale 
deposit attraction would also limit the ability of Ukrainian banks to expand their 
product portfolios. Financial innovation based on widening the scope of maturity 
transformation would only come with better access to wholesale funds (see Chapter 
3). 
Unfortunately few banks detailed the methods used by their "special department" and 
had not, perhaps understood the question correctly. Commercial sensitivity to deposit 
attraction plans may also have coloured responses here. Mostly, however, the banks 
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concentrate on the attraction of larger deposits from individual organisations, other 
banks and institutions. Mainly funds attraction was better in such cities as Kiev, 
Zaporozye, Charkov, Dnepropetrovsk. 
Table 5.9 reports the answers to question 7. 
Table 5.9 Mechanisms for attraction of private deposits* 
Big banks Small banks 
Figures in brackets show % of bank type Reg. Kiev Reg. Kiev % of 
resp. 
"Special department" plus top management 3 8 7 8 84% 
and shareholders (lOO) (88) (87) (73) 
Advertising 0 1 0 4 16% 
(11) (36) 
Competitive interest rates 0 2 0 4 19% 
(22) (36) 
Deposits not important 0 1 0 3 13% 
(11) (27) 
No licence held 0 0 0 1 (9) 3% 
Totals· 3 12 7 20 
Number of banks 3 9 8 1J 
• Banks made multiple responses 
Interestingly, the smaller banks, including the western owned ones, use consumer 
advertising (banks are amongst the largest TV and Press advertisers in Ukraine) and 
competitive interest rates to attract deposits. 
It is interesting to note that it is the smaller banks that perceive a more competitive 
marketplace than the larger banks. The smaller banks also adopt competitive 
strategies based on price (interest rates) and non-price (advertising) than their larger 
rivals. 
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The impact of inflation and wide vanances In official rates, however, makes the 
interest rate a difficult tool to use. Data are difficult to obtain on advertising 
expenditures but budgets of 300,000 to 400,000 UAH (US$ 100,000) are expected for 
banks with gross assets of 100 million UAH or above. Prominvestbank also provides 
sponsorship for Ukraine's top football team - Dynamo Kiev as part of its advertising 
strategy. 
Two questions were asked about the development of new products as a way to 
measure the markets to which banks are addressing themselves. All banks questioned 
declared interest in developing new products. The range of products available in 
Soviet times was very limited and following independence the aggravation of the 
general economic and political situation, uncertainty, high risk loan business most 
commercial bank moved towards expansion of their services. 
Expansion of products and services is also caused by bank clients' demand for new 
products. In 1999 these factors conditioned the appearance of the products shown in 
Table 5.10 amongst respondents in the Ukrainian banking sector. 
Plastic cards and entry to the international card networks, Visa and Mastercard, are 
prominent products for many commercial banks. Prior to full currency convertibility 
in Ukraine cash deposits were required to support card applications. The banks are 
moving in the direction of credit provision to individuals but this is still limited to the 
most affluent individuals. 
Most product development has been in the bank-to-bank market with clearing and 
settlement products and systems featuring. This underlines the emphasis placed by 
commercial banks on institutional lending and securities markets rather than 
commercial and consumer credit markets. 
This table reports the answers to question 9. 
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Table 5.10 New products offered by respondent banks* 
Big banks Small banks 
Figures in brackets show % of bank type Reg. Kiev Reg. Kiev %of 
resp. 
New management systems 0 5 (55) I (12) 0 19% 
Security operation services 0 2 (22) 4 (50) I (9) 22% 
New operation software systems 0 4 (44) 0 I (9) 16% 
Plastic card services 0 5 (55) 5 (63) 2 (18) 39% 
Settlement products 0 2 (22) 0 2 (18) 13% 
Other 3 (100) 2 (22) 3 (37) 3 (27) 35% 
totals 3 20 13 9 
Number of banks 3 9 8 JJ 
* Banks made multIple responses 
Examples of "new operation software" abound. PUMB and Raiffeisen Bank (not in 
the study sample) have installed MIDOS software whilst Bank Ukraina uses 
ABRAXSYS software. Both MIDOS and ABRAXSYS have been developed for 
activity analysis and the control of risk and dealing. 
In its annual report for 1995 First Ukrainian International Bank lists its achievements 
in advancing technology since foundation in 1991. The poor state of Ukrainian 
telecoms, it says, has been responsible for a decision to use satellite communication 
channels, as they seem to be the "most economically reasonable and most rapid 
solution" (First Ukrainian International Bank, 1996). The report goes on to announce 
the intention to install satellite stations in branch offices and at head office in 1996, 
linking them to a hub station outside Ukraine to ensure good links to international 
telephone, fax and data transmission lines. 
Despite the small sample size a clear picture emerges among respondent banks. The 
picture is that loan activity is the priority in Ukrainian banking at the moment. Table 
5.11 shows that 74% out of all questioned banks consider credit one of the most 
important (or the only important) products offered. Both big and smaller banks seem 
to be equally active in this area. Regional banks seem to place more importance on 
loan based business than Kiev based ones (91 % against 65%). The loans provided for 
clients are in national currency - hryvna and foreign (according with currency 
legislation) - mainly in US dollars. The interest rate in US dollars is still quite high -
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18% -22% per year. A number of big banks attract funding at the international 
markets and provided loans to national companies. 
Following loan activity bank managers pay significant attention to settlement 
procedures (58%). Settlement products and services are offered equally by large and 
small banks although the larger banks dominate the inter-bank market. During the 
currency crisis situation, daily "in-time" settlement between partners is very important 
for maintaining the confidence of clients. The better service a bank provides, the 
more chances that clients will chose this particular bank. 
Table 5.11 shows that 66% of big banks, and 53% of smaller banks consider clearing 
services a very important product of their activity. Kiev based banks are more 
concerned about their clearing products than banks, based in regional centres (65% 
against 45%). 
As for inter-bank crediting, 35% of all questioned banks cited this as a key operation. 
50% of big and 26% of smaller banks are quite active in this sector, the activity is 
seen equally in Kiev and regional sector. The more active behaviour of bigger banks 
can be explained by larger turnovers at the money market. Larger banks are 
significant market players in a small market. Their inter-bank activities can influence 
the whole market quite markedly. 
Table 5.11 Key banking products* 
Figures in brackets show % a/bank type 
Interb.nk Settlement Security Currency Loan No. of No. of 
operations products operation operation facilities responses banks 
Big banks 6 (50%) 8 (66%) 1(8%) 1(8%) 9 (75%) 25 12 
Smaller banks 5 (26%) 10 (53%) 3 (16%) 5 (26%) 14 (74%) 37 19 
TOTAL 11 18 4 6 23 62 31 
°/0 of rcsp. 35% 58% 13% 19% 74% 
n=31 
Kiev based 7 (35%) 13 (65%) 1(5%) 1(5%) 13 (65%) 35 20 
Regional 4 (15%) 5 (45%) 3 (27%) 5 (45%) 10 (91%) 27 11 
TOTAL 11 18 4 6 23 62 31 
% of resp. 35% 58% 13% 19% 74% 
n=31 
* Banks made mulllple responses 
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One traditional way for banks to gamer more deposits is to expand branch networks 
(see Chapter 3). Although this method is in decline in Western Europe the lack of 
networks of branches in Ukraine makes this a viable strategy. Against this 
background, the poor availability of qualified staff and the uncertainty still apparent in 
the economy mean that only 29% (9) of respondents are planning to expand branch 
networks in Ukraine. Table 5.12 shows the breakdown of respondents planning to 
expand domestically. 
This table reports the answers to question 11. 
Table 5.12 Respondents with domestic branch expansion plans 
Big banks Smaller banks Kiev based Regional TOTAL 
No. 2 7 4 5 9 
% of bank type 17% 37% 20% 45% 29% 
From this response it is apparent that the smaller and regionally based banks seek 
expansion in the retail sector through branch networks more then the Kiev based and 
larger banks. As the responses showed earlier the ability of smaller, regional banks to 
compete in the inter-bank market and the wholesale sector is limited by capital and 
communication problems. The network expansion strategy, therefore, is a logical one 
and builds on the growth opportunities offered by a largely un-banked population. 
Most banks showed a desire to expand abroad, although only one (Prominvestbank) 
indicated that it would be opening branches abroad. The remainder would seek to 
expand by opening correspondent accounts with established banks. 
This more cautious approach is, again, a logical and consistent one. It accords with 
the Western Banking development model outlined in Chapter 3 and with the capital 
constraints of Ukrainian banks at the time of the research. A correspondent network 
strategy is likely to promote awareness of Ukrainian markets and to build trust both 
internally and externally. 
Caution and a domestic focus still appear to be the bedrock of decision making 
amongst respondents. 
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A final question in this chapter concerned the threat of competition from Western and 
Russian banks. Only Bank Ukraina (with its close working relationship with overseas 
banks) recognised the longer-term threat from US and European banks. No banks 
considered the crisis-ridden Russian banks as a problem. 
The key reason for this appeared to be that only Ukrainian banks were willing and 
able to offer lending facilities in Ukraine and the Western banks that had opened 
offices in Kiev offered only a limited range of products and services. Of course the 
foreign banks will become a more dangerous threat as economic and political stability 
emerge but at the moment Ukrainian banks do not consider them to be a threat. 
Again, this displays the short-termism that Ukrainian banks have become accustomed 
to. Few interview respondents suggested that there existed a longer-term strategy that 
planned for expansion beyond a 2-year horizon. Clearly there is scope for more 
strategic thinking in the institutions visited although in times of economic and 
political uncertainty it is difficult to see how matters could be otherwise. 
Personnel matters 
In an economy with high unemployment staff retention does not appear to be a 
problem for banks. Unfortunately, however, the better, more qualified and 
experienced staff shows greater signs of mobility. 
Most bankers find that qualified staff are quite hard to find in Ukraine. This is due, in 
part, to the newness of the banking system and the high demand for banking 
specialists. The old (Soviet-era) staff do not have the right qualifications and skills 
for management in market economy. Unfortunately, however, newly qualified 
graduate specialists do not have enough practical experience. 
Banks are trying to remedy this by forging relationships with Ukrainian Universities 
and sponsoring banking qualifications. The University of Trade and Economics, in 
Kiev, began a banking degree in 1993 and saw its first graduates in 1998. All 
graduates found employment immediately. From its earliest days the Banking Faculty 
of the University had been sponsored by Inko Bank (a commercial bank that failed in 
1996) and supported by an EU grant. 
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Technology 
Due to their dependence on state funding and their purely domestic focus in Soviet 
times Ukrainian banks did not keep pace with technological advance before 
independence. The importance of secure communications internally and with other 
international institutions is vital for the achievement of Ukrainian bank goals of 
growth and foreign expansion. 
Respondents were asked, therefore, what were the main problems for integration of 
Ukrainian banks into the international financial market. Their responses are shown in 
Table S.13. At the time of the interviews the Millennium bug problem was a 
considerable threat but in the event no serious harm was done by a failure to be Y2K 
compliant. 
The main technical problems of bankers' concern are old PC hardware; old software 
and the millennium bug (29%). This problem seems to appear more . marked in 
smaller banks (32%) than in big ones (2S%). 
The total picture is quite positive with 46% of questioned banks not having technical 
problems in their operations. Predictably more of the larger banks (S8%) report "no 
problems" than smaller ones (37%). Kiev-based banks seem to have better situation 
compared to regional based banks. SO% of Kiev based banks reported "no problems" 
against 36% of regional ones. 
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This table reports the answers to question 17. 
Table 5.13 Technical problems of Ukrainian banks 
PC, Funding Size ofa Staff No serious No. of 
software source bank expenence problems banks 
Big banks 3 (25%) 2 (17%) - - 7 (58%) 12 
Smaller 6 (32%) - 4 (21%) 2 (10%) 7 (37%) 19 
TOTAL 9 2 4 2 14 31 
% ofresp. 29% 6% 13% 6% 46% 
n=31 
PC, Funding Size ofa Staff No serious No. of 
software source bank experience problems banks 
Kiev-based 7 (35%) 1(5%) 1(5%) 1 (5%) 10 (50%) 20 
Regional 2 (18%) 1 (9%) 3 (27%) 1 (9%) 4 (36%) 11 
TOTAL 9 2 4 2 14 
DID of resp. 29% 60/0 13% 6% 46% 
n=31 
Figures In brackets show % of bank type 
Smaller banks are likely to have invested later in upgrading their computer 
installations. The bigger banks certainly concentrated on this aspect of their 
operations from an early time. Bank size and staff experience were cited exclusively 
by smaller banks (more regional based than Kiev) as barriers to technical 
advancement. 
Future success 
The final questions In this interview schedule related to the future plans of the 
respondent banks. In order to sum up the strategy employed by the bank in question 
respondents were asked what the most important aspect of development of their bank 
was and how they would best measure success. 
Tables 5.14 and 5.15 detail the responses obtained and show that 45% of banks of all 
sizes strive for greater market share and a further 29% are working towards improved 
quality and improved products. One specialist bank is included in the "market share" 
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total as it aims to maintain its monopoly position in operating interbank settlements. 
Only 2 respondents considered that the economic and political environment in 
Ukraine was the most important driver of development. 
This table reports the answers to question 18 according with questionnaire. 
Figure 5.14 Key aspects of bank development 
Big banks . Small banks 
Figures in brackets show % of bank type Reg. Kiev Reg. Kiev %of 
Banks made multiple responses. resp. (n=31) 
Market share/better cl ient base 0 4 (44%) 3 (38%) 7 (64%) 45% 
Improved quality and products 2 (67%) 2 (22%) 4 (50%) 1(9%) 29% 
Better credit portfolio 0 2 (22%) 0 0 6% 
IT improvements 0 I (11%) 0 0 3% 
Investment banking 0 1(11%) 0 0 3% 
Management/planning I (33%) 0 I (12%) 1(9%) 3% 
Better settlement system 0 I (11%) 0 1(9%) 6% 
Political and economic stability 0 0 0 2 (18%) 6% 
totals 3 I I 8 12 
Number of banks 3 9 8 I I 31 
Three banks claim that their management lacks the skills to operate in a market 
environment and so improving management and strategy will be a primary aim. 
It is interesting to note that no large regional banks cited "market share" as a driver, 
reserving this status for "improved quality". Of the smaller banks more of the Kiev 
based ones sought market expansion (58%) than their regional counterparts (38%). 
Again, as for the larger banks "improved quality" was the key for smaller regional 
banks. Short-termism is very apparent in the responses given. 
This question was left "open" in order to allow respondents to prioritise their key 
strategic drivers. It is interesting to note that the majority does not feel held back by 
the environment of instability in the region. 
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This table reports the answers to question 13. 
Figure S.tS Key measures of success 
Big banks Small banks 
Figures in brackets show % a/bank type Reg. Kiev Reg. Kiev 0/0 of 
Banks made multiple responses. resp. (n=31) 
Capital growth 3 7 5 8 74% 
(100%) (78%) (62%) (73%) 
Asset growth 0 I 3 I 16% 
(11%) (38%) (9%) 
Market share 0 3 2 4 29% 
(33%) (25%) (36%) 
Improved liquidity 0 I 4 2 22% 
(11%) (50%) (18%) 
Profit growth 0 0 1 2 10% 
(13%) (18%) 
totals 3 12 15 17 
Number of banks 3 9 8 11 31 
It is clear that Ukrainian banks see capital growth as a key measure of success. Under 
NBU regulatory rules and IAS accounting standards any bank showing capital growth 
will have shown an ability to overcome the Soviet legacy of bad debt. The 
mechanisms for improving the capital position are very logical and include better 
client bases, larger market shares and better quality products. 
Conclusion 
The primary research has added considerable detail to the picture of Ukrainian 
banking that is developing. Simple PEST analysis would suggest that Ukraine's 
political and economic instability in the last decade would have had a major effect on 
Ukrainian banks but that strategies have been developed to lessen the individual 
banks' sensitivity to these factors. 
The interview based methodology for empirical work proved to be an excellent tool 
for collecting data. Cultural resistance to questionnaires was overcome although the 
individual approach could have led to bias in some cases. 
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The respondents in this research are all senior bankers who experienced the turmoil of 
the 1990's first-hand. The quality of the data is, therefore, assured. The sample size 
and the wide-ranging nature of questions, together with the candour displayed by 
respondents all help to add credibility to the research findings. 
The findings, themselves, indicate that amongst respondents political uncertainty 
affected only a minority and although all could see the need for reform most were 
able to work within the strictures imposed by high taxes and close supervision. 
Interestingly, banks would rather the government lowered bank taxes as a priority 
rather than taxes on their clients. 
Political impact was felt mainly in Kiev, rather than the regions and in larger, rather 
than smaller, banks. The influence of state policy, enacted through former "system" 
banks, was still felt keenly in late 1998. Larger, Kiev based banks felt positive about 
the 1998 elections due to the success of their own candidates. 
Tax reform is high on the political agenda but little movement is seen in this regard. 
Banks lobby for tax liberalisation both for their own businesses and for those of their 
clients. 
Larger banks tended to suffer more from government economic policy, especially in 
the purchase of government debt and the directives to support inefficient industries. 
Smaller banks suffered less and were more able to service niche markets rather than 
the mainstream business lending market. Higher quality management in larger banks 
(especially in Kiev) also helped flexibility and responsiveness. 
Perhaps the biggest potential impact on banks came in 1997 when accounting systems 
switched to JAS. Although many balance sheets suffered through this most bankers 
saw the move in a positive light. 
Marketing is still in its infancy in Ukraine and the attraction of consumer deposits is 
not seen as crucial. This is underlined by the small number of banks planning 
domestic branch network expansion. Most banks prefer to concentrate on corporate 
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deposits and facilities for high net worth individuals as well as inter-bank and 
settlement products. 
The dominance of lending in the banks' portfolios is both a legacy from Soviet times 
and a useful barrier to entry for foreign banks. Only the lack of qualified staff and 
overcoming minor technological problems appear to have the potential to hold the 
banks back from their short-term aims of growth and market share expansion. 
For the future (although Ukrainian banks tend only to consider the short-term future) 
smaller banks strive for market share whilst larger ones work towards improved 
quality and products. This is borne out as nearly all respondents see capital growth as 
a key measure of success. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis I have analysed the establishment of the Ukrainian commercial banking 
sector, outlining its development and function since independence. This research has 
indicated that the banking sector has played a major role in the process of economic 
reform in Ukraine from 1991 to 2000. 
No meaningful comparison can be made of the physical development of Ukrainian and 
UK banking. The latter happened over centuries against the backdrop of market forces, 
growing economic wealth and capitalist objectives. The former has happened over a 10-
year period. Change in Ukraine has been rapid and pragmatic. The backdrop has been a 
stagnant economy, government control and the market distortion of "privatised" banks, 
thinly disguised "system" banks of the soviet era. To a smaller extent poor 
communication and poor financial education have also influenced development in 
Ukraine. 
There were, however, some similarities of banking systems development in surrounding 
countries of post-Communism regime in Eastern Europe. Almost every banking sector in 
these countries has experienced certain problems that were slowing the process of 
development of banks: 
• Macroeconomic trends; 
• Low capital; 
• Large portfolios of non-performing loans; 
• Old principles of accounting; 
• Little to encourage for lenders in event of default; 
• Untrained personnel; 
• Old technology. 
144 
The Ukrainian banking system has gone through several stages of formation. Starting 
from restructuring of former Soviet Union banks the banking sector has been developing 
towards a growing and stabilizing market. Transition to a free-market economy brought 
about the appearance of commercial banks, the main principle of which became profit. 
The overall monitoring and controlling functions of the National Bank of Ukraine have 
been improving over the past years. Besides, the NBU became the main protector of 
Ukrainian commercial banks. 
I have discovered that as the Ukrainian banking sector has been growing and improving, 
the number and quality of banking services has been increasing as well. In addition, the 
technology used by Ukrainian commercial banks has reached a level seen in many 
developed countries. Growing professionalism and experience of banking staff makes 
mismanagement less meaningful in Ukrainian banking. Government influence on 
banking decision-making and strategy-planning processes is also getting weaker in 
Ukraine. 
The primary research has added considerable detail to the picture of Ukrainian banking 
that is developing. Simple PEST analysis would suggest that Ukraine's political and 
economic instability in the last decade would have had a major effect on Ukrainian banks 
but that strategies have been developed to lessen the individual banks' sensitivity to these 
factors. 
The findings, themselves, indicate that amongst respondents political uncertainty affected 
only a minority of banks and although all could see the need for reform most were able to 
work within the strictures imposed by high taxes and close supervision. Political impact 
was felt mainly in Kiev, rather than the regions and in larger, rather than smaller, banks. 
The influence of state policy, enacted through former "system" banks, was still felt 
keenly in late 1998. Larger, Kiev based banks felt positive about the 1998 elections due 
partly to the success of their own candidates. 
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Larger banks tended to suffer more from government economic policy, especially in the 
purchase of government debt and the directives to support inefficient industries. Smaller 
banks suffered less and were more able to service niche markets rather than the 
mainstream business lending market. Higher quality management in larger banks 
(especially in Kiev) also helped flexibility and responsiveness. 
Perhaps the biggest potential impact on banks came in 1997 when accounting systems 
switched to IAS. Although many balance sheets suffered through this most bankers saw 
the move in a positive light. 
Marketing is still in its infancy in Ukraine and the attraction of consumer deposits is not 
seen as crucial. This is underlined by the small number of banks planning domestic 
branch network expansion. Most banks prefer to concentrate on corporate deposits and 
facilities for high net worth individuals as well as inter-bank and settlement products. 
The dominance of lending in the banks' portfolios is both a legacy from soviet times and 
a useful barrier to entry for foreign banks. Only the lack of qualified staff and 
overcoming minor technological problems appear to have the potential to hold the banks 
back from their short-term aims of growth and market share expansion. 
For the future (although Ukrainian banks tend only to consider the short-term future) 
smaller banks strive for market share whilst larger ones work towards improved quality 
and products. This is borne out as nearly all respondents see capital growth as a key 
measure of success. 
Analysing the Ukrainian banking system development helps us to forecast future 
tendencies in the banking sector for 3-5 years ahead. Analysis based on the Bankscope 
database and interviews shows that the banking sector has been successfully developing 
in Ukraine according to all normal accounting measures. Future development of middle-
sized banks and eliminating of overall number of commercial banks may now be seen in 
Ukraine as NB U restrictions decrease. 
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The oligopoly of former Soviet-era (Oschadbank and others) and new wave banks (Aval, 
Privatbank) has been decreasing during past few years and their influence will fall in 
future as foreign banks invest in Ukraine and provide effective competition. 
The banking business will remain profitable in the future and the level ROAA, ROAE 
ratios (based on the Bankscope database analysis) will be much higher than in developed 
countries. As a result, since stabilization of political situation and after V.Yuschenko 
became a Prime Minister, foreign capital will be more actively entering the Ukrainian 
banking sector. This inflow probably will be rather arranged through purchasing of local 
banks' shares. 
Still, there are a lot of problems that slow the process of national banking sector 
development: 
• Low living standards of Ukrainian citizens slows the accumulation of deposit-base 
funds for banking operations; 
• Uncertain bankruptcy procedures prevents the market from getting rid of "dead" 
enterprises, including government-owned Soviet-era factories; 
• Slow privatization speed el iminates the potential for economic improvement. There 
are still a lot of commercial banks having large equity stakes held by the government. 
• Unstable government regulation of banking activity along with bureaucracy and 
corruption in all levels of government administrations provides an unpredictable 
environment for the banking sector to act in; 
• Poor credit rating of most national enterprises along with high reserve requirements 
of the NBU (which makes the level ofhryvna funds supply very low) makes real 
sector crediting less attractive than interbank operations. This prohibits economic 
growth through industry. 
Further research of this topic should certainly attempt the role of reforming processes that 
need to be introduced in banking sector and the Ukrainian economy in general. Another 
important aspect of Ukrainian banking sector development and function is preventing the 
potential banking system crisis, which have been experienced in many emerging 
countries (including the most recent Russian crisis in 1998). 
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APPENDIX 1 UKRAINE - GENERAL DATA 
1.1 Ukrainians outside the Ukraine 
Ukrainians in the European countries bordering on Ukraine belong to the 
autochthonous population. In Poland, there are Boikivshchyna, Lemkivshchyna, 
Nadsiannya, Pidliashya and Kholmshchyna - ethnic territories where their forefathers 
had lived since the immemorial. After WWII, most were deported, either to the USSR 
or to Northeast Poland. There they were subjected to intensive pressures of 
assimilation. At present, official Polish statistics recognises 150,000 ethnic 
Ukrainians. By contrast, Ukrainian organisations in Poland say the number is close to 
500,000. 
In Romania, Ukrainians mostly inhabit the provinces of Sucava, Maramures, Banat, 
and Dobruja. Again, different sources cite different numbers of ethnic Ukrainians: 
from 50,000 to 600,000. 
In the Slovak Republic, the number is up to 40,000 mostly near Presov. 
In other European countries, Ukrainians are registered as immigrants. The largest 
Ukrainian communities are found in former Yugoslavia (up to 5,000), France (up to 
30,000), Germany (some 20,000), and Great Britain (up to 30,000). 
In North America, the Ukrainian ethnic community at large formed as the result of 
three waves of emigration - at the turn of the 20th c., between WWI and WWII, and 
after the war. In the USA, they number over a million; in Canada, the 1991 census 
showed 530,000 ethnic Ukrainians. Most of them (up to 90%) were born in their 
countries of residence. 
There are ethnic Ukrainian communities in Latin America, mainly in Argentina (up to 
160,000) and Brazil (some 100,000). Most of them came in between the world wars 
from Poland and Romania. 
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Historically the youngest ethnic Ukrainian community is in Australia (some 34,000), 
formed after 1948, and, for the most part, of former Dps - immigrates of displaced 
persons camps in Western Europe. 
1.2 Act of proclamation of Ukraine's independence 
Considering the deadly threat to Ukraine, in conjunction with the coup d'etat in the 
USSR, on August 19, 1991 
Continuing the age-old tradition of state construction in Ukraine, 
Proceeding from the right to self-determination, provided for by the UN 
Charter, and by other international legal documents, 
Acting in pursuance of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, the 
Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic hereby solemnly 
PROCLAIMS INDEPENCE OF UKRAINE 
and the creation of an independent Ukrainian state, UKRAINE. The territory of 
Ukraine had become indivisible and inviolable. Henceforth only the 
Constitution of Ukraine and laws of Ukraine would have had legal strength in 
the territory of Ukraine. 
This Act became effective instantly following its approval. In August 24,1991 by 
VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE. 
On December I, 1991, a referendum took place in Ukraine, involving 84,18 percent of 
the population, of which 90,32 % seconded the Independence Act of August 24. 
Winning 61,6 % of the votes, Leonid Kravchuk was elected a President of Ukraine. 
Later Kravchuk had been criticised for a number of things, including the nuclear-
disarmament deal he signed with Russia and the disastrous economy (Anonymous, 
20). 
At a summit meeting in Belovezhskaya Pustcha (December 7-8, 1991) leaders of the 
States of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine signed a Treaty on the formation of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), thus putting an end to the USSR. 
Ukraine had been doing its utmost to increase the voice within the Commonwealth of 
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Independent States and expressing the autonomous nature of its interests. Although 
the country was a founder member of the CIS in 1991, it has reduced its status to that 
of an associate member (Mellow, 1994). 
Ukraine only participates in joint activities which it regards as serving its interests. 
For example, Ukraine has not signed the collective security treaty for the CIS - in line 
with the principles of neutrality. It was also a key player in the adjournment ofa 
decision on joint peace-making military units and protection of common borders 
(Pearce, 1995). Over a short period a new system of state administration was created, 
along with the National Armed Forces, the Security Service and law enforcement 
authorities. New, broader horizons opened for political freedoms; practically all 
restrictions on the spiritual progress of the Ukrainian and other nations were lifted. 
The Ukrainian state had entered the international community as an equal partner. 
1.3 Ukraine's resources 
Present-day independent Ukraine has a considerable potential to quickly develop its 
economy - and this is explained not only by the favourable natural conditions, but also 
by the convenient geographic position in terms of international trade exchanges. 
Ukraine's iron and manganese ore deposits are considered the richest in the world-
primarily in the Kryvyi Rih Basin (up to 62% of pure iron) and the Nikopol Basin. 
There are also considerable reserves of titanium, nickel, chrome, mercury and other 
rare metals. 
The non-ore deposits are quite variegated (e.g., sulphur, phosphorites, potash salts, 
refractors, flux, granite, marble, porcelain clay, chalk, et.) 
Still, the oil and gas deposits of Sub-Carpathia (Prykarpattya) and Left-Bank Ukraine 
cannot satisfy their own needs in these energy resources. 
Ukraine's energy balance had been hit not only by the decline in coal output but for 
some years also by falling petroleum and natural gas production, making the country 
more dependent on imports. The exploration and development of domestic oil and gas 
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reserves was neglected during the Soviet era. Oil production contracted from 12.8 m 
tpy in 1975 to around 4.1 m tpy in 1994, while gas production fell from 56.7 bn cubic 
metres in 1980 to only just over 20 bn cubic metres in 1994. Needs had therefore been 
met increasingly by imports. At present some 80% ofthe country's natural gas and 
almost the same percentage of its oil is imported, above all from Russia and 
Turkmenistan. 
However, Ukraine has good chances of improving its energy self-sufficiency by 
exploiting own resources more intensively. Production of around 45 bn cubic metres 
of natural gas per annum is considered a realistic target, although estimates of proven 
natural gas reserves range, according to the technology applied, between 1.2 tr. and 7 
tr. cubic metres. Oil production could be hiked to around 9 mil. tpy - given estimated 
reserves of 240 m tonnes - if the country presses ahead with investment in developing 
the fields in southern Ukraine, the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. 
Ukraine's labour pool amounts to 29.6 million persons, of whom 22.4 million are 
employed in the national economy, including 6.4 million in the industries, 4.6 million 
in agriculture and forestry, 1.7 million in construction, 1.6 million in transport and 
communications, and 6.6 million in the communal sphere, medicine, and public 
education. 
1.4 Relations with international financial institutions 
Ukraine became a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank in September 1992. Ukraine's IMF quota is SDR 997,3 million. Relations with 
these two financial organisations have improved substantially since President Kuchma 
took office at mid-1994 (Economist, 1994g). The first key stabilisation measures have 
been implemented, and a tough 1995 budget has been pushed through parliament. 
Internally, the president had set about building up his position vis-a-vis the hard-liners 
still entrenched in the state administration, in state industries, and in a parliament 
dominated by a left-wing ex-communist faction hostile to economic reform (Jones, 
1995a). Virtually his first act on reaching the presidency in July 1994 was to 
telephone International Monetary Fund managing director Michel Camdessus to 
invite the Fund's help in preparing an economic plan. 
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To financially underpin the refonn process, the IMF had approved in October 1994 
the disbursement of the first trench of the equivalent of roughly USD 370 m ofa 
credit granted under the Systemic Transfonnation Facility [STF], (Economist I 994f). 
Back in November 1994, negotiations began on a standby agreement for the 
equivalent of roughly USD 1.5 bn. It was based on an economic programme that 
include curbing inflation, bringing down the budget deficit, increasing exports to 
reduce the current account deficit, further price deregulation and the introduction of 
structural refonns (Economist I 995b,d). 
After 18 months since Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma had announced a set of 
radical refonns, things had been tricky. The government had its first row with the IMF 
earlier this year. Ukraine failed to pay its import bill at the end of December. The 
budget deficit turned out much bigger than planned. An angry parliament had forced 
the usually strict central bank to print more money. Hence the IMF's decision to 
freeze a standby loan worth $ 1.5 billion (Economist, 1996b). 
The World Bank had also recognised the resumption of the refonn policy by granting 
a credit totalling USD 500 m. The first part was already disbursed before the end of 
1994 and was used primarily to pay for urgently needed imports and to stabilise the 
foreign exchange market. 
The World Bank held out the prospect of further support especially to promote 
specific projects in agriculture, food processing, energy supply, the modernisation of 
refineries and the security of nuclear power plants. Furthennore, the World Bank is 
advising the country on the creation of a social network. 
Ukraine's relations with the European Union had been systematically expanded. In 
1993, a "partnership agreement" was concluded between Ukraine and the EU. It 
provided comprehensive co-operation above all in trade, economic and financial co-
operation as well as the promotion of political and cultural dialogue. In December 
1994, the EU provided balance of payments aid totalling ECU 85 m. Disbursement of 
the credit was made contingent on - among other things - Ukraine taking steps to 
close the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. 
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Under the EU's TACIS Programme, Ukraine receives diverse support, for example 
the implementation of reforms in the agricultural field and food processing, creation 
of the legal, economic and technical foundations in this field and the compilation of 
statistics. Farmers receive start-up aid via a special promotion programme. The 
programme also includes the creation of an agricultural pilot project to demonstrate 
the conversion of an agricultural-industrial complex. 
Ukraine became a member of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD). Following the granting of a technical credit for USD 27 m, 
which was agreed at mid-1994, the Eastern European Bank increased its total 
exposure in Ukraine to USD 200 m at the beginning of 1995. Furthermore, the Bank 
had also proposed Ukrainian Government some programs concerning establishing of 
the financial system, privatisation as well as the conversion of agriculture, the energy 
and transport sectors (Jenkins, 1996). 
1.S The privatisation procedure 
Choice of privatisation method 
At the auction sale, the property went to the highest bidder. In a public tender, the 
successful bidder was the one who pledged to fulfil stipulations such as investment 
commitments or job guarantees and also submitted the best offer. Finally, an 
enterprise could have also been privatised by share subscription. 
Valuation 
The valuation method for privatisation assets dated from September 8, 1992 
calculated the value of the enterprise to be sold on the basis of the replacement cost. 
The valuation covered full inventories. 
Form of payment 
The respective privatisation programme determined the extent to which the selling 
price had been covered by privatisation certificates. 
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Besides paying cash, employees of a company which was to be privatised, as well as 
other parties, could obtain company shares by using the privatisation certificates 
allotted to them. This right applied to all privatisation methods. 
Privatisation certificates create no direct ownership of a particular property. Instead 
they are to be exchanged first for a participation certificate in either an investment 
fund or a specific company. 
Pre-emptive purchasing rights 
The privatisation process in Ukraine was characterised by many pre-emptive rights. 
The pre-emptive right enjoyed by the workforce was limited to one and a half times 
the nominal value of a privatisation certificate. Every employee could turn in his 
certificate and pay for another half in cash, with the company stakes offered to him at 
face value. Beyond the normal pre-emptive right, employees of both food-processing 
operations and their suppliers enjoy even more incentives for taking over their 
businesses. 
1.6 Treasury Bills 
Primary Market 
Treasury Bills were first issued in March 1995 and they had been playing an 
increasing role in monetary policy till the financial crisis of 1998. The Ukrainian 
Ministry of Finance with the NBU acting as general agent were issuing bills. Investors 
had access to T-Bills through domestic commercial banks, which could participate in 
T-Bill auctions as the only primary dealers. 
All T-Bills auctioned before April 1996 were paying quarterly coupon. As of May 
1996, T-Bills were issued as a discount instruments only. Also, the nominal value of a 
T-Bill was reduced to UAH 100 ($54) from UAH 1000 in order to make the T-Bill 
market accessible to domestic retail investors. 
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Auctions 
T -bills of all maturity were traded twice a week on Tuesdays and Thursdays. Due to 
high demand, it was usual to see three and six month T-Bills issued on Wednesday or 
Friday at the weighted average price of the last auction. 
Primary dealers submitted their bids and received executions through the NBU's 
electronic interbank payment system. Dealers could submit bids either at limit price or 
request execution at the weighted average of the successful limit prices. Results were 
announced in the afternoon and successfully subscribed T-Bills were then credited to 
the securities accounts of investors at the National Bank of Ukraine. Registration of 
bills was through electronic book-entry form. 
A secondary market in T-Bills was opened on January 11, 1996 at the Ukrainian 
Interbank Currency Exchange (UICE) and was organised weekly. Six domestic banks 
were registered to trade government securities. The most liquid were T-Bills with I to 
2 months remaining until maturity. However, the average volume per session in the 
most liquid issues was only 30 to 200 bills ($1500 - 11000). Through May the total 
sum ofT-Bills sales on the secondary market reached more than UAH 2.23 bin ($ 
118,000,000). A seller was liable for 30% taxation on any realised capital gain (not 
paid if held until maturity). Sale on the secondary market was less attractive than 
holding to maturity since accrued interest is taxed as a capital gain. 
Repatriation 
According to the Act on Foreign Investments, repatriated UAH profits of non-resident 
investors were subject to 15% capital gains tax. Investors from countries that do have 
a double-taxation treaty with Ukraine (UK, USA, Cyprus, EU countries, Czech 
Republic, Switzerland and others) could avoid this tax. 
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APPENDIX 2 UKRAINIAN BANKING SYSTEM AND 
UKRAINIAN BANKS 
2.1 Key NBU Decree 
# 122 from Registered in Legislative 
03/27/98, Kiev Department of the NBU 
4/3/1998, # 538 
Validation of new amendment Regulation Act of loan loss reserve forming and 
spending procedures for commercial banks. 
In order to make all rules and regulations of the National Bank of Ukraine 
suitable to International Standards of Accounting and Reporting requirements, the 
Management of National Bank of Ukraine had enacted the following PROCEDURES: 
I. To introduce changes into Regulation Act of loan loss reserve formation and 
spending procedures for commercial banks approved by Management of the 
National Bank of Ukraine (Decree # 323 from 09/29/97). 
2. For Crimean, Central, regional and Kiev's branches of the National Bank of 
Ukraine to assure the observance of Decree's requirements of creditor debts 
evaluation, loan loss reserve formation and spending procedures by commercial 
banks. 
3. For Control and Economical Departments to proceed changes into standards of 
statistic reports. 
For Control Department and Informational Department, the necessary accounting 
software needed no be installed by 03/31198. 
4. Vice governor of the National Bank of Ukraine; banking control department and 
heads of regional management's of the National Bank of Ukraine are to be 
responsible for observance of Decree. 
5. Decree has taken effect from the date of its approval. 
Governor V. A. Yuschenko. 
Approved by Decree # 122 from 3/27/98 (code # 538 
from 4/3/98) by Management of the National Bank of 
Ukraine. 
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Regulation Act of loan loss reserve forming and spending procedures for 
commercial banks. 
In order to ensure safety and stability of banking sector, to protect bank's creditors 
and depositors, according to Clause 24 of the Law of Ukraine "About banks and 
banking activity" (872-12) the National Bank of Ukraine establishes procedures of 
loan loss reserve forming and spending for commercial banks (further - reserve). 
1. Main procedures 
1.1. Commercial banks are to form reserve for compensation for possible losses 
from credit activity. 
1.2. Commercial banks are to form reserve for covering possible losses from debts 
(without interests and commissions), for all kinds of credits in national and 
foreign currency including interbank loans and deposits, overdraft, discounted 
bills, leasing, factoring, guarantees and pledges. 
Reserve fund formation is not necessary for government loans, credits and 
deposits between branches within commercial bank's structure. 
1.3. Reserve is to be spent on covering from not-recoverable loans of banking 
credit activity. 
1.4. The volume of reserve is established according to total volume of credits fixed 
with an allowance for extend of risk and risk ratios. 
1.5. Reserve can be specified as total and special. Total reserve is formed for 
standard credits, special for specific credits (credits under control, 
substandard credits, doubtful credits and not-recoverable loans, which is 
mentioned in part 2.7. of this Decree. 
1.6. Each quarter commercial banks are to specify the volume of reserve according 
to total credits and deposits volume fixed with extend of risk. 
I. 7. Accounting entries are to be made during following period after reporting 
because of changes in reserve volume. 
1.8. The total reserve volume is used in calculation of bank's capital and other 
economical ratios established by NBU. 
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2. Credit specification and determination of reserve volume 
2.1. In order to accumulate reserve volume commercial bank needs to make 
specification for issued loans and deposits by following criteria: 
• evaluation of financial position of company; 
• repayment of debt and interest. 
2.2. Choosing criteria's of evaluation of financial position of debtor-company is 
commercial bank's priority according to requirements of the Decree and 
recommendations of the National Bank of Ukraine, approved by Management 
09/29/97 (#323). 
Procedures of evaluation of financial position of company are specified by 
decree of commercial bank. 
Commercial bank evaluates the commercial position of company-debtor and 
ensures of debt repayment once before approving the loan, after that - every 
quarter of the year. 
2.2.1. For proper evaluation of the company's financial position commercial bank 
needs to consider the following ratios and information of the company: 
• gross income; 
• profit and loss; 
• gross margm; 
• liquidity; cash flow; 
•. structure of accounts receivable and payable; 
• product cost. 
Other factors are also can be considered: 
• management effectiveness; 
• market strategy of the customer and its depending on seasonal variations 
and other factors; 
• government support or government orders; 
• repayment of payables in the past; 
• professional Management. 
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Commercial bank should consider the following ratios for evaluation of 
financial position of company: 
• total liquidity ratio (LR I) shows the ability to repay current liabilities 
with gross assets of the company 
Division II (assets) - future spending + Division II (assets) 
L R I == ------------------------------------------------------------------ -----------
Division II (liabilities) - overdue loans + Division 1lI (liabilities) 
Theoretical volume ofLRI should not be under 2.0 - 2.5; 
• absolute liquidity (acid test) ratio (LR2) shows the ability to repay 
short term liabilities with short term (liquid) assets (including 
securities) : 
Cash Resources + Current Account + Other Accounts + S T Deposits 
LR2 == --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Division (liabilities) 
Theoretical volume of LR2 should not be under 0.2 - 0.25; 
• ratio of capital base and borrowed capital: 
Division II (liabilities) + Division 1lI (liabilities) 
FlI3 == ------------------------------------------------------------
Division I (liabilities) 
Theoretical volume of FlI3 should not exceed 1.0; 
• equity capital mobility ratio (RM): 
Division I (liabilities) - Division I (assets) 
Ftlv! == ----------------------------------------------------
Division I (liabilities) 
The volume ofFtlv! should not be less than 0.5. 
2.2.2. Evaluation of economical position of commercial bank, receiving a loan 
should be proceeded on the base of following factors: 
• observance of economical ratios and indexes of functioning, required by 
the National Bank of Ukraine; 
• profit and loss analysis; 
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• assets and liabilities structure quality; 
• reserve formation; 
• recovery of debt in the past; 
• banking management quality. 
2.2.3. Evaluation of economical position of non-corporate client should be carried 
out on the base of following factors: 
• social stability (family status, real estate, stable job); 
• real pledgery; 
• age and health of the client; 
• financial situation of the client, its income and spending; 
• recovery of debts and interests in the past, using interbank services; 
• client's relationship within business world. 
2.3. According to evaluation of economical position and chances of borrower's 
development, credits are specified by following categories: 
• class "A" - financial position is very good and ensures the repayment 
of debt and interest in time. It is possible that financial activity will 
remain at the same high level; 
• class "8" - financial position is good or very good but it is complicated 
to remain at the same level of financial stability; 
• class "en - financial position is average but there IS a tendency for 
becoming worse; 
• class "on - financial position is poor and it IS determined for short 
periods of time; 
• class "E" - financial position shows losses and it is seen than neither 
loan no interest will be possibly returned. 
2.4. Loan and interest recovery can be: 
• good - if loan and interest is repaid in time, or by refinanced loan (only 
once) no longer than 90 days; 
• poor - if loan and interest are overdue no longer than 90 days, or loans 
refinanced for over 90 days with interest repayable. 
164 
• very bad - if loan and interest are overdue for over 90 days, or loans 
refinanced for over 90 days without interest repayable. 
2.5. Determining reserve value the volume of loan per each customer should be 
decreased by the volume of: 
• guarantees (Cabinet of Ministry of Ukraine guarantees, guarantees of 
bank, registered in countries of A-rating); 
• pledges (current accounts, deposits in bank-creditor, property, or 
property ownership). 
2.6. Price of pledged property, or property ownership should be determined as real 
(market price), according to possible complications and losses in case of not 
recoverable debt and sale of pledge. Agreement of pledge should be settled in 
accordance to the Law of Ukraine "About Pledge" (2654-12). 
Determining the volume of reserve, the value of property pledged (property 
ownership), except government bonds, is to be considered with the ratio of 50 
% from the value, mentioned in pledge agreement. The value of government 
bonds pledge can be taken with full value mentioned in pledge agreement. 
Commercial bank should re-evaluate the pledge value at least once a year or in 
case of debt refinancing. 
By non-recoverable credits the following procedures are to be carried out 
while determining the volume of reserve: 
• credit's pledge is taken with ratio of 25 % (or less) In case of 
refinancing or overdue for the term of 180 - 360 days. 
• in case of credit overdue and refinancing term is over 360 days, the 
whole value of debt is considered in evaluating the reserve volume 
without counting pledge value. 
2.7. According to criteria's above, credit portfolio of banks are 
divided into following groups: 
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Good 
Standard 
Under control 
Substandard 
Doubtful 
Non-recoverable 
Poor 
- , 
Very bad 
substandard 
doubtful 
non-recoverable 
non-recoverable 
non-recoverable 
During classification by extend of risk and determining the groups of 
discounted bills, factoring, guarantees for reserve calculation, only overdue 
debts are to be in calculations: 
standard debt - debt, which is not overdue; 
doubtful- protested bills (no longer than 30 days), factoring operations 
debt and bank guarantee repayment (no later than 90 days from 
agreement date); 
non-recoverable debt - protested bills (overdue for over 30 days), 
factoring operations debt and bank guarantee repayment (over 90 days 
from agreement date); 
2.8. On the base of classification of loans, commercial bank is to accumulate 
reserve in accordance to each specific credit group. Reserve needs to be 
formed full amount in accordance to real credit volumes by extend of risk, 
established by reserve requirements. 
Credit group 
Standard credits 
Credits under control 
Substandard credits 
Doubtful credits 
Non- recoverable credits 
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Reserve level (risk rate) 
2% 
5% 
20% 
50% 
100 % 
2.9. Total reserve for standard credits is to be accumulated by commercial bank 
every quarter in full-required volume from last year profit. This money is 
accumulated on account # 5929 "Total reserve", within Group # 502 "Funds 
and total reserves". 
The following entries need to be made: 
Debit - account # 5030 "Last period profit" 
Credit - account # 5020 "Total reserves" 
In case of non-sufficiency of resources for accumulating the required volume 
of total reserves during the year, commercial bank needs to make the 
following entry for the sum that reserve fund is short of during profit 
distributing: 
Debit - account # 5040 "Last period profit that needs to be approved" 
Credit - account # 5020 "Total reserves" 
2.10. Commercial bank accumulates special reserve in whole - required volume for 
credits "under control", "substandard", "doubtful" and "non-recoverable" 
credits. This reserve needs to be formed from withdrawn funds, account group 
# 770 "Withdrawals to reserves". Special reserve funds are to be accumulated 
on: balance accounts of: 
Interbank operations: # 1590 "Reserve for interbank's debt"; 
client's operations # 2400 "Client's credit reserve". 
Total debt on credits, guarantees and pledges is accumulated on 
balance accounts # # 1510-1517, 1520-1527, 1581, 1582, 1589,2000,2010, 
2020, 2027, 2030, 2037, 2040, 2045-2547, 2050, 2055-2057, 2061, 2062, 
2065-2067,2070-2077,2090-2099,2100-2107,2110-21 17,2190,2191,2198, 
2199, 2200-2207,2210-2217,2290,2291,2299, 9000, 9002,9020, 9090, 
9091. 
Special reserve needs to be formed in accordance to credit portfolio evaluation 
(fixed on 7/1/98) by 7/1/99 by following schedule: 
• Non-recoverable credit reserve needed to be formed in whole-required 
volume by 1/1/98. After that date special reserve for non-recoverable 
credits is to be formed next period (quarter) after determining a credit 
as "non-recoverable ll • 
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• Special reserve for credits "under control", "substandard" and 
"doubtful" must be accumulated no later than 711/99 by equal parts (no 
less than 12.5 % each quarter). 
S = 12.5 %x NxC, where 
12.5 % - per cent rate of reserve forming (12.5 x 8 quarters = 100 %); 
N - amount of periods (quarters) starting from beginning of reserve forming 
(711/97). 
Class - reserve value, calculated on a certain date of period. 
Special reserve for credits, issued by commercial bank after 7/1/97 and for 
banks, registered after 7/1/97 is to be formed during quarter, following after 
issuing credit. 
The entries below are to be made: 
For commercial bank spending: 
Interbank operations: 
Debit - account # 7701 "Withdrawals to reserve on interbank debt", 
Credit - account # 1590 "Reserve on interbank debt". 
During client's operation: 
Debit - account # 7702 "Withdrawals to reserve on client's credit debt"; 
Credit - account # 2400 "Reserve on client's credit debt" 
2.11. In case of total reserve volume decreasing, compared to prevIOus period, 
commercial bank is to make the following entry: 
Debit - account # 5020 "Total reserve" 
Credit - account # 5030 "Profit for previous period". 
2.12. In case of special reserve required volume decreasing, compared to previous 
period, commercial bank needs to transfer the overage sum for income 
increasing and make following entries: 
• By interbank operations: 
Debit - account # 1590 "Reserve on interbank debt"; 
Credit - account # 6701 "Decreasing of reserve on interbank debt"; 
• by client's operations: 
Debit - account # 2400 "Reserve on client's credit debt" 
Credit - account # 6702 "Decreasing of reserve on client's credit debt". 
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2.13. Reserve is to be formed by head bank and its branches according to 
procedures above (1.2. of Decree). Total reserve is accumulated on central 
bank's balance. Special reserve is accumulated on branches' balance. Central 
bank is fully responsible for sufficiency of formed reserves. 
3. Reserve spending 
3.1.. Commercial bank can spend reserve funds for coverIng losses from not-
recoverable loans, among "doubtful loans" on balance accounts. 
3.2. Not-recoverable loans can be reimbursed from special reserve in condition, 
that commercial bank follows procedures mentioned in clause 12 of the Law 
of Ukraine "About changes introduced in the Law of Ukraine "About profit 
tax collection procedures". 
3.2.1. If bill has been protested and not repaid for over 30 days after protesting and 
drawer of bill has applied to Arbitrage court about bankruptcy procedure of 
bill's debtor, this debt on not-repaid bill is to be covered from special reserve. 
The following entries are to be made in this case: 
Debit - account # 2400 "Reserve on client's credit debt" 
Credit - account # 2092 "Doubtful debt on client's discounted bills" Non-
recoverable debt of a client that has gone through bankruptcy legislative 
procedure is to be covered by special reserve funds, but only after approving 
by Arbitrage court the fact of debtor's bankruptcy. 
Money returned by commercial bank from debtor's pledge and property selling 
is to be considered as gross income and calculated in the period of income. 
In case of issuing loan for client that was on the bankruptcy procedure before 
the loan contract approving and information about bankruptcy process was 
available, non-recoverable loan is to be covered by total reserve of commercial 
bank. 
3.2.2. Loans, secured with pledges are to be recovered according to procedures of 
the Law of Ukraine "About pledge". If pledge selling by commercial bank did 
not provide full covering of debt and any legislative procedures of taking 
additional property did not succeed, non-recovered debt sum is to be covered 
by special reserve. Selling of pledge should be held in auctions, public sales if 
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other procedures are not mentioned In pledge agreement according to the 
Ukrainian legislation. 
3.2.3. Not-recovered credit debt that happened because of force - major 
circumstances and as a result - insolvency of debtor can be covered from 
special reserve if any of the following documents are present: 
• approving by Chamber of Commerce and Industry the fact of force-
major at the territory of Ukraine or approving by other country's 
authorities, legalized by Ukrainian Councilor Institutions, the fact of 
force-major at the territory of other country; 
• decision of President of Ukraine about implementation of emergency 
economical situation in certain areas of Ukraine, approved by 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, or decision of Cabinet of Ministry of 
Ukraine about considering specific areas of Ukraine suffered from fire, 
flood's and other disasters that caused losses of agricultural harvest in 
the volume, exceeding more than 30 % of average harvest for last 5 
years. 
In case of covering debt by special reserve, but after reviewing the information 
about force-major by authorities it is found that force-major circumstances are 
temporary natured and do non influence debtor's sufficiency to pay debt after 
force-major is over, commercial bank is to apply to Arbitrage court and client 
is to repay the debt no later than 30 days after force-major is over. 
In case of not applying to the Arbitrage court by commercial bank about 
turning debt under terms, introduced in Ukrainian legislation, bank's income 
increases by the sum of debt and special reserve is to be recovered. These 
credits are to be covered from total reserve. 
3.2.4. Overdue loans of companies, organizations and different institutions that do 
not have any property for sale to recover debt, can be covered from special 
reserve of commercial bank according to Ukrainian Legislation, unless this 
debt was covered by government, municipal or other funds within 30 days 
from loan expiring. 
This stipulates that commercial bank applies to Arbitrage court about covering 
of losses from this crediting. 
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If commercial bank does not apply to Arbitrage court in terms according to 
Ukrainian Legislation or if Arbitrage court does not satisfy the application, 
commercial bank will cover the losses from total reserve. 
3.2.6. Overdue loans of non-corporate clients that are dead or disappeared is to be 
covered from special reserve only if decision of the court about proving their 
death or disappearance was approved after date of credit agreement. 
3.2.7. Overdue loans of non-corporate clients that are under criminal search are to be 
covered from special reserve unless criminal is found within' 180 days from 
the beginning of search. 
3.2.8. Overdue loans of corporate clients that have directors under criminal search 
are to be covered from special reserve unless criminal is found within '180 
days from the beginning of search. 
3.2.9. Overdue loan by agreement or its parts that became invalid after decision of 
Arbitrage court because of debtor's fault, is to be covered from special reserve 
of commercial bank, if debtor does not pay the debt within 30 days after 
decision of Arbitrage court. 
If higher level institutions of Arbitrage court cancel decision of lower level 
institutions about invalidating the agreement of contract by debtor's fault and 
commercial bank does not appeal against this canceling in terms, stipulated in 
Ukrainian Legislation, it will increase its gross income by the sum, previously 
included in gross spending, or covered from special reserve. In this case the 
sum is to be covered from total reserve. 
3.2.10. Overdue loan by agreement or its parts that became invalid after decision of 
Arbitrage court because of commercial bank's or both-sized fault is to be 
covered by total reserve within 30 days unless debtor pays credit debt. 
3.2.11. Commercial bank is authorized to cover losses from credit activity with total 
reserve in accordance with decision of Management, approved by required 
document of Management, but no later than last day of a year, when the loan 
has been specified as non-recovered. 
Covering of the credit loss from special reserve, formed with increasing the 
value of gross spending, is possible to be carried out by decision of 
commercial bank's Management according to Ukrainian Legislation. 
3.2.12. In case of covering the debt loss from special reserve the following entries are 
to be made: 
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a) by interbank operations: 
Debit - account # 1590 "Reserve on interbank debt"; 
Credit-account## 1581, 1582, 1589 
The same time interests not paid are also covered. 
b) by client's operations: 
Debit - account # 2400 "Reserve on client's credit debt"; 
Credit - account # 2027, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 
2099,2190,2191,2290.2291,2199,2299. 
The same time interests not paid are also covered. 
3.2.13. In case of covering credit debt from total reserve the additional reserve is to be 
formed for this sum and calculated on separate analytical (balance) accounts # 
# 1590,2400. This procedure stipulates the following entries:. 
a) by interbank operations: 
Debit - account # 7701 "Withdrawals to reserve on interbank debt"; 
Credit - account # 1590 "Reserve on interbank debt"; 
Debit - account # 1590 "Reserve on interbank debt"; 
Credit - account # # 1581, 1582, 1589 
b) by client's operations: 
Debit - account # 7701 "Withdrawals to reserve on client's debt"; 
Credit - account # 2400 "Reserve on client's credit debt"; 
Debit - account # 2400 "Reserve on client's credit debt"; 
Credit - account # # 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2099, 
2190,2191,2290.2291,2199,2299. 
The same time while covering interbank and client's credit debt the following 
entries are to be proceeded: 
Debit - account # 5020 "Total reserve"; 
Credit - account # 5030, 5031. 
3.2.14. Amount, written off a credit account with total and special reserves is to be 
fixed on off-balanced accounts # # 9610, 9611 of Division # 961 "Debts 
written off to losses" of commercial bank. Interest for overdue loan volume 
calculated but not received are to be reflected on off-balanced accounts # 
9600, 9601 of Division # 960 "Debts, not paid in time". Commercial banks 
need to continue the procedures of debt return for no less than 3 years. 
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3.2.15. If after 3 year period commercial bank does non manage to return not-
recovered debt, it will be considered totally not-recovered and written of 
balance accounts # # 9610, 9611, while interests will be written off from off-
balanced accounts # # 9600, 960 I. 
3.2.16. If debtor recovers partly or full debt that has been covered from reserves, 
commercial bank will increase its gross income by the volume of returned 
sum. In this case the following entries are to be made: 
Debit - current account of debtor; 
Credit - account # 6800 "Unforeseen income". 
Interests, paid for such loan are to be written on unforeseen income account. 
Paid credit debt and interest will be written off off-balanced accounts # # 
9600,9601,9610,9611. 
3.2.17. In case of insufficiency of total reserve for covering losses from credit 
activity, commercial bank will cover current year's losses by reducing its 
funds, not distributed profit from previous year, that form additional reserve. 
4. Procedures of conclusion 
4.1. Commercial bank (commercial bank's branches) needs to revlCW credit 
portfolio structure in order to evaluate credit risk every I si of each quarter. 
4.2. Commercial bank is to organize credit committee (for branches and 
departments - credit commissions), that will keep records and information 
about evaluating of credit portfolio and forming of reserves up to three years. 
4.3. Credit specification, reserve accumulation and spending reports are to be 
provided: by branches - to central bank and regional department of National 
Bank of Ukraine, Central bank - to regional department of National Bank of 
Ukraine quarterly according to procedures of National Bank of Ukraine about 
statistic reports providing. 
"Credits classification according to ownership" and "Evaluation of reserve for 
possible losses from credit activity by commercial banks" statements are to be 
prepared on the basis of commercial bank's credit committee decision about 
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credit specifications with an allowance of risk and level of reserving for next 
quarter. 
"Changing In reserve structure" and "Written off not-recovered debt" 
statements are prepared on a basis of accounting information for last period. 
4.4. Banking Control Department of the National Bank of Ukraine always checks 
commercial bank's and its branches' reports for proper classification of credit 
portfolios and following the procedures of reserves accumulation and 
spending. 
If these procedures show the difference between commercial bank's statements 
and information of Banking Control Department of National Bank of Ukraine, 
commercial bank will correct the differences and reserve volume if required. 
4.5. In case of insufficiency of money for reserve forming or violations of its 
accumulation and spending special fines are pressed against commercial banks 
according to Clause 48 of the Law of Ukraine "About banks and banking 
activity". 
2.2 Discount rates 1997-1999 
Date of rate change Discount rate, % Refinancing rate for commercial 
banks under government bonds' 
pledge, % 
11124/97 35 45 
02/06/98 44 48 
03/18/98 41 45 
OS/21198 45 50 
OS/29/98 51 56 
07/07/98 82 82 
08118/98 85 92 
12/21160 60 70 
04/5/99 57 65 
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2.3 Bank profiles 
Ukraina 
Bank 'Ukraina' was established in 1990 on the base of the fonner Agroindustrial bank 
of the USSR. Regarding to the rating list published by the Information and Analysis 
Centre of the Association of Ukrainian Banks (AUB) in 1996 Bank Ukraina was the 
first by the amount of Capital and the second by the Share capital. The number of the 
Bank's employees was 26,450 (as on 1.01.1997). 
The bank was founded as open joint-stock company and now has 290,900 shareholders 
(276,700 - individuals, 14,200 - entities). The main shareholders are listed below with 
their share accordingly: 
- 'InterAgro' association - 2,18% 
- 'UkrAgroBusiness' lSC - 1,07% 
- 'ladkivskiy' sovhoz - 0,55% 
- 'UkrSotsTrust' company - 0,43%. 
The Bank's shareholders equity as on 1.01.97 is divided accordingly: 
- Individuals including: -70% 
- Bank's employees - 21,8% 
- Legal entities including: - 27,5% 
- state-owned - 0,9% 
- non-state owned - 26,6% 
Shares bought - back - 2,5% 
Bank 'Ukraina' has the biggest branch network among the Ukrainian commercial 
banks with 576 branches located in all regional and district capitals. Bank provides 
the complete range of banking services and carries out all types of transactions in 
local and foreign currencies to more than 217,000 corporate and 1,200,000 individual 
customers. Bank 'Ukraina' has mainly customers in the agroindustrial and farming 
sector. The involvement in the conduit of governmental funds to the agricultural 
sector gives the Bank a strong position in the Ukrainian agroindustrial complex. The 
Bank services about 90% of centralised state capital investments into agroindustrial 
complex and almost 20% of capital investments into other fields of economy. 
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Since 1994 Bank 'Ukraina' had been audited by Arthur Andersen according to 
International Accounting Standards. In order to approach the quality of its services to 
the high international level and to optimise its effectiveness Bank 'Ukraina' together 
with Arthur Andersen has worked out the Business plan of the Bank's development 
for years 1997-2000. Bank 'Ukraina' was the first commercial bank in Ukraine to deal 
internationally with correspondent banks after receiving the International General 
License from the National Bank of Ukraine and now has the correspondent relations 
with more than 300 well-known commercial banks abroad. 
Since 1992 when Bank 'Ukraina' became one of the founders and key shareholders of 
the Ukrainian Stock Exchange (USE) it actively operates on the securities market. In 
1996 the Bank became one of the main authorised dealers on the Ukrainian State 
Domestic Loan Bonds market for residential and non-residential clients. Bank 
'Ukraina' works with privatisation papers as well. 
Bank Ukraina co-operates with international financial institutions in particular with 
the World Bank and the EBRD. Co-operation with the EBRD includes the following 
projects: 
Twinning Programme (carried out together by the World Bank and the 
EBRD). Bank 'Ukraina' is the only Ukrainian bank which gained the access to this 
programme. The main objective of this project is to assist Bank Ukraina to 
successfully achieve its institutional goal of transforming itself into a modem 
competitive and profitable commercial bank. Our twinning partners are Credit 
Agricole (France) and Rabobank (Niderland Bank). Bank 'Ukraina' met all the 
eligible criteria and in November 1996 was qualified to participate in the ECU 100 
Mio EBRD loan facility focusing on small and medium-sized businesses. In terms of 
presented projects to be financed under this line Bank 'Ukraina' is considered as the 
most successful participant among other Ukrainian banks. In 1996 KIB with a capital 
of ECU 5 Mio was set up in Kiev. The founders and the main shareholders of this 
bank are: 
the EBRD 
Kreditbank 
Bank 'Ukraina' 
Ukrainian Financial Group 
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- 35%, 
- 13,5%, 
- 16,5%, 
- 35%. 
Prominvestbank 
Ukrainian Joint-Stock Commercial Industrial-Investment Bank (Prominvestbank) is 
the largest commercial bank of Ukraine, that is recognized as the bank having 
considerable experience in providing complex services to the leading branches of 
industry in Ukraine. Approximately one fifth of total banking capital in Ukraine is 
concentrated in Prominvestbank of Ukraine. During 1995 year the Bank's ownership 
capital has increased by 3.3 times in current prices and the authorised fund has 
increased by 5.5. The total number of enterprises and organisations that the Bank 
serves increased from 116,000 to 125,000. They can be categorised as follows: state 
enterprises - 15.2%, private - 33.4%, collective 48.8%, enterprises of common 
property - 2.6%. The volume of Prominvestbank of Ukraine credit portfolio is twice 
as large as the portfolio of Bank "Ukraina", the second largest bank in Ukraine. 
Under the conditions of the reduction in industrial production of 11.5%, 
inflation of 281,7% and a decrease in the gross domestic product of 11.8% during 
1995, Prominvestbank kept stable indices of it's development. 
Prominvestbank proved credit support to those industries which to a large extent 
influence the conservation of industrial potential of the country including: machine 
building, power engineering, metallurgy, oil and gas, coal-mining, chemical, 
construction, transportation and in particular to those enterprises that are importers. 
The Bank also serves more than 1.2 million private clients. Approximately two thirds 
of short-term credits in Ukrainian carboranets totalling UKR 194.6 trillion were 
directed to support state and collective enterprises. 
Organisation structure: 
Prominvestbank of Ukraine has branches in 182 towns in Ukraine and representation 
in Moscow. The Bank is structured in 6 head regional branches, 12 regional branches, 
7 head local branches, 242 local branches, 544 offices for deposits from population 
and 617 offices for hard currencies exchange. The biggest branches operate in 
Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Lviv and other regions of Ukraine. 
Prominvestbank is a closed joint-stock company. 92% of the Bank's authorised 
capital is formed at the account of shares sold to physical persons. The highest 
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authority of the Bank is the Meeting of Shareholders. 9 persons are members of the 
Bank Council and 5 persons of the Audit Commission. The Bank Board consists of 8 
persons and they govern the Bank's day to day activity. The Bank's central office 
consists of 17 structural subdivisions. 
The Bank financed and credited capital investments III machine-building, 
shipbuilding, aircraft construction, energetic and other industrial segments. At the end 
of 1995 the Bank entered the state debentures market and became a participant of the 
National Bank of Ukraine closed auctions for investing the bonds of state domestic 
loan. When the Bank is accepted into the fund sector of Ukrainian interbank currency 
exchange, they provide for clients services relating to state bonds on the secondary 
market. 
Investment funds and companies that were formed with the Bank participation began 
their activity in Donetsk, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk and Kharkiv for acquiring and 
investing of private property certificates. The funds purchased the portfolio of such 
big industrial giants as Dnepropetrovsk plant for heavy presses, Pavlograd plant of 
chemical machine building, "Electrodvigun", "Dniproazot", Dergachiov turbo-
compressor plant, Lviv experimental oil plant and others. Prominvestbank also 
participated in the capital formation of 12 insurance companies with authorised funds 
totalling UKR 100 billion. In addition, the Bank is a shareholder in 75 different 
enterprises and organisations including the first Russian-Ukrainian Creditimpex Bank. 
Oschadbank 
Oschadbank, the Savings Bank of Ukraine, is one of Ukraine's largest and oldest 
banks, tracing its origins back more than 150 years to the days of Tsarist Russia. It has 
enjoyed a special status since 1991, the year that Ukraine became independent. 
Os chad bank is wholly state owned and has 650 district branches and 13000 outlets. 
This gives the Bank a presence throughout the country and allows it to offer services 
to the population. The breadth of its branch network gives the Bank enormous 
potential for future development. 
178 
Recent years have witnessed major changes in Ukrainian society and Oschadbank has 
had to change accordingly. The emergence of competition has eroded its share of the 
savings market over the past four years. Its market share decreased from 99.4% in 
1991 to 75% at the end of 1995, but has since stabilised at that level. Oschadbank 
still operates more than 80 million accounts. In addition to its traditional business, the 
position of Oschadbank in Ukraine is expanding rapidly as the process of privatisation 
gathers momentum. Its role in privatisation is unique, since it acts as an official agent 
for the government by operating privatisation accounts for each citizen. In response to 
the forthcoming total privatisation and small business development in Ukraine, the 
bank is conscious of its role as a Bank actively facilitating each citizen's, being a 
private owner and an entrepreneur. 
The Bank has long-lasting and locally tailed relations with its depositors, maintained 
through generations. So it is quite natural for the Bank to grant credits and render all 
other kinds of financial assistance primarily to its clients who are starting to run 
business of their own, such as private stores, restaurants, work-shops, filling stations, 
farms, etc. In 1995, such credits were granted by Oschadbank to the amount of 6884 
bil. Krb. Of them 525 firms and enterprises were Oschadbank's customers. Taking 
into account the importance of loan activity in generating revenues, the Bank's loan 
policy is targeted at achieving the greatest effectiveness at acceptable risk level. 
The Bank's balanced asset portfolio was one of the factors that helped ensure its 
successful performance during past years. 
Oschadbank of Ukraine has the largest nation-wide branch network of all commercial 
banks of the country. This enables the Bank to redistribute financial resources within 
its system, concentrate funds and efforts on key lines of its business and benefit from 
fluctuations on regional markets. At the beginning of 1996, the Bank's network 
comprised 13454 institutions, of them: 26 regional branches, 646 district branches and 
12781 outlets. Oschadbank of Ukraine is a large enterprise with over 60,000 
employees - nearly half of all staff working in the entire Ukrainian banking system. 
For that reason, the Bank not only serves society with its banking products, but also 
forms part of society itself. It acknowledges that it has a position of responsibility and 
actively supports the state in its efforts to create economic stability. 
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The state export-import bank (Ukreximbank) 
State export-import Bank of Ukraine was fonned on January 3RD 1992 by 
Presidential Decree. The Government of Ukraine wholly owns it. The Bank possesses 
a general banking license from the National Bank of Ukraine, granted on 23rd January 
1992, and also a license for hard currency operations, granted on 17th July 1992. The 
general banking license, which includes a license for hard currency operations, was 
re-registered by the National Bank of Ukraine on 25th December 1995. 
Ukreximbank is one of the few Ukrainian banks, which are able to preserve stable 
growth indices in such a complicated economic environment. The reasons for the 
Bank's success are closely related to its development strategy and operations, and to 
the ranking Ukreximbank occupies amongst the banks of Ukraine. Ukreximbank is 
the only Ukrainian bank, which acts as an agent of the Government in the attraction 
and allocation of interbank and intergovernmental hard currency loans. 
A letter from the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukraine was received, dated 4th August 
1995, confirming that the responsibility of the State export-import Bank of Ukraine is 
to act as an agent of the Ukrainian Government for the above described activities and 
thereby the loan obligations and related risks belong to the Ukrainian Government. 
Today, the Bank services lines of credit in the amount of approximately USD 3 
billion. In addition, in 1995 new lines of credit with international financial 
organisations and financial institutions in developed countries around the world were 
initiated. In the near future, the realisation of these projects will promote the 
development of export capabilities of Ukrainian enterprises and a diversification of 
the country's trade flows. 
The growing international stature of Ukreximbank can be verified by the increase in 
the number and amounts of LlC and guarantee confinnation lines, and currency 
conversion operation lines which were opened by major western banks including 
Credit Swiss, Zurich; Deutche Bank, Frankfurt/Main; Dresdner Bank and others. 
Strong compliance with international standards in effecting these operations gave the 
Bank a reputation of a reliable partner and promoted the development of strong 
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mutually profitable relations with the world's leading banks many of which have 
provided the Bank with foreign exchange lines. 
The total number of Bank's employees is 1,322, the Bank's main office is located in 
Kyiv, it had 24 branches throughout the Ukraine. 
2.4 BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME STATEMENT OF THE 
UKRAINIAN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY EXCHANGE 
BALANCE SHEETS AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1995 and 1994 (USD TH) 
Assets 1995 
Cash and cash equivalents 29047 
Balances at the NBU 3146 
Amounts due from other banks, net 13000 
Tangible fixed assets, net 1513 
Other assets, net 1466 
Total asscts 48172 
Liabilities 
Vostro accounts with other banks 27254 
Amounts owed to trading customers 3325 
Other liabilities 828 
Total liabilities 31407 
Contingencies 
Shareholders' funds 
Authorised capital 1896 
Retained earnings 14869 
Total shareholders' funds 16765 
Total liabilities and shareholders' funds 48172 
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1994 
23989 
6335 
4988 
485 
1062 
36859 
10427 
19550 
912 
30889 
437 
5533 
5970 
36859 
VICE STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE YEARS ENDED 31 
DECEMBER 1995 and 1994 (USD TU) 
1995 
REVENUES 
Commissions revenues 15059 
Interest income 5545 
Other income 93 
Total revenues 20697 
OPERATING EXPENSES 
General and administrative (2087) 
Salaries and employment benefits (295) 
Provisions for doubtful accounts and losses ( 1125) 
Depreciation (279) 
Exchange di fferences (1024) 
Total operating expenses (4810) 
Operating income 15887 
Taxation (5809) 
Net income 10078 
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1994 
6375 
2507 
165 
9047 
(445) 
(220) 
(238) 
(95) 
(609) 
(1607) 
7440 
(2388) 
5052 
VICE STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS FOR THE YEARS EHDED 31 
DECEMBER 1995 and 1994 (USD TH) 
1995 
Cash flows from operating activities 
Net income before taxation 15887 
Depreciation 279 
Interest income (5545) 
Operating profit before changes 10 operating assets and 10621 
liabilities 
Changes in operating assets & liabilities 
Increase amounts due from other banks (8012) 
(Decrease )lincrease balances at the National Bank of 3189 
Ukraine 
Increase in other assets (539) 
Increase in Vostro accounts with other banks 16827 
(Decrease )/increase in amounts owed to trading customers (16225) 
Increase in other liabilities 540 
Net cash flow from operating activities before income taxes 6401 
paid and interest received 
Income taxes paid (6433) 
Interest received 5701 
Net cash flow from operating activities 5669 
Cash flows from investing activities 
Tangible fixed assets, net (1307) 
Loans advanced, net (21 ) 
Net cash flow from operating activities (1328) 
Cash flows from financing activities 
Statutory contributions, net 717 
Net cash flow from financing activities 717 
Change in cash and cash equivalents 5058 
Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of the year 23989 
Cash and cash equivalents at end of the year 29047 
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1994 
7440 
95 
(2507) 
5028 
(4824) 
(4347) 
(459) 
9455 
6275 
85 
11213 
(1669) 
2066 
11610 
(348) 
(24) 
(372) 
0 
0 
11238 
12751 
23989 
2.5 BANK SCOPE DATA 
Total Capital Ratio 1995·1998 
Bank Name 1998 change 1997 change 1996 change 1995 
Prominvestbank of Ukraine-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Commercial Industrial·lnvestment Bank 29.89 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
East-Ukrainian Slock Exchange Bank Grant - Grant Bank 25.82 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Republican Commercial Bank for Social Development· Ukrostsbank 17.00 78.95% 9.50 n.a. n.a. 
State Export-Import Bank of Ukraine· Ukreximbank 11.00 0.00% 11.00 ·8.33% 12.00 n.S. 
Privatbank Commerdal Bank 9.10 -9.90% 10.10 n.a. n.a. 
Bank Ukraina 8.25 -14.95% 9.70 31.26% 7.39 n.a. 
Credit Onepr Joint Stock Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
AGIO Bank (UAS) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Pivdenniy Joint-Stock Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Percombank n.a. na na n.a. 
Aval Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Oschadny Bank Ukrainy n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Pravex Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bank Kyiv - Joint Stock Commercial Bank Kiev n.a. 18.84 n.a. n.a. 
Transbank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy (Ukraina) Ltd in lutsk-Deposit Credit Bank (Ukraine) ltd in 
lutsk n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Ukrgazprombank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
West-Ukrainian Commercial Bank (UAS) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Joint Stock Bank EtaJon n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
VABANK - All-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Bank n.a. 45.00 -2.17% 46.00 91.67% 24.00 
First Ukrainian International Bank n.a. n.a. 53.79 11.21% 48.37 
Ukrainian Innovation Bank - Ukrinbank (IAS) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Credit lyonnais Ukraine n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Average 
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Net loans I Total assets 1995 ·1998 
Bank Name (alpha order) 1998 change 1997 change 1996 change 1995 
AGIO Bank (UAS) 23.28 50.38% 15.48 n.a. n.a. 
Avar Bank 32.77 -26.91% 44.84 n.a. n.a. 
Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy (Ukraina) Lld in Lulsk-Deposit 
Credit Bank (Ukraine) Lld in Lutsk 3.95 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bank Kyiv - Joint Stock Commercial Bank Kiev 45.34 -17.83% 55.18 n.a. n.a. 
Bank Ukraina 50.12 28.71% 38.94 6.98% 36.40 69.01% 21.54 
Credit Dnepr Joint Stock Bank 31.57 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Credit Lyonnais Ukraine 62.10 53.08% 40.57 137.96% 17.05 n.a. 
East-Ukrainian Stock Exchange Bank Grant - Grant Bank 40.18 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
First Ukrainian International Bank 32.66 54.88% 21.09 -43.31% 37.20 -12.72% 42.62 
Joint Stock Bank Etalon 32.98 8.36% 30.44 718.37% 3.72 n.a. 
Oschadny Bank Ukrainy 21.78 -20.57% 27.42 -28.81% 38.52 n.3. 
Percombank 23.97 16.58% 20.56 737.86% 2.45 -80.37% 12.50 
Pivdenniy Joint-Stock Bank 23.46 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Pravex Bank 32.99 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Privatbank Commercial Bank 51.68 12.06% 46.12 10.24% 41.83 63.51% 25.58 
Prominvestbank of Ukraine-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Commercial 
Industrial-Investment Bank 64.83 6.13% 61.08 3.04% 59.28 25.45% 47.25 
Republican Commercial Bank for Social Development -
Ukrostsbank 66.54 8.74% 61.19 n.a. n.a. 
State Export-Import Bank of Ukraine - Ukreximbank 43.70 3.22% 42.34 187.23% 14.74 47.32% 10.01 
TranSbank 37.23 12.71% 33.03 n.a. n.a. 
Ukrainian Innovation Bank - Ukrinbank (IAS) 33.06 -33.87% 50.00 -2.16% 51.11 n.a. 
Ukrgazprombank 5.00 92.53% 2.60 n.a. n.a. 
VABANK - All-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Bank 17.80 436.44% 3.32 -32.93% 4.95 -78.97% 23.53 
West-Ukrainian Commercial Bank (UAS) 31.64 3.66% 30.52 n.a. n.a. 
Average 35.16 1.30% 34.71 24.25% 27.93 6.82% 26.15 
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Cost to income ratios 1995 -1998 
Bank Name 1998 change 1997 change 1996 change 1995 
Ukrainian Innovation Bank - Ukrinbank (IAS) 99.29 -6.27% 105.93 148.82% 42.57 n.8. 
Pravex Bank 76.88 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bank Ukraina 75.80 -7.59% 82.02 24.19% 66.05 106.06% 32.05 
Republican Commercial Bank for Social Development -
Ukrostsbank 64.46 8.42% 59.45 n.a. n.a. 
First Ukrainian International Bank 62.50 10.12% 56.76 33.07% 42.65 3.08% 41.38 
Privatbank Commercial Bank 52.98 -12.17% 60.33 19.20% 50.61 n.8. 
VABANK - All-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Bank 51.58 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Percombank 51.25 15.31% 44.44 33.33% 33.33 0.00% 33.33 
East-Ukrainian Stock Exchange Bank Grant - Grant Bank 50.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bank Depozytowo¥redytowy (Ukraina) Ltd in Lutsk-Deposit 
Credit Bank (Ukraine) Ltd in Lutsk 50.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
AGIO Bank (UAS) 46.84 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bank Kyiv - Joint Stock Commercial Bank Kiev 41.94 -26.33% 56.92 n.a. n.a. 
State Export-Import Bank of Ukraine - Ukreximbank 39.41 4.75% 37.63 1.15% 37.20 116.51% 17.18 
West·Ukrainian Commercial Bank (UAS) 38.65 12.32% 34.41 n.a. n.a. 
Transbank 36.67 6.07% 34.57 n.a. n.a. 
Credit Lyonnais Ukraine 36.26 -12.31% 41.35 -49.19% 81.40 n.a. 
Ukrgazprombank 19.90 -38.09% 32.14 n.a. n.a. 
Prominvestbank of Ukraine-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Commercial 
Industrial-Investment Bank 7.65 -85.35% 52.18 20.92% 43.15 70.19% 25.35 
Credit Dnepr Joint Stock Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Pivdenniy Joint-Stock Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Aval Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Oschadny Bank Ukrainy n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Joint Stock Bank Etalon n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Average 50.11 -6.68% 53.70 8.23% 49.62 66.18% 29.86 
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Return on Average Equity 1995 -1998 
Bank Name 1998 change 1997 change 1996 change 1995 
AvalBank 84.17 39.59% 60.30 n.a. n.a. 
Ukrgazprombank 83.66 337.99% 19.10 n.a. n.a. 
Joint Stock Bank Etaton 65.75 -28.61% 92.11 33.97% 68.75 n.8. 
Republican Commercial Bank for Social Development -
Ukrostsbank 59.25 285.97% 15.35 n.a. n.a. 
Credit Lyonnais Ukraine 42.05 -42.25% 72.82 400.63% 14.55 n.8. 
Privatbank Commercial Bank 40.78 -35.22% 62.95 -11.21% 70.90 n.8. 
VABANK - All-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Bank 38.17 18.28% 32.27 -68.30% 101.82 69.70% 60.00 
Bank Kyiv - Joint Stock Commercial Bank Kiev 36.62 107.50% 17.65 n.a. n.a. 
Transbank 34.55 23.38% 28.00 n.a. n.a. 
West-Ukrainian Commercial Bank (UAS) 32.02 15.36% 27.75 n.a. n.a. 
East-Ukrainian Stock Exchange Bank Grant - Grant Bank 28.38 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
AGIO Bank (UAS) 23.60 -1.49% 23.96 n.a. n.a. 
Pravex Bank 15.75 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Percombank 12.75 -70.57% 43.30 15.46% 37.50 -25.00% 50.00 
Bank Ukraina 10.39 -83.25% 62.06 -92.00% 775.61 -628.27% -146.82 
Prominvestbank of Ukraine-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Commercial 
Industrial-Investment Bank 8.91 -43.57% 15.79 38.34% 11.41 -95.55% 256.46 
Pivdenniy Joint-Stock Bank 7.30 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
State Export-Import Bank of Ukraine - Ukreximbank 5.98 -77.10% 26.12 -15.72% 30.99 16.43% 26.61 
First Ukrainian International Bank 1.52 -93.36% 22.95 -50.72% 46.57 -31.38% 67.87 
Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy (Ukraina) Ltd in Lutsk-Deposit 
Credit Bank (Ukraine) Lld in Lutsk 0.42 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Ukrainian Innovation Bank - Ukrinbank (JAS) n.a. n.a. 44.52 n.a. 
Credit Dnepr Joint Stock Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Oschadny Bank Ukrainy n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Average 31.60 -18.77% 38.90 -67.65% 120.26 129.71% 52.35 
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Return on Average Assets 1995 -1998 
Bank Name 1998 change 1997 change 1996 change 1995 
Ukrgazprombank 30.70 178.06% 11.04 n.a. n.a. 
Transbank 15.45 20.27% 12.84 n.a. n.a. 
Joint Stock Bank Etaton 11.78 -1.22% 11.93 162.38% 4.55 n.3. 
AGIO Bank (UAS) 9.65 -8.63% 10.57 n.a. n.a. 
VABANK - All-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Bank 7.92 -4.53% 8.29 -67.91% 25.84 156.21% 10.08 
East-Ukrainian Stock Exchange Bank Grant - Grant Bank 6.39 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
West-Ukrainian Commercial Bank (UAS) 6.27 -13.98% 7.28 n.a. n.a. 
Republican Commercial Bank for Social Development -
Ukrostsbank 6.15 516.85% 1.00 n.a. n.a. 
Aval Bank 5.62 61.84% 3.47 n.a. n.a. 
Bank Kyiv - Joint Stock Commercial Bank Kiev 5.46 151.59% 2.17 n.a. n.a. 
Credit Lyonnais Ukraine 5.07 -26.42% 6.88 617.08% 0.96 n.3. 
Percombank 3.40 -60.82% 8.68 158.89% 3.35 -46.37% 6.25 
Prominvestbank of Ukraine-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Commercial 
Industrial-Investment Bank 2.88 -22.99% 3.74 307.86% 0.92 -94.44% 16.48 
Privatbank Commercial Bank 2.70 -35.50% 4.19 -12.98% 4.82 n.a. 
Pravex Bank 2.36 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Pivdenniy Joint-Stock Bank 1.71 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
State Export-Import Bank of Ukraine - Ukreximbank 0.71 -73.10% 2.65 46.06% 1.82 71.90% 1.06 
Bank Ukraina 0.67 -83.59% 4.05 -43.49% 7.17 129.06% 3.13 
Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy (Ukraina) Ltd in Lutsk-Deposit 
Credit Bank (Ukraine) Lld in Lutsk 0.40 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
First Ukrainian International Bank 0.33 -93.16% 4.75 -59.50% 11.73 -11.79% 13.29 
Ukrainian Innovation Bank - Ukrinbank (IAS) n.a. n.a. 3.64 n.a. 
Credit Dnepr Joint Stock Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Oschadny Bank Ukrainy n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Average 6.28 -2.95% 6.47 -0.11% 6.48 -22.73% 8.38 
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Net Interest Margin 1995 - 1998 
Mark Bank Name 1998 change 1997 change 1996 change 1995 
1 Transbank 36.12 -15.72% 42.86 n.a. n.a. 
2 AGIO Bank (UAS) 30.19 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
3 Ukrgazprombank 24.97 101.13% 12.41 n.a. n.a. 
4 Republican Commercial Bank for Social Development -
Ukrostsbank 23.26 -28.54% 32.54 n.a. n.a. 
S Bank Ukraina 21.76 -48.43% 42.20 -40.92% 71.43 -58.74% 173.12 
6 East-Ukrainian Stock Exchange Bank Grant - Grant Bank 21.57 n.a. n.a. n.a, 
7 First Ukrainian International Bank 19.49 63.12% 11.95 10.92% 10.77 -61.28% 27.62 
6 Prominveslbank of Ukraine-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Commercial 
Industrial-Investment Bank 15.17 -31.34% 22.09 -25.89% 29.61 -44.72% 53.92 
9 Bank Kyiv - Joint Slock Commercial Bank Kiev 11.61 -2.35% 11.69 n.a. n.a. 
10 Slate Export-Import Bank of Ukraine - Ukreximbank 10.60 1.04% 10.69 -0.69% 10.76 -40.04% 17.95 
11 West-Ukrainian Commercial Bank (UAS) 10.06 -49.73% 20.00 n.a. n.a. 
12 Privatbank Commercial Bank 6.51 -47.66% 12.43 -24.42% 16.45 n.a. 
13 Credit Lyonnais Ukraine 5.34 -0.34% 5.36 87.68% 2.66 n.a. 
14 Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy (Ukraina) Lld in Lutsk-Deposit 
Credit Bank (Ukraine) Lld in Lutsk 4.87 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
15 Pravex Bank 2.94 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
16 Ukrainian Innovation Bank - Ukrinbank (IAS) 2.07 669.52% 0.27 -97.26% 9.84 n.a. 
17 Percombank 0.69 -117.16% -4.03 -215.93% 3.48 -54.78% 7.69 
18 VABANK - All-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Bank -10.17 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
19 Credit Dnepr Joint Stock Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
20 Pivdenniy Joint-Stock Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
21 Aval Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
22 Oschadny Bank Ukrainy n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
23 Joint Stock Bank Eta10n n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Average 13.18 -22.35% 16.97 -12.61% 19.42 -65.38% 56.10 
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Capital Funds I Liabilities 1995 -1998 
Bank Name (alpha order) 1998 change 1997 change 1996 change 1995 
AGIO Bank (UAS) 61.20 ~22.43% 78.90 n.a. n.a. 
AvalBank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy (Ukraina) Ltd in Lutsk-Deposit 
Credit Bank (Ukraine) Ltd in Lutsk n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bank Kyiv • Joint Stock Commercial Bank Kiev n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bank Ukraina 6.16 -22.45% 7.94 n.a. n.a. 
Credit Dnepr Joint Stock Bank 33.62 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Credit Lyonnais Ukraine n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
East-Ukrainian Stock Exchange Bank Grant - Grant Bank 29.08 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Flrst Ukrainian International Bank 45.49 120.37% 20.64 -47.91 % 39.62 48.76% 26.64 
Joint Stock Sank Etalon 22.40 6.38% 21.05 197.36% 7.08 n.8. 
Oschadny Bank Ukrainy 3.71 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Percombank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Pivdenniy Joint-Stock Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Pravex Bank 17.62 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Privatbank Commercial Bank 6.94 -5.52% 7.35 8.86% 6.75 -23.00% 8.77 
Prominvestbank of Ukraine-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Commercial 
Industrial-Investment Bank 45.89 -7.51% 49.61 392.40% 10.08 26.41% 7.97 
Republican Commercial Bank for Social Development -
Ukrostsbank 15.42 121.96% 6.95 n.a. n.a. 
State Export-Import Bank of Ukraine - Ukreximbank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Transbank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Ukrainian Innovation Bank - Ukrinbank (IAS) -3.72 -137.04% 10.05 12.99% 8.89 n.a. 
Ukrgazprombank 46.87 -65.77% 136.92 ".a. n.a. 
VABANK - All-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Bank 22.56 -32.23% 33.29 -8.78% 36.50 80.66% 20.20 
West-Ukrainian Commercial Bank (UAS) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Average 25.23 -32.31% 37.27 105.31% 18.15 14.21% 15.89 
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Equity I Total Assets 1995 -1998 
Bank Name 1998 change 1997 change 1996 change 1995 
Bank Depozylowo-Kredytowy (Ukraina) Ltd in Lutsk-Deposit 
Credit Bank (Ukraine) Ltd in Lutsk 94.86 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Transbank 43.80 -4.53% 45.87 n.a. n.a. 
AGIO Bank (UAS) 37.97 -13.92% 44.10 n.a. n.a. 
Ukrgazprombank 31.91 -44.78% 57.79 n.a. n.a. 
Prominvestbank of Ukraine-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Commercial 
IndustriaHnvestment Bank 31.45 -5.15% 33.16 262.26% 9.15 23.99% 7.38 
First Ukrainian International Bank 31.27 82.74% 17.11 -39.71% 28.38 34.92% 21.03 
Percombank 27.00 4.41% 25.86 201.05% 8.59 -31.29% 12.50 
Credit Dnepr Joint Stock Bank 25.16 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Pivdenniy Joint-Stock Bank 23.46 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
East-Ukrainian Stock Exchange Bank Grant - Grant Bank 22.53 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
VABANK - All-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Bank 18.41 -26.30% 24.98 -6.59% 26.74 59.09% 16.81 
Joint Stock Bank Etalon 18.30 5.22% 17.39 163.02% 6.61 n.3. 
Bank Kyiv - Joint Stock Commercial Bank Kiev 17.63 43.48% 12.29 n.a. n.a. 
West-Ukrainian Commercial Bank (UAS) 15.95 -39.24% 26.24 n.a. n.a. 
Pravex Bank 14.98 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Republican Commercial Bank for Social Development -
Ukrostsbank 13.36 105.67% 6.49 n.a. n.a. 
Credit Lyonnais Ukraine 12.59 12.19% 11.22 69.89% 6.60 n.a. 
State Export-Import Bank of Ukraine - Ukreximbank 11.38 -9.72% 12.60 53.38% 8.22 99.10% 4.13 
Aval Bank 7.29 26.68% 5.76 n.a. n.a. 
Privatbank Commercial Bank 6.49 -5.17% 6.85 8.25% 6.32 -21.55% 8.06 
Bank Ukraina 5.80 -21.14% 7.36 28.97% 5.70 -367.37% -2.13 
Oschadny Bank Ukrainy 3.57 -51.98% 7.44 -45.52% 13.66 n.a. 
Ukrainian Innovation Bank - Ukrinbank (IAS) -3.87 -142.34% 9.13 11.81% 8.17 n.a. 
Average 22.23 7.67% 20.65 77.24% 11.65 20.31% 9.68 
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Loan Loss Reserve I Gross Loans 1995 - 1998 
Bank Name (alpha order) 199B change 1997 change 1996 change 1995 
AGIO Bank (UAS) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Aval Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy (Ukraina) Ltd in Lutsk-Oeposit 
eredil Bank (Ukraine) Lld in Lulsk 0.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bank Kylv - Joint Stock Commercial Bank Kiev 5.26 -63.02% 14.23 n.a. n.a. 
Bank Ukraina 21.56 -31.85% 31.64 -15.84% 37.60 0.26% 37.50 
Credit Dnepr Joint Stock Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Credit lyonnais Ukraine n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
East-Ukrainian Stock Exchange Bank Grant - Grant Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
First Ukrainian International Bank 16.30 78.30% 9.14 17.82% 7.76 19.79% 6.48 
Joint Stock Bank Etalon n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Oschadny Bank Ukrainy n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Percombank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Pivdenniy Joint-Stock Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Pravex Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Privatbank Commercial Bank 15.64 50.31% 10.41 32.40% 7.86 19.64% 6.57 
Prominvestbank of Ukraine-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Commercial 
Industrial-Investment Bank n.a. n.a. 26.82 n.a. 
Republican Commercial Bank for Social Development -
Ukrostsbank 12.59 -21.84% 16.11 n.a. n.a. 
State Export-Import Bank of Ukraine - Ukreximbank 17.85 -6.22% 19.03 -43.73% 33.83 0.52% 33.65 
Transbank 15.00 -1.92% 15.29 n.a. n.a. 
Ukrainian Innovation Bank - Ukrinbank (IAS) 45.12 105.99% 21.90 n.a. n.a. 
Ukrgazprombank 8.11 -59.46% 20.00 n.a. n.a. 
VABANK - All-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Wesl-Ukrainian Commercial Bank (UAS) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Average 17.49 -0.21 % 17_53 -23.03% 22_77 8.19% 21_05 
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Net Income USSOOO's 1995 ·1998 
Bank Name 1998% 1998 cum % 1998 change 1997 change 1996 change 1995 
Aval Bank 27.07% 27.07% 34603 88.1% 18400 n.a. n.a. 
Republican Commercial Bank for Social Developmenl • 20.61% 47.68% Ukrostsbank 26349 611.1% 3706 n.a. n.a. 
Prominvestbank of Ukraine·Ukrainian Joint·Stock Commercial 14.06% 61.74% Industrial-Investment Bank 17975 -47.5% 34206 275.7% 9105 ·94.1 % 153177 
Privatbank Commercial Bank 10.43% 72.17% 13333 6.3% 12546 68.0% 7469 n.a. 
Ukrgazprombank 5.30% 77.47% 6772 652.5% 900 n.a. n.a. 
VABANK - AII·Ukrainian Joint·Stock Bank 5.01% 82.48% 6402 48.6% 4303 -31.1% 6243 442.1% 1152 
Credit lyonnais Ukraine 3.56% 86.04% 4550 14.6% 3970 790.4% 446 n.a. 
Bank Ukraina 3.52% 89.56% 4500 -78.7% 21100 -55.8% 47700 87.6% 25400 
West-Ukrainian Commercial Bank (UAS) 3.19% 92.74% 4074 14.2% 3567 n.a. n.a. 
State Export-Import Bank of Ukraine' Ukreximbank 2.50% 95.25% 3200 -74.0% 12300 11.8% 11000 61.8% 6800 
Joint Stock Bank Etalon 1.99% 97.23% 2540 28.2% 1982 223.2% 613 n.a. 
Pravex Bank 1.90% 99.14% 2434 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bank Kyiv • Joint Stock Commercial Bank Kiev 1.88% 101.02% 2400 166.7% 900 n.a. n.a. 
AGIO Bank (UAS) 1.87% 102.89% 2393 -47.4% 4550 n.a, n.a, 
East-Ukrainian Stock Exchange Bank Grant - Grant Bank 1,74% 104.63% 2222 n.a. n,a. n.a. 
Percombank 1.61% 106.24% 2063 76.3% 1171 306.6% 288 -63.7% 793 
Transbank 1.57% 107.81% 2011 35,6% 1482 n.a. n,a. 
First Ukrainian International Bank 0.55% 108.36% 700 ·93.3% 10500 ·28.1% 14600 29,2% 11300 
Plvdenniy Joint·Stock Bank 0.41% 108.77% 529 n.a. n.a, n,a. 
Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy (Ukraina) lid in lutsk-Deposit Credit 0.04% 108.82% Bank (Ukraine) lid in Lutsk 53 n.a. n.a. n.a, 
Ukrainian Innovation Bank - Ukrinbank (IAS) -8,82% 100.00% -11270 56.5% -7200 ·267.2% 3846 n.a. 
Credit Dnepr Joint Stock Bank n.a. n,a. n.a. n.a. 
Oschadny Bank Ukrainy n.a. n,a, n,a. n.a, 
Total 127834 -0.4% 128383 26.7% 101311 -49.0% 198622 
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Equity US$OOO's 1995 - 1998 
Bank Name 1998% 1998 cum % 1998 change 1997 change 1996 change 1995 
Prominvestbank of Ukraine-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Commercial 29.14% 29.14% Industrial-Investment Bank 201050 -45.2% 366931 452.8% 66371 -32.3% 96105 
Republican Commercial Bank for Social Development - 9.39% 38.53% Ukrostsbank 64615 168.5% 24140 n.a. n.B. 
State Export-Import Bank of Ukraine - Ukreximbank 7.99% 46.52% 55100 6.2% 51900 22.7% 42300 47.4% 26700 
Aval Bank 7.78% 54.30% 53704 76.0% 30516 n.a. n.a. 
Bank Ukraina 6.99% 61.29% 46200 25.5% 38400 29.7% 29600 -271.1% -17300 
First Ukrainian International Bank 5.64% 67.13% 40300 -21.9% 51600 29.3% 39900 75.0% 22600 
Privatbank Commercial Bank 5.67% 72.80% 39153 49.1% 26257 83.3% 14326 23.4% 11612 
Oschadny Bank Ukrainy 5.24% 78.04% 36136 -20.8% 45652 -14.6% 53455 n.a. 
VABANK - All-Ukrainian Joint-Slock Bank 2.78% 6o.B2% 19206 25.2% 15343 37.6% 11148 480.8% 1919 
Pravex Bank 2.24% 83.06% 15450 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Credit Dnepr Joint Stock Bank 2.11% 85.17% 14550 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Credit Lyonnais Ukraine 1.98% 87.15% 13651 70.8% 7994 160.7% 3066 n.a. 
West-Ukrainian Commercial Bank (UAS) 1.95% 89.10% 13439 4.6% 12852 n.a. n.a. 
Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy (Ukraina) Ltd in Lutsk-Oeposit 1.84% 90.94% Credit Bank (Ukraine) Ltd in Lutsk 12696 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Percombank 1.71% 92.65% 11799 155.0% 4627 244.3% 1344 -15.3% 1566 
Ukrgazprombank 1.66% 94.31% 11461 143.7% 4711 n.a. n.a. 
AGIO Bank (UAS) 1.42% 95.73% 9604 -48.4% 18995 n.a. n.a. 
East-Ukrainian Stock Exchange Bank Grant - Grant Bank 1.13% 96.87% 7631 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Pivdenniy Joint-Stock Bank 1.05% 97.92% 7249 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bank Ky;v- Joint Stock Commercial Bank Kiev 1.01% 98.93% 7000 37.3% 5100 n.a. n.a. 
Transbank 0.92% 99.65% 6349 19.9% 5294 n.a. n.a. 
Joint Stock Bank Etalon 0.66% 100.51% 4550 34.0% 3397 280.9% 892 n.a. 
Ukrainian Innovation Bank - Ukrinbank (IAS) -0.51% 100.00% -3545 -139.9% 8894 2.9% 8640 n.a. 
Total 669973 -4.5% 722601 166.6% 271041 83.9% 147423 
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Customer & Short Term Funding US$OOO's 1995 ·199B 
Bank Name 1998% 1998 cum % 1998 change 1997 change 1996 change on 1995 year 
Bank Ukraina 19.49% 19.49% 759000 65.3% 459100 17.2% 391800 -21.9% 501500 
Privalbank Commercial Bank 14.04% 33.53% 546825 61.1% 339439 71.5% 197938 54.8% 127831 
Oschadny Bank Ukrainy 11.94% 45.47% 464921 89.8% 244983 80.3% 135893 n.a. 
Aval Bank 11.60% 57.07% 451746 30.2% 346940 n,a. n.a. 
Republican Commercial Bank for Social Development· Ukrostsbank 10.65% 67.72% 414868 23.6% 335786 n.a, n.a. 
Prominvestbank of Ukraine·Ukrainian Joint-Stock Commerdallndustrial-Investment Bank 10.54% 78.26% 410388 -41.3% 698995 13.6% 615086 -9.1% 676472 
State Export·lmport Bank of Ukraine - Ukreximbank 7.53% 85.80% 293400 26.3% 232300 -30.3% 333200 -46.5% 623000 
Credit lyonnais Ukraine 2.41% 88.20% 93704 49.4% 62732 46.2% 42921 n.a. 
Ukrainian Innovation Bank - Ukrinbank (IAS) 2.35% 90.55% 91481 4.4% 87612 -8.9% 96154 n.a. 
First Ukrainian International Bank 1.64% 92.19% 63800 -73.4% 239600 164.5% 90600 10.5% 82000 
VABANK - All-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Bank 1.18% 93.37% 45926 19.5% 38442 113.5% 18004 103.9% 8829 
Pravex Bank 1.10% 94.47% 42910 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
West-Ukrainian Commercial Bank (UAS) 0.93% 95.40% 36032 71.1% 21061 n.a. n.a. 
Credit Onepr Joint Stock Bank 0.73% 96.13% 28466 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
East·Ukrainian Stock Exchange Bank Grant - Grant Bank 0.68% 96.81% 26667 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bank Kyiv - Joint Stock Commercial Bank Kiev 0.68% 97.49% 26500 -24.9% 35300 n.a, n,a. 
Ukrgazprombank 0,61% 98,11% 23810 602.8% 3388 n.a. n.a. 
Pivdenniy Joint-Stock Bank 0.49% 98.59% 18995 n.a. n.a. n,a, 
Joint Stock Bank Etalon 0,44% 99.03% 17143 21,1% 14154 17.6% 12040 n.a. 
Percombank 0.40% 99.43% 15556 138.5% 6522 -11.7% 7390 55.3% 4758 
AGIO Bank (UAS) 0.37% 99.80% 14269 ·20.9% 18042 n.a. n,a, 
Transbank 0.20% 100.00% 7778 36.0% 5717 n.a. n,a. 
Bank Oepozytowo-Kredytowy (Ukraina) Ltd in Lutsk-Depos'lt Credit Bank (Ukraine) Ltd in Lutsk O.QO% 100.00% 53 n.a. n.a, n.a. 
Total 3894235 22.1% 3190113 64,4% 1941027 -4.1% 2024390 
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Total Assets US$OOO's 1995 -1998 
Bank Name 1998% 1998 cum % 1998 change 1997 change 1996 change 1995 
Oschadny Bank Ukrainy 17.64% 17.64% 1,011,164 64.8% 613,434 56.7% 391.363 n.a. 
Bank Ukraina 14.50% 32.13% 831.000 59.2% 522.100 0.6% 519.000 -36.0% 811.200 
Aval8ank 12.84% 44.98% 736.296 38.9% 529.978 n.a. n.a. 
Prominvestbank of Ukraine-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Commercial 11.15% 56.13% Industrial·lnvestment Bank 639.189 -42.2% 1.106.508 52.6% 725.084 -45.4% 1.328.846 
Privalbank Commercial Bank 10.52% 66.65% 603.069 57.2% 383.536 69.3% 226,533 57.3% 144.050 
Republican Commercial Bank for Social Development - 8.47% 75.11% Ukrostsbank 485.291 30.5% 371,731 n.a. n.a. 
Slate Export-Import Bank of Ukraine - Ukreximbank 8.45% 83.56% 484,400 17.6% 411.900 -20.0% 514.900 -26.0% 695.600 
First Ukrainian International Bank 2.25% 85.81% 128.900 -57.3% 301.600 114.5% 140,600 29.7% 108,400 
Credit Lyonnais Ukraine 1.89% 87.70% 108.466 52.2% 71.255 53.5% 46,433 n.a. 
VABANK - All-Ukrainian Joint-Stock Bank 1.82% 69.52% 104.339 69.9% 61.428 47.3% 41,695 265.1% 11,420 
Pravex Bank 1.80% 91.32% 103,122 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Ukrainian Innovation Bank - Ukrinbank (IAS) 1.60% 92.92% 91,693 -5.9% 97,406 -7.9% 105,797 n.a. 
West-Ukrainian Commerciat Bank (UAS) 1.47% 94.39% 84,286 72.1% 48.972 n.a. n.a. 
Credit Dnepr Joint Slock Bank 1.01% 95.40% 57.831 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Percombank 0.76% 96.16% 43.704 144.3% 17,893 14.4% 15,643 23.3% 12,688 
Bank Kyiv - Joint Stock Commercial Bank Kiev 0.69% 96.86% 39,700 -4.3% 41,500 n.a. n.a. 
Ukrgazprombank 0.63% 97.48% 35,979 341.3% 8,152 n.a. n.a. 
East-Ukrainian Stock Exchange Bank Grant - Grant Bank 0.61% 98.09% 34.762 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Pivdenniy Joint-Stock Bank 0.54% 98.63% 30,899 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
AGIO Bank (UAS) 0.45% 99.08% 25,824 -40.0% 43,069 n.a. n.a. 
Joint Stock Bank Elaton 0.43% 99.51% 24.868 27.3% 19.532 44.8% 13,489 n.a. 
Transbank 0.25% 99.77% 14,497 25.6% 11,540 n.a. n.a. 
Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy (Ukraina) Lld in Lutsk-Oeposit 0.23% 100.00% Credil Bank (Ukraine) Lld in Lutsk 13,386 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total 5,732,664 23.0% 4,661,535 70.1% 2,740,536 -11.9% 3,112,205 
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APPENDIX 3 POST-COMMUNIST STATES DATA 
3.1 Real GDPINMP in the ECE Transition Economies 1989-1999 
(Index I 989 ~ 100) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Eastern Europe 100 93.2 82.9 79.3 79 82.1 86.9 90.3 92.2 93.9 95.2 
Czech Republic 100 98.8 87.3 86.9 86.9 88.8 94.1 98.7 97.7 95.5 95.3 
Hungary 100 96.5 85 82.4 81.9 84.4 85.6 86.8 90.7 95.2 99.4 
Poland 100 88.4 82.2 84.4 87.6 92.1 98.6 104.5 111.7 117.1 121.8 
Baltic States 100 97.8 89.9 67.9 68.2 55.2 56.4 58.8 63.7 66.6 65.4 
ClS 100 96.8 90.9 78 70.4 60.3 56.9 55 55.6 53.9 55.5 
Belarus 100 98.1 96.9 87.6 81 70.8 63.4 65.2 72.6 78.7 81.4 
Russian Federation 100 97 92.2 78.8 71.9 62.8 60.2 58.2 58.7 55.8 57.6 
Ukraine 100 96.4 88 79.2 68 52.4 46 41.4 40.2 39.5 39.3 
Source: UNECE (2000) 
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3.2 Consumer Prices in the ECE Transition Economies 1990-1999 
Annual average % change over previous year 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Czech Republic 9.9 56.7 1l.1 20.8 10 9.1 8.9 8.4 10.6 2.1 
Hungary 28.9 35 23 22.6 19.1 28.5 23.6 18.4 14.2 10.1 
Poland 585.8 70.3 45.3 36.9 33.2 28.1 19.8 15.1 11.7 7.4 
Estonia 18 202 1078.2 89.6 47.9 28.9 23.1 11.1 10.6 3.5 
Latvia 10.9 172.2 951.2 109.1 35.7 25 17.7 8.5 4.7 2.4 
Lithuania 9.1 216.4 1020.5 410.1 72 39.5 24.7 8.8 5.1 0.8 
Baltic States 12.7 196.9 1016.6 202.9 5l.9 31.1 2l.8 9.5 6.8 2.2 
Belarus 4.7 94.1 971.2 1190.9 2219.6 709.3 52.7 63.9 73.2 293.7 
Russian Federation 160 1528.7 875 309 197.4 47.8 14.7 27.8 85.9 
Ukraine 5.4 94 1209.6 4734.9 891.2 376.7 80.2 15.9 10.6 22.7 
Source: UNECE (2000) 
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3.3 Current Account Balances in selected ECE transition economies 1990 - 1999 
(Million US$) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Eastern Europe -6188 -2146 -857 -7914 -2705 -1655 -13498 -15021 -17468 -20122 
Czech Republic -122 1708 -456 456 -787 -1369 -4292 -3211 -1336 -1058 
Hungary 127 267 324 -3455 -3911 -2480 -1678 -981 -2298 -2076 
Poland 716 -1359 -269 -2868 677 5310 -1371 -4312 -6858 -11628 
Baltic States 548 353 -59 -788 -1400 -1890 -2489 -1925 
CIS 10669 5699 4655 6497 -2233 -5273 
Belarus 131 -435 -444 -458 -516 -788 -862 -40 
Russian Federation 12792 8846 7736 12116 3924 2056 23000 
Ukraine -765 -1163 -1152 -1184 -1335 -1296 1022 
Source: UNECE (2000) 
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3.4 Capital Formation in the ECE Transition Economies 1990-1999 
(Index 1989 (or earliest year available thereafter = lOO) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Czech Republic 97.9 71.1 82.8 83 90.5 108.5 117.3 113.9 109.4 103.4 
Hungary 92.9 83.1 81 82.6 92.9 88.9 94.8 103.6 117.3 126.4 
Poland 75.2 71.9 73.6 75.7 82.6 96.2 115.2 140.1 160 171.1 
Estonia lOO 106.2 //0.5 123.1 144.6 156.3 
La/Via 100 36.1 25.7 21.6 21.8 23.7 29 35 38.9 
Lithuania lOO /10.9 133.2 147.8 
Baltic States 100.0 36.1 25.7 60.8 64.0 78.1 87.7 104.3 114.3 
Belarus 100 105.3 85.6 79.1 68.3 48.1 46.6 56.7 62.5 
Russian Fedn. 100 84.5 49.4 36.7 27.1 24.6 20.4 18.9 17.7 17.4 
Ukraine 100 81.6 69.3 48.2 28.4 19.7 15.2 15.5 16 
Source: UNECE (2000) 
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3.5 Background on Poland 
The exchange rate policy in Poland 
The combination of a massive one-off devaluation in 1989 with subsequent constant 
gradual devaluation and strong productivity gains has allowed a substantial 
undervaluation of the zloty to persist. This point has not only been argued through the 
calculation of purchasing power parities but has also been strongly supported by the 
Zloty's continuous push towards the lower boundary of its floating band. At the height 
of this push the zloty gained up to 6% versus central parity before the NBP decided to 
readjust the rate and actually revalue the zloty by the same amount in December 1995. 
In the event, the currency still pushed about 3% firmer than the central parity rate, so 
the NBP initiated a policy of consecutive intervention against its own currency. 
Interventions had a strong comeback during the summer of 1996 and since then a 
level of roughly 3% under parity has been accepted as the tolerance limit of the NBP. 
Overall, the zloty has lost roughly 12.4% versus the dollar and 6.3% versus the 
Deutschmark in the 12 months since the end of October 1995. Considering that the 
managed devaluation alone should account for roughly 12.7% in the same period, the 
zloty has performed rather well and, in the light of the continuing surge of both direct 
and indirect foreign investment, is expected to continue doing so. The extraordinary 
growth of the NBP's official currency reserves is a good illustration of this. 
Monetary policy in Poland 
In terms of both exchange rate and monetary policy, the NBP has proved and 
continuously defended its independence, as laid down in the Central Bank Act of 
1989. Notwithstanding increasingly vociferous demands for export-oriented 
devaluation in the face of nominal balance of trade problems, the Central Bank has 
stuck to its guns and thereby strongly assisted the growing community of foreign 
investors. In terms of interest rate and money supply management, the NBP relies 
mostly on the frequent issue of its own bills, the more ore less regular offer of repo 
transactions and recently the outright sale of Treasury bonds from its portfolio. 
Given the quantity of underperforming assets on the books of most domestic banks, 
the market has been rather risk-averse over the last years. The result has been a strong 
preference to invest liquid funds in government and NBP securities and the interbank 
deposit market rather than to lend to corporate customers. As a consequence, the 
domestic money market has tended towards a state of constant excess liquidity, with 
the exception of the dates at which minimum reserves are calculated. on those days, 
the whole market is regularly caught scrambling for funds which frequently drives the 
short end of the curve up to the Lombard level. So far, the NBP has been honing its 
skills in mopping up excess liquidity in an environment of high nominal interest rates, 
but it remains to be seen how it would cope with a prolonged scarcity of funds. 
Polish monetary market securities 
Polish money market securities presently comprise Treasury bills (issued by the 
Ministry of Finance), NBP bills (issued by the Central Bank), certificates of deposit 
(issued by the local banks) and commercial paper (issued by major corporate). The 
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lion's share of zloty-denominated market investment, Z24 billion ($8.5 billion) out of 
an overall market volume of roughly Z50 billion, is transacted in Treasury bills. This 
paper is auctioned regularly on Mondays and comes in volumes ranging from Z200 
million to Z I billion. However, this market is not restricted to banks and a lot of 
individual and institutional investors also participate via licensed securities brokers. 
As a complement to the Treasury bills, the NBP started to issue its own paper and has 
now reached at outstanding market volume of ZI2 billion (as of June 30,1996). The 
central bank sells this paper by way of irregular auctions of several hundred million 
zloty in five maturity terms (one, three, six, nine and 12 months). Interestingly 
enough, NBP bills have consistently offered a yield premium over T -bills during 
1995. This can be seen as part of the reason for reduced demand in the latter, although 
NBP bills, unlike T-bills, are not available to foreign or retail investors. 
Treasury bills have been a steady feature of the market for quite some time, far 
outweighing the long end of the zloty-denominated capital market (as would be 
expected in a situation of a strongly inverted yield curve). In contrast, the commercial 
paper market is a relatively young segment with present market volume of roughly 
Z900 million, dispersed among a dozen domestic issuers which tend to be either large 
domestic trading conglomerates (for instance Elektrim and Universal) or subsidiaries 
of foreign multinationals (such as Unilever and FIAT). Zloty-ep tends to pay only a 
marginal premium over Treasury bills and is therefore a financial method of growing 
interest ina market that has been rather cautious with new lending activity. There are, 
however, certain legal snags involved. 
The market is divided as to whether to treat ep as promissory notes or as proper 
securities. Under the first definition, issue of ep would fall under the law governing 
bills of exchange (1936) with all the entailing legal definitions as to transfer of 
ownership and legal recourse in case of default. Most running programmes have come 
explicitly under the first approach but the most prominent issue has been explicitly 
defined as a security under the second approach. For the moment, both viewpoints 
have their local champions and the ongoing debate has yet to produce a final legal 
ruling. In general, all fungible segments of the zloty money markets (NBP bills, T-
bills and commercial paper) suffer from a severe lack of secondary market liquidity, 
as investors tend to follow a buy-and-hold strategy. Recently, lending activity seems 
to be picking up dramatically, so that the emergence of a liquid Polish commercial 
paper market might be a foregone conclusion. Support for this view comes from the 
gradual decline of interest rates over the 1995, preparing the way for more of a 
longer-term capital markets approach to corporate finance. The recent return to zero 
or even negative real rates of interest after a one-year period of positive returns has 
already inspired considerable activity in this regard. 
Warsaw Stock Exchange 
The Warsaw Stock Exchange had a capitalisation of $8 billion. There were 83 stocks 
listed on it, and average daily turnover in 1996 was $35 million. Poland became an 
OEeD member in the summer of 1996. Per capita GDP equalled $3,000 according to 
current exchange rates, and $5,500 according to purchasing power parity. The rise in 
GDP was mainly due to improved productivity, as employment had remained 
practically unchanged. Trading securities in Poland could be conducted only through 
brokerages, and is concentrated mainly on the WSE. For investors on the WSE, 1996 
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was a good year. The WIG Index gained 86% during 1996. Factors that played the 
greatest role in attracting investors to the stock market in 1996 include the 
undervaluation of stocks in 1995, the favourable perception of Poland's economy, 
growth affirms' profits in real terms, and major agencies rating Poland at investment 
grade. (Euromoney, 1997). 
3.6 Background on Hungary 
The National Bank of HUllgary 
The National Bank of Hungary (NBH), Hungary's central bank, was established in 
1924. Its primary responsibility is to maintain the internal and external purchasing 
power of the Hungarian currency. The NBH is regulated by the Central Bank Act of 
1991 and since the start of the reforms has gradually been divested of its non-central-
bank functions and granted an increased level of independence. The most recent 
amendment to the Central Bank Act, in force since January I 1997, has brought the 
regulation of the NBH into line with the principles laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. 
This amendment prohibits the NBH from financing the central government. 
Determining the exchange rate system remains the responsibility of the government in 
agreement with the NBH. As a consequence of comprehensive stabilisation-cum-
reform policy programme launched in March 1995, the Hungarian economy has 
moved decisively towards macroeconomic balance and sustainable economic growth. 
The growth rate has reached 3% in 1997, led by exports and private investment. From 
$3.9 billion in 1994, the current account deficit had fallen to $1.7 billion in 1996. As a 
result, the net foreign debt of the country has declined by $6 billion since the end of 
1994. In order to build on these developments, monetary policy is focused on 
maintaining a stable environment for economic activity. 
The NBH's goal is a reduction of inflation to single digits within the next few years 
while maintaining the momentum for growth. One important objective of the 
monetary authorities is to break through the public's inertia towards inflationary 
expectations by improving the credibility of their policies. To this end, since March 
1995, a pre-announced crawling band exchange rate regime has been adopted to serve 
as a nominal anchor. The rate of crawl has been 1% per month since August 15 1997. 
The market rate can fluctuate within a +-2.25% band around the central rate, but with 
the exception of very short periods the exchange rate has remained at the lowest edge 
of the band since the introduction of the system. This is an indication of the 
confidence of the markets in the economic policy. Close co-ordination of fiscal and 
monetary policies is a precondition for the sustainability of such an exchange rate 
regime. The NBH has implemented a cautious interest rate policy, with the aim of 
guiding the market to establish a level of domestic interest rates which stimulates 
private savings and channels the funds to the most productive investments without 
encouraging an excessive inflow of speculative capital. The NBH intends to maintain 
this prudent policy in order to provide a stable and predictable environment conducive 
to sustained economic growth. 
The NBH has played a dominant role in establishing and developing the financial 
markets during the years of transition. These markets have achieved a remarkable 
level of development - allowing the NBH to use indirect instruments of monetary 
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control and providing policy-makers with information previously not available. The 
monetary policy instruments used by the NBH are very similar to those, which will be 
used by the future European central bank. The most important instruments are open-
market operations, repo and reverse REPO transactions, short-term swaps and reserve 
requirements. The NBH focuses on the short-term market, but the fight against 
inflation and the need to develop the longer-term market have made it necessary for 
the NBH to intervene here as well. Thus, reverse repo is available for one month and -
due to a lack of marketable government securities in its portfolio - the NBH issued its 
own one-year bond in June 1997. 
Equities 
The Budapest Stock Exchange has undergone a unique and spectacular 
transformation. Despite the bold, decisive reforms of the early 1990s, which 
contributed radically to increasing the efficiency and profitability of businesses, the 
macroeconomic imbalances prevented the success of these developments. Whilst net 
profits of companies listed on the stock exchange shot up by 166% between 1993 and 
1995, the stock index actually dropped by 12% (both measured in dollars), which 
clearly illustrates investors' uncertainty in this period. However, the Hungarian 
austerity package of 1995 turned the situation around, ushering in a new era of 
confidence in the economy and, by the end of 1996, the remarkable progress of 
Hungarian companies finally came to be recognised in their share price. 
Fundamental to the progress made has been the tight rein kept on inflation, 1997 end 
target was 18%, down from 19.8% from previous year. Moreover there has been the 
improvement in the current account balance, 5.7% in 1995 and 4% in 1997 as a 
percentage of GDP. Another notable achievement in monetary policy has been to 
maintain the stability of the crawling peg currency devaluation system since the 
spring of 1995. This has contributed considerably in reassuring investors that inflation 
will remain under control. The monthly crawling peg started at 1.9% in April 1995 
and it will be reduced to I % from August 1997. Interest rates are falling, especially 
long-term rates, a fact which also reflects market participants' confidence in the 
prevailing monetary policy. However large real wage increases and slowing savings 
make it likely that export- driven growth will spread to other sectors of the economy, 
which should result in increasing consumption towards the end of the year. This in 
itself will obviously stimulate economic activity further, giving a boost to the banking 
sector in particular. It should be noted however that mainly because of the relative 
immaturity of the long-term savings sector, e.g. pension funds, insurance and 
investment funds, the availability of long-term resources is still limited. 
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The development of BSE's trading section 
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3.7 BACKGROUND ON THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
Budget deficit 
In 1995 the current account deficit widened considerably. In 1995, the deficit was 
fully financed by foreign capital inflows. In 1996, the overall balance of payments for 
the first half registered a deficit exceeding $730m. For the first time since the creation 
of the Czech Republic in 1993, net capital inflows have not been sufficient to cover 
the current account deficit. The main factor in the deficit on the current account is the 
development of the trade balance. Fast economic growth and an even faster growth of 
investment caused an increase in demand for imports which resulted in a surging trade 
deficit. The gap between imports and exports significantly widened in 1996. Imports 
continue to grow more rapidly than exports, but the structure of imports is changing. 
Imports of machinery and investment goods form the most dynamic part. 
These goods are used for the restructuring of the industry and infrastructure and are 
therefore an imperative component in the structure of imports. The composition of 
exports is shifting as well, and higher value-added goods like machines, transport 
equipment and consumer goods are growing faster than the average of all sectors. In 
1995, roughly two-thirds of the trade deficit was compensated for by income from 
services and transfers, while in the first half of 1996, services and transfers accounted 
for less than half the trade deficit. High inflows of foreign capital covered the 
remaining current account deficit in 1995, and, on top of that, permitted a further 
increase in foreign exchange reserves. Capital totalling $8.4bn flowed into the country 
in 1995, $2.5bn of which as foreign direct investment (FDl), $3bn as lending by 
foreign banks to Czech companies or joint ventures in the Czech Republic, and 
$1.6bn in portfolio investment and speculative inflows. Capital inflows so far in 1996 
were not sufficient to cover the remaining deficit. 
The Czech capital market 
As the Czech capital market is still developing, it might seem to be difficult for 
foreign investors to become familiar with possible opportunities and changes which 
could occur. Considering these facts, the following overview could be helpful to 
potential investors. There are two securities markets in the Czech Republic. The major 
market for foreign investors is the Prague stock exchange (PS E). In addition, there is 
the RM-System, an order-based electronic exchange for equities, established 
primarily for Czech retail investors. 
The Prague stock exchange 
The PSE began trading in June 1993 under the conditions stipulated by the 1991 
Stock Exchange Act. At December 3 I 1996 the Prague stock exchange had 109 
members, 33 of which were bank-type members and 77 broker-type companies. 
About a fourth of the membership has foreign capital participation. Trading sessions 
are held daily. In 1996, the organisation of the PSE was changed by dividing into 
three markets - main, secondary and free. In the main market there are only Czech 
«blue chips». The committee can either admit or reject any application for admission 
subjectively, provided that the following basic requirement has been met: for 
securities· issued by corporations and banks, public offering amounts to Kr200 
million, and for investment funds and unit trust funds, the minimum registered capital 
amounts to Kr500 million. In 1996 a new liquidity criterion was imposed to the main 
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market at the amount of Kr300,000. Once issuers have been admitted to the main 
market, they are obliged to provide the stock exchange, on a quarterly basis, with 
economic information and on a continuous basis and with any information, which 
may have an impact on the price of their securities. The secondary market has the 
same characteristics as the main market. The basic requirement to be met for the 
admission to the secondary market is a public offering amount set at KrIOO million 
for securities issued by corporations and banks, and minimum registered capital of 
Kr500 million for investment funds and unit trust funds. The issuers are obliged to 
provide the stock exchange, semi-annually, with economic information as well as 
with any information, which may have an impact on the price of their securities. The 
free market can be filled by some of the existing exchange members. 
Sellillg of IlIvesticlli Postovlli Ballka (IPB) alld Komerclli Ballka 
In July 1997 the Czech Republic's finance minister persuaded to sell the state 36% 
stake in Investicni a Postovni Banka (IPB), the third largest bank in Czech Republic, 
to Nomura, a Japanese securities house. And on August 20th, the government had 
accepted his arguments in favor of unloading the state's holdings in Komercni, Ceska 
Sporitelna and CSOB, three other big banks with cabinet assets of almost 1 trillion 
koruna ($29 billion). 
At the turn of 1997 35% of all Czech bank loans were non-performing, the highest 
ratio in Central Europe. The Central Bank's futile attempt to defend the koruna in May 
caused interest rates to skyrocket and the interbank money market to dry up, and set 
off a run on deposits. In July the freak floods did an estimated 30 billion koruna-worth 
of damage to Czech industry, with obvious consequences for big lenders. 
All of this had fuelled rumors in Prague that the Czechs, like the neighboring Poles 
and Hungarians before them, will have to spend billions propping up wobbly banks. 
The cabinet's decision to sell IPB to Nomura was driven by fears that the bank had 
only about two months to function before running into deep trouble. 
With the banks in such a mass partners had to be lured with public money to write off 
their bad debts. (Economist, 1997b). 
In November 1997 the new government of Czech Republic had put the privatization 
project of Komercni Banka in doubt. Komercni, with assets of 456 billion koruna 
($12.7 bn.) is Central Europe's biggest bank. As of September provisions did not 
cover a fifth of Komercni's loan-book, or 55 billion koruna - a sum greater than the 
bank's equity. 
Komercni's disclosure came on top of new troubles at two other banks that were on 
privatization block: Investicni a Postovni Banka (IPB), the third biggest bank and 
Agrobanka. These cases made a mockery of claims from Czech bankers that their loan 
books were not as bad as they looked. Their reports showed that nearly a third of all 
outstanding loans were delinquent, and that provisions and collateral were woefully 
insufficient. (Economist, 1998a). 
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3.7 BACKGROUND ON THE BALTICS 
Regulations of commercial bank's activity in Latvia 
Since Latvia's independence, its government has been trying to achieve macro-
economic stability and establish structure reforms in order to make an effective 
market economical system along with stable banking system. 
Fortune financial policy displayed constant improving of economy, national currency 
stabilization, constant and lasting decreasing of inflation rate, and as a result -
development of banking system in Latvia. 
Macro-economic characteristics and Russian crisis influence on Latvian economy: 
1997 and first half of 1998 showed impetuous growing of economy, fast development 
of financial sector, increasing of export value and positive balance of government 
budget. 
Because of outside factors influence in 1998, the speed of economical grow had 
slowed down. Russian crisis, ruble devaluation, problems of Russian banking system 
had decreased the growing speed of production and export in Latvia. 
Thus, export reducing speed was higher than import decreasing and as a result - 11% 
trade deficit of GDP. 
GDP increasing rate slowed down as well. In 1998 GDP increased by 3.6%, compared 
to 1997 - 8.6%. It is predicted that this rate in 1999 will be 3%. 
Inflation rate continued to decrease and was 4.7% in 1998 (in 1997 - 8.4%). Inflation 
in March 1999 compared to March 1998 was 2.8%. 
Deficit of current balance yet had been covered by foreign investments. 
Main resources of investment attractions are direct foreign investments and long-term 
loans. Private capital was being supported by legislative base, which provided 
favorable conditions for foreign investors. 
In 1998 the volume of direct investments inflow was 4.3% of GDP. Foreign currency 
reserves of Bank of Latvia increased in 1998. Clear reserves (gold and foreign 
currency) were covering total value of cash resources and commercial banks' balances 
on corresponding accounts of Bank of Latvia for over 100%. 
Since banking system remains stable, complete and developing, it IS expected to 
further inflow oflong-term foreign capital. 
Banking system condition 
Banking system was one of the first sectors effected by Russian crisis influence, since 
government bonds of CIS countries were ones of the most profitable short-term 
instruments. 
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As a result of the crisis 2 banks ("Kapital-bank" and "Viktorija") which had 1.2% of 
whole banking system turnover, had lost their licenses for banking activity and one 
bank was under control of Administrator, nominated by court. 
According to auditing of year balance reports, losses of banking sector for 1998 were 
53 million lats, and 9 banks alone ended up with 4 million profit. Losses came from 
revaluation of Russian Government bonds. These savings' volume was 95% of total 
Russian securities purchasing and 20 - 60% of investments' volume into securities, 
denominated in US dollars. Ukrainian Government bonds were also reevaluated so the 
balance values did not exceed 70-80% of nominal value. 
Despite all losses of 1998, the capital adequacy ratio, calculated according to Basely 
Committee requirements (minimum volume, established by "Law of credit 
institutions" is 10%), still remained on high level at the beginning of 1999 and 
exceeded 17%. 
In 1998 banks' deposit volume decreased by 3.5%. Deposit structure had also 
changed. Decreasing of non-resident's deposits( -15.7%) was partly compensated with 
increasing of resident's deposits (+5.7%). Per cent value of non-residents' deposits, 
sensitive to changes of market conditions had decreased from 43% to 38%. 
Tendencies of deposit account volume increasing were seen. In 1998 the volume of 
saving deposits had decreased from 83% to 75%. 
Investment risk growing in Russia pushed all the banks to reducing of these 
investment portfolios and direct free resources to domestic crediting. 
During 1998 the value of gross credits had increased by 46% and came to volume of 
43% of all assets structure of banking sector (in 1997 - corresponding 74.4% and 
30%). 
Growing of credits' value was attended by changing of its structure. Per cent value of 
middle- and long-term credits (over I year) had increased from 45% to 65% of total 
credit value. 
Credit portfolio quality remained at the same high level. Proportion of standard, non-
problem credits had increased from 90% in 1997 to 93% in 1998, the proportion of 
not functioned loans had decreased. 
Increasing of market interest rates and slight increasing of credit risk by the end of 
1998 came to increasing of weighted average rates for long-term (up to 15.3%) and 
short-term credits (up to 16.4%) in national currency and by 11.1 % and 13.9% 
(corresponding) in currencies ofOESR countries. 
Russian crisis effected liquidity of Latvian financial market and increased profitability 
of Latvian Government bonds. At the end of 1998 coupon rate on these bands came to 
11.8% (for I year) and 14.9% - for bonds, maturing in 2 years. But already in 
February-March of 1999 the process of interest rates decreasing was seen. 
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Moving of priorities and concentration on domestic market - the main positive result 
of Russian crisis. Loss of high profitable and - high risky investment possibilities on 
eastern market made banks to pay more attention to financing of domestic economy. 
Growing of domestic market competition, from another side, makes premises for 
banking sector consolidation, which contained very big amount of commercial banks 
compared to market volume. 
Present time there are 25 banks functioning in Latvia, 7 savings banks, Riga's branch 
of Societe Generale (France) and branch of Dresden Bank (Germany). 10 biggest 
banks control 80% of whole market. 
Increasing of bank's capital volume requirement also push banks to consolidation. 
According to "The law of credit institutions" by 31112/99 bank's equity capital and 
capital base must not be under 5 million EUR (approximately 3.5 million Lates). 
Increasing of foreign capital share in Latvian banks (by 67.7%) was a very typical 
thing in the end of 1998. Foreign capital contain 24 banks, 15 of them have over 50% 
offoreign capital. 
Government share of banking sector is still decreasing (now-4.9%) and now 
government controls only one middle-sized bank that deals mainly with mortgage 
loans. 
The following factors are considered as main in banking system developing in the 
future: 
• Attraction of foreign and domestic investments; 
• Restoring and development of banking profitability; 
• Combining of small banks and purchasing of small banks by bigger ones. 
It is expected that the process of combining will speed up in 1999. Thus, at least II 
small and middle sized banks will have to make an attempt of accumulating their 
capital base volumes. 
(Armande Hteinberge, Chief of Banks Credit Institutions' Department control in 
LaMa). 
Upgrading of banking control in Latvia 
Latvia Bank has been working on improving of banking activity regulation 
requirements and their accordance with EU banking directives and main principles of 
effective banking control, that were established by Basely committee of banking 
control. 
In May 1998 there was a Decree of Latvia approved (actually functioning from 
1/1/99), it introduced changes to the Law of Latvia "About credit institutions". It 
underlined certain commercial banks that require consolidate control. Special 
legislative-based procedures were elaborated in order to Bank of Latvia cooperation 
with Latvia's and foreign control institutions. 
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Some changes those stipulate procedures of banks' liquidation and regulate 
procedures of insolvency, restructuring, bankruptcy and point out Administrator's 
actions in these situations were introduced in legislative base. Bank of Latvia is 
authorized to control liquidation's procedure. There is legislative base elaborated for 
establishing the Register of credit institution's debtors. 
06/0111998 "The Law of criminal resources' legalization preventing" was enrolled. It's 
main role - preventing from using Latvian financial system to legalize criminal 
resources. In situations, stipulated by this law, credit, financial institutions, their 
authorities are to provide by demand of control department any information about 
"unusual" financial dealings. 
The law "About citizen's deposits security" (acting since 01101198) stipulates that 
commercial banks are to make transfers to special Insurance Fund of non-corporate 
clients' deposits, which stipulates receiving by depositors, in case of bank's 
bankruptcy, the sum of deposit, but not more than 500 lates. The Law also stipulates 
that this value will be constantly growing and will reach 13,000 lates by 2008. 
"The Mortgage Bond Law" (introduced from 01129/98) that regulates procedure of 
public mortgage bonds' emission is a good aid in mortgage crediting development. 
In order to control investment limitation in non-financial sector and investments in 
movable property and real estate the Latvian bank had elaborated the "Procedures of 
big enterprises' proper reporting". 
In the beginning of 1999 the Bank of Latvia had introduced "Procedures of 
consolidate banking control" that describes proper group report providing procedures, 
and reports of meeting the requirements (capital adequacy, investment and risky 
activity) by a group. 
In order to supply creditors, owners and others with financial reports and activity 
results the Latvian Bank had elaborated "Procedures of consolidate year reports of 
commercial banks" (active since 05/01/99). 
The "Procedures of credit institutions' licensing" was enrolled from 0110111999. Since 
introducing of consolidate banking control procedures there were corrected and added 
requirements of credit institutions' owner and founders identification, and providing 
the information about financial condition of owners and their valuable equity 
investments. 
The "Procedures of trust operations" was elaborated and enacted on 01/01/1999. This 
document establishes minimum requirements in order to avoid conflict between 
investor and bank, and also regulations according accounting principles of trust 
operations using devising to investor's money resources and securities. 
Aggravation of economic situation in B-group countries and Russian crisis pushed the 
Bank of Latvia to change risk ratio of B-countries government bonds, denominated in 
national currencies. From now these assets will be fixed with 50% of risk ratio for 
calculating the value of Capital (earlier - 0%). 
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In order to eliminate risks of B - group countries' dealings there are limits established 
by Latvia Bank. The total value of dealings with B-countries, including their 
governments, must not exceed 2 times the bank's capital. 
Since IMF mission of technical aid by Latvia's request had evaluated procedures of 
banking activity regulation and control, it approved the positive result in this sphere 
and pointed out that out of 25 procedures, elaborated by Basely Committee, only 3 
need to be enacted (2 of them - about regulation of market risks, one - about 
regulation and monitoring of countries' risks). Elaboration of new regulation 
documents is already started. 
(by Voyevoda Ludmila Methodology Department head manager of La/via Bank). 
Collapse of Lithuanian banks 
In 1995 nine small banks were closed and two larger ones needed government 
support. In December 1995 the Central Bank was obliged to suspend operations at the 
two largest banks, Innovation Bank and Litimpeks, after it was discovered that they 
were being run into the ground as a result of mismanagement, bad lending decisions, 
and fraud. The banks, privately owned and about to merge, were key players in the 
country's banking system, holding between them about 23% of all bank deposits. 
Perhaps learning from Latvia's experience in May 1995, when the Riga government 
reacted hesitantly to the collapse of Banka Baltija, the biggest Latvian bank, dragging 
down about 40% of the sector, the Lithuanian authorities' response was swift and 
decisive. 
Innovation Bank and Litimpeks Bank were both closed. The 52,000 individual 
depositors were compensated up to a government-imposed limit of Litas 1,000 ($250) 
each. The two banks were nationalised and then merged with Vakaru Bank, which 
closed in 1995, into a new institution, called United Bank. After recapitalisation, 
United Bank was reopen for business. The speed of response, which is being financed 
by the issue of five-year interest-bearing government bonds, earned praise from the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which lent their technical help, and 
from many other observes. There were no runs on other banks: any threat of systemic 
risk did not materialise. But the affair cost Kazys Ratkevicius, governor of the central 
bank, his job after Lithuanian president Algirdas Brazauskas demanded his 
resignation for exercising "insufficient control" over the commercial banking system. 
The position of Adolfas Slezevicius had been severely undermined by reports that he 
had withdrawn personal deposits worth the equivalent of $30,000 from a fixed-term 
account just two days before Innovation Bank was suspended. Lithuania's general 
prosecutor also wanted to know why the prime minister had been receiving a specially 
high interest rate on his deposit account. Interior minister Romasis Vaitekunas also 
resigned. He had enjoyed the same rate of interest - and in December in a widely 
publicised move had despatched armed anti-terrorist police to besiege Innovation 
Bank's headquarters and arrest its chairman, Arturas Balkevicius. It was this action in 
particular that threatened to start a run on deposits. Mindaugas Stankevicius, another 
former communist, is now prime minister. He faces fresh parliamentary elections in 
October. He is a former technocrat, like Reinoldijus Sarkinas, who has moved from 
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being finance minister to the central bank governorship. Together, the two men have 
to deal with the wider economic effects of the InnovationlLitimpeks failures. 
Banking crises in Baltic States 
Banking crises, mainly involving private banks, surfaced in Estonia in 1992, in Latvia 
in early 1995, and in Lithuania in late 1995. There were many causes, some of which 
- systemic in nature - had been eating away at the fabric of these banking systems for 
some time. For example, falling inflation was a prominent factor in all three countries, 
which helped make borrower distress more apparent while simultaneously squeezing 
banks' intermediation margins. But in each country, different events led to the crises 
and different triggers brought them to a head. 
In Estonia, the proximate causes of the crisis were the freezing of the assets in 
Moscow of two important Estonian banks, and the drying up of cheap credit from the 
central bank, which had previously provided Estonian banks with significant profits 
and liquidity. In Latvia, the waning of highly profitable trade-financing opportunities, 
as well as general mismanagement and corruption, set the stage for the crisis. It was 
set off by the central bank's requirement that banks be properly audited using 
International Audit Standards (IAS) principles. Bank profits in Lithuania were also 
compressed owing to the contraction of lucrative trade financing opportunities. 
Moreover, the government pressed some banks (both state-owned and private) to lend 
to the public sector to finance quasi-fiscal expenditures. Leaks of the result of on-site 
examinations of two banks, showing deep insolvency, led to runs on those banks and 
liquidity shortages. 
Broadly, there were four systemic factors underlying the crises: poor regulation and 
supervIsIOn, poor accounting and excessive taxation, an inadequate legal 
infrastructure for lending, and pervasive corruption coupled with weak banking skills 
and mismanagement. The stresses and strains of the economic transition and 
stabilization also exposed the bank's underlying weaknesses. To some extent these 
factors are interrelated. For instance, the transition environment has unleashed profit-
seeking in many segments of society, including the banking industry. While much of 
it reflected enterpreneurialest, some of it spilled over into illegal and unscrupulous 
activities. In some instances, weaknesses in bank regulation and supervision created 
incentives for corruption. 
Bank regulation and supervision 
A contributory factor to all three banking crises was the failure of banking regulation 
and supervision. In Latvia, deficiencies in the regulatory framework itself contributed 
to the crises, although there were also some weaknesses in implementation. In 
Lithuania, the culprit was deficiencies in the implementation of regulations - even 
when bank supervisors had identified problems, they were not acted upon. In Estonia, 
the legal, regulatory, and supervisory framework was very underdeveloped at the time 
of the crisis, but it was less important as a cause of crisis than in the other two 
countries. The licensing and regulatory regimes in the three countries did not 
discourage the entry of foreign banks. The Lithuanian central bank may nonetheless 
have discouraged foreign banks from entering the local market. Arguably in Estonia -
where nine foreign banks have entered the market in recent years - banking discipline 
may have been more quickly embedded in the system. 
217 
Accounting and taxation 
Initially, banks in the Baltics continued to use the old Soviet Gosbank chart of 
accounts. In Estonia, banks were required to use IAS for the first time in 1995, 
although the better banks had begun doing so in 1993. In Latvia, the introduction of 
IAS accounting and reporting requirements began in 1994 - indeed, this requirement 
precipitated the country's banking crisis. In Lithuania, a number of changes in bank 
accounting and prudential rules have been introduced gradually over the last three 
years, but full IAS compliance was expected only as of January I, 1997. The initial 
absence of and unfamiliarity with IAS - based accounting systems in the Baltics has 
made it more difficult for bank managers, shareholders, and supervisors alike to 
accurately gauge the solvency and liquidity problems building up in individual banks. 
Even though most of the Baltic banks were quick to have international auditors 
undertake IAS audits, these audits have not served as the early warning signals they 
were intended to be and often have been ignored altogether by the supervisors. 
Legal infrastructure 
In the Baltic countries, there was initially no legal framework to support bank lending. 
There was no appropriate legislation relating to bankruptcy and collateral; well -
functioning property title, mortgage and pledge registers; or, more generally, a market 
for land and real estate. Another important omission was corporate governance and 
accountability provisions for banks that specified the duties and responsibilities of 
bank shareholders, supervisory board members, and managers. This allowed 
shareholders to manipulate supervisory board members and, through them, managers 
to serve their own interests. All of this factors - most of which have been or are being 
addressed - contributed to the riskiness of bank lending. 
Corruption and weak management 
In all three Baltic countries, some banks were created as captive funding mechanisms 
by groups of enterprises and individuals - raising funds directly from the public was 
cheaper than borrowing from banks. In other cases, owners and managers tried to 
make quick profits by making high-risk loans or by assuming large open foreign 
exchange positions. This behavior was encouraged by the knowledge that the 
supervisory authority was inexperienced and understaffed, and lacked effective 
enforcement powers. The lack of skills among bank managers and other staff also led 
to poor decision making. 
3.8 BACKGROUND ON BELARUS 
Regulation of bankillg activity ill Belarus 
Banking Control Department is to regulate and determine the following risks of 
banking system: 
• Insolvency risk (capital adequacy ratio, minimum volume -10%). 
• Liquidity risk (current liquidity ratio - 100%). 
• Credit risk (limit of loan to one customer-fewer than 20% of Capital). 
• Investment risk (total investment value must not exceed 15% of commercial 
bank's equity capital). 
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• Currency risk (open currency position limit - under 10% of Equity capital in hard 
currencies and S% - in soft currencies). 
• In-banking control and audit regulate operation risk). 
Special regulation norms were introduced in order to more effective controlling over 
banking stability. 
The NB supports policy of foreign investment attractions III commercial banks' 
equity. 
Since the world financial crisis, the banking system of Belaruss has been trying to 
prevent its negative influence by improving of some documents (solvency, liquidity, 
big risk norms). Since all residents' and non-residents' (not members of Organization 
of Economical Union and Development) loan repayment risk ratio had risen from SO 
to 70%. For government loans (not members of OEUD) the risk ratio is 20% (up from 
0%). 
The National Bank of Belaruss and Russian Central Bank had set an agreement about 
cooperation in commercial banks' control activity. 
By 01/0111999 only 6.S% of foreign currency assets was accumulated in Russian 
banks. 3S.2% of assets accumulated in Russian banks were set on corresponding 
accounts of Belarussian banks, 17% - Russian government bonds. 
Banking control procedures show the tendency of banking system operation quality 
improving. This is mainly due to requirement standards increasing level of National 
Bank of Belarus to banks' staff - necessary testing of banks' staff by National Bank's 
authorities. 
The future development of banking activity control and regulation system will be 
carried out in accordance to Basely Committee Principles. The I 999-year will change 
the system of capital evaluation. The new method stipulates dividing bank's capital 
into two levels; this will show more realistic picture of banks' capital, its stability and 
structure. 
(Grigorovich V. N., Head of Banking Control Department of the National Bank of 
Belarussian Republic). 
Export-import structure in Belarus 
The main reasons of import volume increasing in Belarus: 
• establishing by Russia in August 1996 the Value Added Tax for goods, 
imported from Ukraine, Belarussian government approved V AT only in 
February 1997. This caused big attraction for goods importing to Belaruss and 
further re-export to Russia, especially tires (their supply in 1996 had increased 
by 2.3 times compared to 1995), liquid pumps (import increased by 2 times), 
busses (6.8 times), black metals (1.8 times), and products from them (1.4 
times); 
• increasing of wheat (by $S2.7 million or 32 times) and barley supply (by $19 
million or IS times) from Ukraine for alcohol production and its export to 
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Russia. This caused growing of ethyl alcohol export to Russia in 1996 by $79 
million, and strong spirits - by $24 million; 
• re-orientation of supply for Belarussian industry from Russia to Ukraine. For 
example, the value of flat metal sheets and nickel steel import had decreased 
in 1996 from Russia by 49%, increased by 23% from Ukraine; black metal 
pipes import from Russia had reduced by 5%, from Ukraine - increased by 
27%; cable production - by 10.7% (decreased from Russia) and by 2.7 times -
increased from Ukraine. 
Because of V A T differences between Russia and Belarus the system "import from 
Ukraine - re-export to Russia" kept on working in 1997 for some groups of goods. 
For example, busses import had increased by 2.2 times or $15.8 million (VAT rate in 
Russia was 20% for this group, in Belarus - zero). The same situation was with liquid 
pumps (import increasing from Ukraine was 46%). 
Procedures enrolled in 1998 (import limitations for Belarussian rubles and barter 
operations) leaded to rationalization of import from Ukraine and as a result - it's 
decreasing by 24%. 
Export 
The following groups of goods predominate over Belarussian export structure to 
Ukraine: vehicles; textile, and textile products; machinery, equipment and 
mechanisms; plastic, rubber, caoutchouc and products - corresponding to 22, 17.2, 
16.5 and 10.5%. Most of these goods show decreasing of supply volumes. During last 
period heavy trucks supply was reduced hy 20.8% ($7 million), agricultural 
machinery - $98.9 million, bearings - $7.1 million, refrigerators and freezers - $1.8 
million and other goods. Potash fertilizers' supply had sharply decreased: from 112 
tons in 1996 down to 20 tons in last year. 
Most of the government institutions in present financial situation avoid shrinking of 
export value. For example, "Belnyeftekhim" corporation increased its export by $21.3 
million and decreased import by $14 million. "Bellegprom" had increased shoe export 
value by 3.7 times, clothes - 2.3 times, textile clothes - 1.5 times. Quite a big amount 
of light industry products is being imported to Ukraine by "chelnocks" (private 
persons, dealing at the market). Legalization of chelnocks' trading by developing of 
chelnocks' supply net would greatly increase export and improve trading balance of 
Belarus. 
Export-import regulation procedures of export support, enrolled by the Government 
helped to slow down export decreasing in 1998 in Belarus. 
3.9 BACKGROUND ON RUSSIA 
Production Decline in Russia 
Between 1989 and 1995 real GDP fell by an average of 8% per annum. In 1996 
Russia's economic performance recorded a further, albeit smaller drop of 6% in real 
terms in comparison to the preceding years. The first indications that the situation is 
beginning to stabilise are therefore evident. Estimates are already suggesting 
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moderate growth in real ODP of 1 % for 1997, and this could certainly increase in the 
coming years. However, in overall real economic terms, the indicators still showed 
declines in 1996. Recently industrial production fell by 5% in real terms. Measured 
against the pre-reform level of 1989, Russian industrial production declined to just 
under 50%. The greatest weakness of Russian industry is its obsolete machinery arid 
equipment, which is main reason for inefficiency and low labour productivity, above 
all in the predominant capital-intensive heavy industrial sectors. A boost in 
investment activity would therefore be needed to initiate the necessary structural 
changes within industry. In addition, the expansion of infrastructure, which in some 
regions of Russia is still completely inadequate, presents the economy with the 
problem of enormous capital investment requirements. In fact, the Russian economy 
is characterised by a drastic lack of investment. Gross fixed capital formation has 
fallen continuously since the beginning of the reforms and today it is just one quarter 
of pre-reform level. This indicator recently again fell by 15% in 1996, and together 
with the recent downturns in private consumption it was the main reason for the 
continued deterioration of the economic situation in Russia. 
Foreign trade in Russia 
The integration of the Russian economy into the international division of labour is 
making progress. In the meantime, more than one half of Russia's foreign trade is 
conducted with the West. The majority of this is with the EU. In June 1994 a 
partnership and co-operation agreement was signed with the EU. In 1996 the balance 
of trade surplus achieved was about $35 billion and the balance on current account ran 
a surplus of $10 billion. Raw materials still represent a large proportion of goods 
which are exported. In fact minerals and fuels amount to more than 40% of all 
Russian exports, and metals and metal products approximately 20%. Since the 
beginning of the reforms, Russian industry has increasingly developed in the direction 
of raw and basic materials. Declines in production were less than average in view of 
the steady and strong domestic demand and the realisation of the great potential for 
exports. Furthermore, the focus for foreign investment is the raw materials sector. 
Tax regulation of banking activity in Russia 
Banking activity - is an area of extreme attention of tax administrations of Russian 
Federation. This problem is conditioned by difficult financial condition of many 
commercial banks and as a result - not transferring of tax payments to budget. 
It is known that banking sector keeps around 20 billion of tax payments. Figures, 
showing that this situation is getting more complicated, push administrative 
department to tighten control functions: 
• applying to Central Bank of Russia about canceling of some licenses for 
banking activity; 
• unquestionable withdrawals of arrested amounts of taxes from corresponding 
accounts; 
• keeping a record of insolvent banks in order to reaching this information by 
other tax administration departments. 
There were some changes introduced in tax legislation in order to increase banks' 
effectiveness. These changes are mostly related to evaluation of profit tax for 1998. 
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They stipulate not including the profit from devaluating of ruble in August 1998. 
Besides, in 1999, there was a decrease in profit tax rate from 43 down to 38%. It is 
also planned to cancel profit tax for investment credits (for over I year) that are 
directed to production development. 
It is also being suggested to provide commercial banks that deal with treasure stones 
and metals, with tax privileges, in order to support gold-mining industry. 
It has been slightly developing and installing the policy of declining the tax pressure 
on commercial bank. 
Another topic of conversation - is about taxation of commercial bank's income by 
road tax, housing fund and cultural objects fund (total rate - 4%). It is quite clear that 
collection of these taxes without considering each bank's specification brings to 
serious critics by commercial banks. But any suggestions about these taxes' canceling 
has not been implemented yet in 1999. 
According to tax codex of Russian Federation, commercial banks are to pay II taxes. 
From total value of tax income in Russia in 1998 banks' portion was 4.2%. Most of it 
was profit tax (from 8 billion of income there was 5.9 billion - from profit tax or 
79%). 
Delay in tax payments by commercial banks show bad financial conditions of many 
commercial banks. In 1998 this sum raised by 2 times and came up to 1.9 billion 
rubles or 10% from total income to budget from banking system. 
Russian Government together with Russian Bank are implementing complex 
procedures of banking system restructuring and orientation of its functioning in real 
sector of economy. Ministry of Russian Federation Tax Collection plans to take part 
in this process and has some constructive suggestions about banks' restructuring 
process: 
• to accept proposal of restructuring a certain commercial bank only after 
Ministry of Russian Federation Tax Collection approves program of banks tax 
debts restructuring; 
• to tight requirements to problem banks (license canceling, bankruptcy) that 
will have restructuring expenses exceeding potential profit from restructuring; 
• to support strong banks that have wide net of branches and experience of 
dealing on real sector of economy and ability to increase the tax volume 
transfers after restructuring; 
• determining the "bearing" banks in regions is to be carried out after approval 
by Ministry of Russian Federation Tax Collection the fact of in-time 
transferring of commercial bank's and clients' taxes. 
Actions of Russian government during crisis in 1998 
• on August 17th, 1998 the Russian government had announced moratorium for 
90 days for Russian residents repayments on loans, received from not-
residents for the term over 180 days, on securities-pledged loans; 
• non-residents were prohibited to invest in Russian assets in rubles for over I 
year of maturity; 
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• the announcement "About conditions of some securities repayment" was 
issued about technical re-registering GDKO-OFP; 
• stopping of GDKO-OFP sales with maturity dates under 31 st of December, 
1999; 
• in order to finance the budget deficit and provide the liquid market for 
commercial banks, the Russian government started issuing short-term bonds 1-
2 weeks maturity; 
• there were mobile groups of enterprises' functioning control in order to meet 
the tax legislation requirements; 
• the Russian Central Bank had established a new currency exchange range - 6-
9.5 RURlUSD; 
• the Russian Central Bank had established limited spread on foreign currency 
cash operation - 15%; 
• Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange started operations on USD dealing for 
DM; 
• in order to overcome the crisis of payment system it was suggested to establish 
the block of 12 Russian banks (Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank, Uneximbank, 
"Menatep", Most-Bank, Incombank, Bank of Moscow, "SBS-Agro", Russian 
Credit). Conditions of these banks' loans supply by Central Bank - GDKO and 
controlled stake of shares pledge; 
• the Central Bank announced about providing 100% guarantee on non-
corporate clients' accounts in credit institutions, opened before 08.01.1998. 
Model of two axes 
Since financial crisis in August 1998 hardly damaged financial and production sector, 
previous organised structure of economic cash flows, the total volume of savings and 
investments greatly decreased. In this situation the only source of "blood" for 
economy is credit emission of Russian Central Bank. The required volume of this 
emission for Russia in 1999 is 190-210 billion of rubles. According to allowed 
controlled inflation (under 45%) the limit of emission is 45-55 billion. 
Creation of certain institutional structures and procedures of emission cash flow 
direction will keep this amount under control and prevent transferring of emission 
money to exchange market. It can possibly increase the value of production that has 
potential on domestic and international markets. 
Institutional structures should be elaborated by three directions: 
I. Creation of big production-financial corporations with government 
participation. These corporations should take the main responsibility for tax 
payments', debt repayments between enterprises, credits repayments, 
maintenance of required liquidity ratio. 
2. Restructuring of big important banks and forming of stable institutional 
connections with big industrial corporations. Establishing of these banks under 
governmental control will produce control over centralised resources' 
spending. The big banks could also work as clearing centres. 
3. Forming of wide net of base regional banks that will be under control of 
Central Bank by equity participation. This will save the stability of financial 
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environment and payment system of the country, to attract resources and make 
channels for regional programs financing. 
So, it is suggested to build up two structural axes: centre - federal and corporate 
banks-big industrial corporations and centre - regional banks-regions. 
Lost billions 
Loss of value, profitability, stability, total bankruptcy, appearance of new leaders in 
banking sector were caused by terrifying financial crisis. 
Total gross assets of commercial banks in Russia reduced since crisis from 88.7 to 
43.2 $billion. Stability loss was even worse: total capital reduced by 5 times in foreign 
currency evaluation - from 16.1 to 3.1 billion dollars (except Sherbank). Most of the 
banks have completely lost their capital, including the biggest banks: five banks from 
top-thirty rating by net assets came down to negative value of their capital 
(Inkombank, Imperial, Tokobank, Promstroibank, Mezhkombank). 
It total banking system ratio capital/assets declined in half a year from 19.4 down to 
8.5%. Russian Central Bank cancelled the requirement of capital adequacy till July I, 
but it seems that this date will be prolonged, since there are no sources for capital 
accumulation. 
Problems. that caused profit and capital loss seem to be hardly related to government 
bonds default and had occurred long before August 17th. During first half of 1998 
most of the banks started to show losses. Total net losses for 1st halfof 1998 were 3.3 
billion rubles, while profit was only 1.5 billion rubles. Despite the fact that profit of 
commercial banks increased in 4th quarter, total losses of banking system in Russia 
were 42.3 billion rupbles, while profit was 5.1 billion rubles. 
Idea that main problem of the crisis was GKO default is far from reality. Portion of 
government bonds in net-assets structure by middle of 1998 was only 13% or 70 
billion rubles (except Sherbank and Vnesheconombank). By August most of the banks 
reduced this amount to 7-10% and 2/3 of commercial bank had under 2% of GKO 
from net-assets structure. 
Of course, bonds' default had a negative influence on liquidity aggravation and lead to 
total withdrawals of deposits from banking sector. 
But one of the central problems, caused the crisis were currency risks of commercial 
banks. Ruble interest rate was much higher than in foreign currency. Here banks had 
huge interest margin: attracting liabilities in foreign currency and selling these 
resources in rubles. In 1997 commercial banks were seriously increasing their foreign 
currency liabilities. Since open currency position rate came to 30% (limit of Russian 
central Bank for this ratio), devaluation by 300% caused total evaporation of banks 
capitals. 
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7Ji) " . 
Since beginning of 1999 banks were trying to improve their currency situation and 
started to accumulate assets in currency, this produced serious pressure on exchange 
market and ruble. 
On August I st foreign liabilities exceeded assets by 4.2 billion dollars. Statistics show 
that the main problem of banking crisis in developing countries is usually caused by 
big value of foreign liabilities compared to gold-currency reserves of the country and 
total assets of banking system. 
Banks with big portion of non-corporate deposits were seriously effected: Inkombank, 
SBS-AGRO, Promstroibank, Russian credit, Most-bank, Menatep, Agrobank and 
others (32.1 billion of rubles, or 22.5%). 
Enterprises were seriously influenced not just by frozen deposits, but by bad 
transferring procedures. 
Talking about small and average banks it is important to say that after last year's 
results small banks have a right to exist. Banks with total gross assets volume under 
500 million rubles recommended themselves the best way. Group of banks with assets 
under 100 million is the only one that could make profit in 1998 and increase the 
capital value. These banks did not have currency risk and barely worked with 
government bonds. 
The worst situation was in big banks with assets value over 2 billion rubles. In first 
half of 1998 losses in this group exceeded profit. After past year results this group's 
losses came to 23 billion rubles out of total 42 billion. These banks took the most 
responsibility for currency risk, coming from non-residents. They also had bad quality 
of credit portfolio and the most serious deposits' withdraw. 
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Debts of Russian banks to foreign creditors 
Bank Debt on July 1998 ($thousand) 
SBSAGRO I 196706 
Inkombank 820405 
"Russian credit" 648098 
UNEXIMBANK 557896 
Gazprombank 549982 
Vneshtorgbank 474089 
MENATEP 419073 
Imperial 388 858 
Sherbank 355 875 
NRB 276682 
(Oleg Solntsev (Scientific staff of Macroeconomic Analyses and Forecast Centre)}. 
Commercial banks' improving scenario 
There are 441 problem Russian banks out of 1473 by CB figures. 44 of them need 
urgent aid of the Government, according to their significance in financial sector. 
These banks keep over 50% of banking assets and 45% of citizens' deposits. 
The Central Bank of Russia has proposed 2 ways of new banking structure: 
I. Stipulates involvement of big Moscow multy-profile banks into sphere of 
government interests. This means providing of structural credit policy of the 
government through wide net of banks' branches throughout the country. This 
will require 25 billion rubles for restructuring of big banks and 15 billion for 
maintenance of current liquidity. Since CORA has only 10 billion there is 2nd 
way, more realistic. 
2. Restructuring of base regional banks (by Central Banks figures - 79 banks in 
67 regions). Re-capitalisation of regional banks will require about 5 billion 
RUR and maintenance of liquidity - 6 billion. 
Approving of 2nd way of restructuring, regional banks will be paid more attention 
because they will be in charge of distributing the Government money. 
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Financial situation of commercial bank except Sherbank 
In the beginning of May, 1999 the Bank of Russia has chosen 85 base banks in 
60 regions to be restored and reconstructed by Government funds in order to 
create the new core of post-crisis period. 
This process will not be easy because of resources lack, unpredictable 
tendencies and other problems. 
These procedures are going to decentralise banking capital and transfer 
necessary resources to regions, where they are urgently needed. Of course, this 
plan is not common for modem market system, but forced transfer of capital 
and strict control over its spending by Government's words seems to be the 
only way in today's situation. 
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Moscow IlIterballk Stock Exchallge 
Stages of MISE development 
"Swimming" ruble 
exchange rate (1992 -
July 1996) 
• Ruble devaluation 
and serious ruble 
deflections; 
• Predomination of 
operations on stock 
exchange; 
• Concentration of 
foreign operations in 
Moscow. Fonning of 
regional stock 
exchanges 
• MISE organises 
trades on $US, DEN, 
Ukrainian 
karbovanyets; 
• MISE initiates 
creation of Russian 
Regional stock 
exchanges in order 
to co-ordinate 
development of 
regional currency 
exchanges. 
Controlled exchange rate 
(July 1996 - September 
1998) 
• Stabilisation of ruble 
exchange rate. It plays a 
role of economy "anchor"; 
• decreasing of stock 
exchange and increasing 
of interbank currency 
exchange function; 
• Adding of Russia to VIII 
clause of IMF Charter 
• Increasing of MISE 
competitiveness by cost 
decreasing, improving of 
clearing and guarantee 
systems; 
• Increasing the amount of 
traded currencies; 
• SEL T system operation; 
Organising currency 
trading .. 
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Uncontrolled exchange 
rate (since September 
1998) 
• Shifting to 
"swimming" exchange 
rate after 200% 
devaluation of ruble; 
• Decreasing of 
interbank currency 
exchange and 
increasing of stock 
exchange function; 
• Elimination of 
speculative 
possibilities of 
commercial banks on 
interbank currency 
exchange; 
• Stopping of trades, 
using fixing procedure; 
• Transferring all foreign 
currencies operations 
to SELT system; 
• Establishing special 
trade session on $US 
trade for Russian 
rubles in SEL T; 
• Starting EURO trades 
for rubles and $US. 
Changing of main parameters of Russian stock exchange 
Official rate RURJUSD Obligatory selling of Pre-Iodgement on Establishing of 
establishing foreign currency MISE trades rate deflection 
• Since 07/03/92 it is 
established to 
obligatory selling of 
export earnings on 
stock exchange 
• Since 06/28/93 this 
ratio came up to 50%; 
• From 06/27/95 
exporters can choose 
either to sell 50% of 
foreign currency on 
stock exchange or 
interbank currency 
exchange; 
• 10/06/98 - selling of 
50% on stock 
exchange; 
• 01111199 - obligatory 
selling offoreign 
currency came up to 
75%. 
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limits for USD 
on MISE 
.01/01195 -
established 
allowed rate 
deflection 
(10%) 
compared to 
last trade with 
fixing 
establishing; 
• 11126/97 - this 
rate is 5%; 
• Since 10/06/98 
the limit of 
rate deflection 
on special 
trade session 
compared to 
average 
volume of last 
trade -15%. 
Trade volumes on MISE (1992-1998) 
Financial instrument 1992 1993 1994 
Exchange market bin. RUR 739.0 13475.0 54152.3 
total 
Stock market total bin. RUR 283.2 27266.0 
GKOIOFZ bin. RUR 283.2 27263.8 
Corporate bonds bin. RUR 
OBR bin. RUR 
Russian enterprises bin. RUR 
bonds 
Agro-bonds bin. RUR 
Shares bin. RUR 
REPO-market bin. RUR 
Short-tenn bin. RUR 
instruments market 
1995 
114169.0 
269120.2 
269120.2 
1996 
28423.4 
1082692 
1081374 
1318.4 
609.470 
1997 
37076.0 
1276374.25 
1265901.16 
1492.24 
404.98 
2942.42 
5733.44 
137374.10 
35766.48 
1998· 
373.740 
699.451 
699.451 
1.407 
6.823 
0.311 
0.637 
15.142 
122730 
48.97 
MISE tumober total bin. USD 2.788 13.265 36.706 83.131 223.029 253.832 127.315 
trln. RUR 0.739 13.759 813421 383.29 1111.73 1486.57 1.244 
* In 1998 the trade volume was figured in denominator (1000 non-denominated rubles 
= 1 denominated ruble) 
Since August 17, 1998 the following changes were made on stock exchange: 
I. Stopping of trades with fixing procedure since 08.27.98 and carrying out 
trades within SEL T system; 
2. Increasing of operation volumes and growing of stock exchange importance 
by: 
• Obligatory selling of foreign currency on stock exchange; 
• Decreasing of trade volume on interbank currency exchange. Stock 
exchange trade volume portion increased to 90%. 
3. Banking operations on servicing the international trade clients dominate on 
stock exchange; 
4. Establishing of special trade session; 
5. Increasing of stock exchange participants (over 500 banks); 
6. Starting from September, 1997 it has been calculated first and only stock index 
of MISE. 
Risk management system on MISE 
Dependability and reliability of technical processes on trading-clearance system 
proved itself during destabilised period. Current system of risk management is carried 
out by following mechanisms: 
• strict criteria's and requirements to financial condition of market participants; 
• 100% depositing on special trading session operation; 
• establishing of USD trading limits on net-operations according to participants' 
resources; 
• establishing of limits on rate deflection compared to previous trades; 
• following the principle "delivery against payment" during trade; 
• supplying corresponding banks by MISE with overdrafts; 
• forming of insurance reserve in RUR by MISE; 
• forming by participants of MISE the operation risk and other losses reserve on 
USD trades - $20.000. 
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APPENDIX 4 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS, METHODOLOGY AND EXAMPLES 
4.1 OUTLINE QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. How does the current political situation influence the development of your bank? 
2. How does the result or"the election impact on the business activity of your bank? 
(Banking system in generally?) 
3. How will the liberalisation of the tax law influence the development your 
business: 
effect on the bank? 
effect on the customers? 
4. How would you like to see the changes in the tax laws? 
for your bank? 
for customers? 
5. Is the current economical situation better or worse for the activities of your bank? 
6. What is the result of reforming the financial and statistical reporting pursuant to 
the IAS requirements on the business activity of your bank? 
7. How do you attract customers to deposit funds in your bank? 
8. Are you interested in providing new types of products for customers? 
9. Which new products have you provided this year? 
10. Are you going to increase the number of branches? 
11. Is it your strategy to expand abroad? 
12. How will you expand your strategy abroad: 
by opening branches? 
by developing correspondent banking? 
13. What is the measure of success for developing of your bank? 
(capital growth, assets growth, lending growth, profit growth, improving liquidity, 
market share etc.) 
14. How do you see the competition of your bank with the entry of western and 
Russian banks into the Ukrainian economy? Why? 
15. What can you tell me about the recruitment and retention of your staff? 
16. How often do your employees leave the bank? 
17. From a technical point of view what are the main problems for integration of 
Ukrainian banks into the international financial market? 
18. What is the most important aspect of the development of your bank? 
19. What are the key products of your bank? Why? 
Translated/ram the original Ukrainian by Alexsey Bagriy 
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4.2 STUDY RESPONDENTS 
Bank Location Size Name of respondent Title of respondent 
I Ukrsotsbank Kiev Large Vasily Slutch First Deputy Chairman of the Board 
2 Commercial bank "Finance & Credit" Kiev Large Kirill Schevchenko Deputy Chairman of the Board 
3 Commercial bank "Metalurg" Zaporozye Small Sergei Kosa Head of Treasury, member of the Board 
4 Commercial bank "Aviatek" Kiev Small Igor Petrov Deputy Chairman of the Board 
5 Commercial bank "RZB - Ukraine" Kiev Small Sergei Manocha Head of Treasury, member of the Board 
6 Commercial bank "Industrial" Zaporozye Small Artem Laznya Head of Treasury, member of the Board 
7 Commercial bank "Privatbank" Dnepropetrovsk Large Vladimir Yaczenko Deputy Chairman of the Board 
8 Commercial bank "Forum" Kiev Small Victor Polovinko Head of Treasury, member of the Board 
9 Commercial bank "Mriya" Kiev Small Vladimir Sich Deputy Chairman of the Board 
10 Commercial bank uDonbirzbank" Donetsk Small Van Lesin Head of Treasurv, Member of the Board 
11 Commercial bank "Legbank" Kiev Small Edvard Popov Deputy Chairman of the Board 
12 Commercial bank "Syntez" Kiev Small Victor Boyko Member of the Board 
13 Commercial bank "Ukraina" Kiev Large Dmitry Gridzuk Chairman of the Board 
14 Commercial bank" A vtozazbank" Zaporozye Small Seraei Kravchuk Member of the Board 
15 Commercial bank "Societe Generate Ukraina" Kiev Small Valeria Gontareva Deputy Chairman of the Board 
16 Commercial bank "Credi Lione Ukraina" Kiev LarKe John Petit Deputy Chairman of the Board 
17 Commercial bank "Demark" Chernigov Small Victor Roslyi Deputy Chairman of the Board 
18 Commercial bank "Aval" Kiev Large Arseniy Yaczeniuk Member of the Board 
19 Commercial bank "lnterbank " Kiev Small Artyr Krikli y Chairman of the Board 
20 Commercial bank "Kiev - Privat" Kiev Small Alia Gromova Member of the Board 
21 Commercial bank "Clearing House" Kiev Small Valentina Yur Member of the Board 
22 Commercial bank "Chemigovbank" Chernigov Small Tatyana Petrenko Member of the Board 
23 State commercial bank "State saving bank of Ukraine" Kiev Large Victor Gribkov Chairman of the Board 
24 Commercial bank "United commercial bank" Simferopol Small Roman Nefred Chairman of the Board 
25 "Megabank" Charkov Small Svetlana Gura Member of the Board 
26 Commercial bank "West-Ukrainian commercial bank" Lvov Large Yuriy Malyk Chief dealer 
27 Commercial bank "Ukrinbank " Kiev Large Vladimir Lavrenchuk Chairman of the Board 
28 Commercial bank "Vabank" Kiev Large Vitaliy Serov Deputy Chairman of the Board 
29 Commercial bank "Morskoi transportnyi bank" Odessa Large Aleksey Kosmyn Chairman of the Board 
30 Commercial bank "En ergo bank" Kiev Small Evgeniy Patrushev Chairman of the Board 
31 Commercial bank "Prominvestbank" Kiev Large Dmitriy Goncharuk Member of the Board 
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4.3 IMPACT OF IAS ON BANK UKRAINA 
Bank Ukraina Balance Sheet as at I January 1996 
(Drawn up under the Law of Ukraine "On Auditing Activity") 
USSOOO's (converted at krb 179,400 = USS1) 
litem 
ASSETS 
Cash and NBU accounts 
Debtors 
Loan credits 
Interbank credits 
Securities purchased 
Physical assets 
Other assets 
US$OOO's 
123,756 
50,232 
311,506 
26,685 
20,738 
80,260 
373,268 
0/0 I IAS re-statement* I 
12.5% 
5% 
31.5% 
3% 
2% 
8% 
38% 
TOTAL ASSETS LI _____ -'-__ -L _____ ---' 986,445 1 100.00% I 811,200 I 
LIABILITIES 
Capital and Reserves 
Profit for the year 
Other funds 
Current accounts 
Customer deposits 
Correspondent bank balances 
Loans 
Creditors 
Other liabilities 
28,169 
123,518 
107,972 
294,883 
73,827 
11,503 
7,632 
43,836 
295,105 
986,445 1 
* IAS re-statement based on Bankscope data (Appendix 2) 
3% 
12.5% 
11% 
30% 
7.5% 
1% 
0.5% 
4.5% 
30% 
100.00% I 
Source: Bank Ukraina Accounts 1995 (Bank Ukraina, 1996) 
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25,400 
Bank Ukraina Profit & Loss account for year ended 1 January 1996 
(Drawn up under the Law of Ukraine "On Auditing Activity") 
USSOOO's (converted at krb 179,400 = USS1) 
I Item 
INCOME 
Interest 
Commissions 
Income from Securities and other 
sources 
US$OOO's 
207,230 
50,546 
8,094 
% 
78% 
19% 
3% 
TOTAL INCOME 265,870 100.00% 
EXPENDITURE 
Interest Paid 
Commissions Paid 
Securities and other expenses 
Staff and overhead costs 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
NET PROFIT 
Profits from other operations 
Compensation 
PROFIT FROM ALL OPERATIONS 
53,723 
1,514 
21,496 
67,455 
144,188 
121,682 
1,153 
683 
123,518 
* IAS re-statement based on Bankscope data (Appendix 2) 
37% 
1% 
15% 
47% 
100.00% 
I IAS re-statement* 
25,400 
Source: Bank Ukraina Accounts 1995 (Bank Ukraina, 1996) 
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